Is the Constitution’s Convention for Proposing Amendments a “Mystery”?
Overlooked Evidence in the Narrative of Uncertainty

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Abstract

Since the 1960s, leading academics and other commentators have claimed that the composition and protocols of the Constitution’s “Convention for proposing Amendments” are unknown and/or subject to congressional control. Today that claim is on a collision course with growing public sentiment for an amendments convention to address federal dysfunction.

This Article reviews the academic literature, and then collects the evidence showing that the narrative of uncertainty is substantially false. This evidence includes Founding-era records and later confirmatory material, including a widely-overlooked Supreme Court decision.

The evidence is essentially uncontradicted. It informs us that an amendments convention is what the Founders called a “convention of the states”—a gathering whose composition and protocols were universally understood when the Constitution was adopted. This Article describes the composition and protocols and explains how the “convention of states” model fits within the Constitution’s structure.

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The author acknowledges editing assistance from Rita Dunaway, J.D. 2001, Washington and Lee University, and a member of the Virginia bar.
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Charles L. Black, Jr., The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster, 72 YALE L. J. 957 (1963) [Black]


RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKSMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY NATIONAL CONVENTION (1988) [CAPLAN]

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One would not expect academic writings to create a constitutional crisis. Yet it could happen.

As detailed below, dissatisfaction with Congress has created powerful popular sentiment for calling a convention for proposing amendments under Article V of the Constitution. Yet the prevailing narrative among influential academics has been that the composition and protocols of such a convention are unknowable—and that those items must be dictated by the very Congress whose misdeeds advocates of a convention seek to remedy. Thus arises a clash between popular dissatisfaction and high-level assurances of irremediability.

Fortunately, a constitutional crisis is unnecessary. This is because, despite the high credentials of those who have promoted the narrative of uncertainty, copious


Emily M. Padgett, Constitutional Conventions: Power to the People or Pandora’s Box, 65 LOY. L. REV. 195 (2019) [Padgett]


Laurence H. Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting Congress to Call a Constitutional Convention to Propose a Balanced Budget Amendment, 10 PAC. L. J. 627 (1979) [Tribe]

JOHN R. VILE, CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: THE ALTERNATE ARTICLE V MECHANISM FOR PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (2016) [VILE].
historical evidence contradicts it. In fact, the record makes convention composition and protocols reasonably clear, and Congress has no power to alter them.

The Constitution’s amendment procedure is outlined in Article V. It requires that any amendment be ratified by the legislatures or conventions in three fourths of the states (now 38 of 50). Before ratification, however, an amendment must be proposed. Article V outlines two methods of proposal: by a two thirds vote of each chamber of Congress or by a “Convention for proposing Amendments.” The Constitution’s framers and ratifiers adopted the convention device as a way for the American people obtain amendments Congress refused to propose—particularly if Congress was contributing to the ills requiring amendment.3

The proposal portion of Article V states that “The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments . . . .” 4 Thus, the text tells us that (1) if two thirds of the state legislatures transmit to Congress resolutions

2U.S. CONST. art. V is as follows:

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

3Natelson, Conventions, supra note 1, at 621-22; LAW OF ARTICLE V, supra note 1, at 26-29 (quoting several Founders on how the convention method permits the people to amend the Constitution without the consent of federal legislators and officials).

4U.S. CONST. art. V.
(“applications”) favoring a convention, (2) Congress must “call” a convention, which then (3) decides whether to propose amendments, and, if it decides to do so, then drafts them. After that point, the procedure is the same as when Congress proposes an amendment.

To date, the convention method of proposal has not been used. However, there have been several major campaigns to trigger an amendments convention. Three of them—to adopt a bill of rights, for direct election of Senators, and to impose a two-term limit on the president—ended when Congress proposed the sought-for amendments.5

The years since the first three campaigns have witnessed movements for conventions to propose amendments requiring a balanced federal budget,6 overruling certain Supreme Court decisions,7 implementing campaign finance reform8 and term limits,9 and remedying alleged federal overreach.10 To date, none of these later campaigns has triggered a convention or persuaded Congress to respond with amendments of its own.

