Here are observations about the 2024 presidential election you are unlikely to see elsewhere:
* The popular vote total was much closer than commonly understood: As of November 30, 2024, former President Trump had won 49.7% to Vice President Harris’s 48.3%. However, Trump’s victory in the Electoral College was sweeping (312-226). You might call this the “magnifying phenomenon.”
* Another example of the magnifying phenomenon was the election of 1960. Democrat John F. Kennedy allegedly won the popular vote over Republican Richard Nixon by 49.72% – 49.55%, but won the Electoral College 303-219. (I say Kennedy “allegedly” won the popular vote because there was verified evidence of vote tampering by Democratic operatives in Texas and Illinois, but because no official investigation was ever held, it is uncertain whether it was sufficient to swing the popular vote and electoral vote results.)
* The 2024 election continues another pattern: Candidates with national appeal usually win Electoral College majorities over those with sectional appeal—even when the candidate with national appeal falls slightly short of winning a plurality. See, for example, the county-by-county results in the 2016 election here. Hillary Clinton narrowly won the popular vote, but notice how isolated her bastions of support were.
* Except for the dubious popular vote totals in the election of 1876, the Electoral College has never denied victory to a candidate who won an absolute majority.
* In 2024, Trump fell short of an absolute majority by about 0.3% However, cynics might point out that Harris won a disproportionate percentage of votes reported late.
* The narrow presidential popular vote totals were reflected in the House of Representatives, where the GOP will hold a razor-thin majority of only 6 or 7 seats.
* In 2024, both major party nominees had (as the politicos say) major “negatives.” Trump, rightly or wrongly, is deeply unpopular with much of the electorate. Harris was an unelected—and untalented—nominee with a history of taking extreme positions. She was foisted by “kingmakers” on the Democratic Party almost literally at the last moment.
* So we can infer that the Democrats could have beaten Trump with a more competent and moderate candidate such as Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro.
* On the other hand, from polls showing deep dissatisfaction with the direction of the country, we also can infer that a Republican nominee such as Florida Governor Ron DeSantis—who could have mobilized both the party base and its establishment—could have won a landslide. This, in turn, would have raised the GOP majority in the House, and perhaps in the Senate.
* One might ask, “If Americans are so unhappy with the direction of the country, then why did Harris come so close in the popular vote?” One reason, as mentioned, was Trump’s relative unpopularity. But another is a “ballast effect” that works in favor of Democrats. The “ballast” is the large share of the electorate dependent on government for jobs and benefits. It guarantees that as the pendulum swings back and forth, it will swing more to the left than to the right. You can see this in the composition of the Senate over the last 60 years or so: Democrats have had effective 60-seat supermajority several times, but Republican majorities have never exceeded 55. That’s one reason I’ve argued that when the Senate is under Republican control, the Senate should reconsider the filibuster.
* Despite talk about how the Trump administration will take on the “Deep State,” there is unlikely to be much lasting change. First, during Trump’s first administration he showed himself more radical in his talk than in his actions. Second, lasting change requires permanent termination or defunding of major federal spending programs. This will be unlikely in a Congress where the GOP majorities are so thin that a few “RINO” Republicans can join with Democrats to preserve targeted agencies such as the U.S. Department of Education.
* To be sure, the Trump administration is likely to promote deregulation, a secure border, a more sensible foreign policy, and extensive personnel changes. The problem is that, unlike program abolition, all of these can be reversed easily the next time the Left controls the federal government.
* The bottom line for those who favor freedom and constitutional government is (1) the new administration is likely to be better than the last but (2) lasting change is unlikely without structural change. And structural change requires constitutional amendments proposed by a convention of the states.