5 Id. amends. I – X (Bill of Rights), XVII (direct election of Senators), XXII (limiting the president to two terms).
7 For example, 33 states have adopted applications to reverse, in whole or in part, the Supreme Court’s state legislative apportionment decisions. See THE ARTICLE V LIBRARY, http://article5library.org/ (click on ‘Applications by Subject,” select “Apportionment” and answer “no” to “Allow rescissions,” “Include Plenary Applications” and “Limit time span”).
One reason is that since the 1960s,\textsuperscript{11} convention opponents have discouraged resort to the convention procedure by disseminated widely the claim that convention composition and protocols are unknown or potentially under congressional control. According to this narrative of uncertainty, we have no idea how participants in an amendments convention would be chosen, how they might be allocated, how voting rules would be formed or what they would look like, how officers would be selected, how the scope of the convention could be limited—or whether it can be limited at all.\textsuperscript{12}

In this Article I first examine the academic literature. Thereafter, I review pertinent historical records almost entirely overlooked in that literature. These include nineteenth century decisions by the United States Supreme Court and by the Supreme Court of Tennessee and other nineteenth century and early twentieth century documents. All of these characterize an amendments convention in much the same way. I then turn to the Founding-era record to ascertain what an amendments convention was in the views of those who framed and ratified the Constitution and what is composition and protocols were. That record fully aligns with nineteenth- and early twentieth-century views.

This material is of obvious historical interest, but it also is highly relevant legally, because courts construing Article V rely heavily on historical practices and

\textsuperscript{11}The nature and protocols of amendments conventions were well understood by lawyers, legislators, and other educated people until well into the twentieth century. \textit{Infra} Part III.

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Infra} Part I. Some writers have added that not even the courts can resolve these uncertainties because Article V issues are not justiciable. \textit{E.g.,} \textit{Bonfield, supra} note 1, at 980 (“Persuasive arguments favor the view that questions arising in the amending process are nonjusticiable”). However, this claim is without merit. The courts have never refused to adjudicate Article V cases on justiciability grounds. \textit{Law of Article V, supra} note 1, at 13-15 (listing numerous adjudicated Article V cases); Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (Justice Stevens) (finding Article V questions to be freely justiciable); Walter Dellinger, \textit{The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process}, 97 \textit{Harvard L. Rev.} 386, 387-88 (1983) (outlining the claim preparatory to rebutting it).
meanings. I conclude by showing how the framers model—the “convention of the states”—fits into the wider constitutional structure.

A note on terms: This Article makes frequent references to the framers and Founders. Constitutional writers often employ these words imprecisely, but in this Article the framers are the Constitution’s 55 drafters. The Founders consist of the framers plus the ratifiers—the 1648 delegates to the ratifying conventions in the original thirteen states. (Of course, some individuals, such as James Madison, were both framers and ratifiers.) Founding generation refers to the entire involved citizenry.

I. SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE: THE UNCERTAINTY NARRATIVE

A survey of modern academic treatment of amendments conventions should begin with a 1963 Yale Law Journal article penned by Yale Law School Professor Charles L. Black, Jr. In addressing a contemporaneous campaign for a convention, Black contended that convention composition and protocols were unknown and unknowable. “[N]either text nor history give any real help,” he wrote. “When and if the article V condition is met, Congress ‘shall call a Convention . . . ’ that is all we know.” Black added that if the state legislatures required Congress to call a convention, Congress should define the conclave’s composition and protocols.

As explained below, Black’s narrative of uncertainty was not based on a thorough review of the historical record. Further, his prescription for congressional oversight undercut the convention method’s primary justification: to enable the people to amend the Constitution without significant congressional influence.

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13Law of Article V, supra note 1, at 33.
14Black, supra note 1.
15Id. at 964.
16Id. at 959, 964.
17Infra Part V.
Nevertheless, at the time Black enjoyed enormous prestige and his narrative of uncertainty and congressional oversight set the stage for similar claims by scholars, lawyers, politicians, and political activists.

Writing later the same year, William Swindler, a Georgetown law professor, argued that the courts should declare the convention device as no longer operative—but that if they did not do so, Congress should determine the rules of convention composition and voting.\textsuperscript{18}

Senator Sam Ervin (D.-N.C.), who enjoyed a “reputation as a skilled interpreter of constitutional law”,\textsuperscript{19} was more welcoming to the prospect of an amendments convention. But he, too, favored congressional oversight. Accordingly, Ervin introduced legislation that would have regulated state legislative applications, the election and apportionment of delegates, and many other details.\textsuperscript{20} Commenting on Ervin’s proposal, University of Michigan law professor Paul G. Kauper agreed: Because of Article V’s “silence”\textsuperscript{21} and “ambiguity”\textsuperscript{22} about convention composition and rules, “It is highly important that Congress define procedures and rules to govern” that subject.\textsuperscript{23}

In 1972, a study by the American Bar Association also claimed convention composition and protocols were unknown, in part because of the (false) belief that

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{18}Swindler, supra note 1, at 23.
\textsuperscript{21}Kauper, supra note 1, at 908 (“Article V is silent on how representation in the convention is to be determined”).
\textsuperscript{22}Id. at 911 (“The constitutional language is ambiguous on these questions”).
\textsuperscript{23}Id. at 919.
\end{footnotesize}
“there was little discussion of Article V in the state ratifying conventions.” The study urged Congress to act:

In addition to the power to adopt standards for determining when a convention call should issue, we also believe it a fair inference from the text of Article V that Congress has the power to provide for such matters as the time and place of the convention, the composition and financing of the convention, and the manner of selecting delegates. Some of these items can only be fixed by Congress. Uniform federal legislation covering all is desirable in order to produce an effective convention.

In 1979, Stanford Law School’s famed constitutional scholar Gerald Gunther, while parting with Black on some issues, concurred with his view that the convention mechanism was a mystery. Gunther tagged a contemporaneous campaign for a convention as “an exercise in constitutional irresponsibility,” because the “convention route bristles with unanswered questions” and “promises uncertainty, controversy, and divisiveness at every turn.” Gunther predicted that “Congress . . . would presumably enact—at last—some legislation that would set up machinery for a convention,” although he doubted the constitutional validity of some proposals.

A particularly influential contribution to the uncertainty narrative was a 1979 article by Harvard Law School’s Laurence Tribe. Tribe’s “catalogue of basic matters on which genuine answers simply do not exist”, otherwise characterized as “unanswerable
provision [in the Constitution] is strikingly vague,” he wrote. A convention “would today provoke controversy and debate unparalleled in recent constitutional history. For the device is shrouded in legal mystery of the most fundamental sort.” Tribe added a long list of allegedly unanswered questions, among them—

a. Who would be eligible to serve as a delegate?

b. Must delegates be specially elected? Could Congress simply appoint its own members?

c. Are the states to be equally represented, as they were in the 1787 Convention, or must the one-person, one-vote rule apply, as it does in elections for all legislative bodies except the United States Senate?

d. Would delegates be committed to cast a vote one way or the other on a proposed amendment? Could they be forbidden to propose certain amendments?

e. Would delegates at a Convention enjoy immunity parallel to that of members of Congress?

f. Are delegates to be paid? If so, by whom?

g. Could delegates be recalled? Could the Convention expel delegates? On what grounds?

Academics more sympathetic toward the convention method of proposing amendments also assumed convention composition and protocols were necessarily

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33 Tribe, *supra* note 1, at 632.

34 *Id.* at 633-34.

35 *Id.* 638-39
uncertain, and that Congress was just the agency to clarify them. American Enterprise Institute Fellow Ann Stuart Diamond wrote:

Because a convention has never been called none of the procedural questions has been answered. What is a valid state petition? What kind of convention does Article V authorize? Can a convention be limited? How will the delegates be chosen? What is the proper role of Congress, or the federal courts?36

* * * *

Another serious question of procedure is the principle of representation at a convention. . . . representation based on population is preferable.37 Diamond urged Congress to pass regulatory legislation of the kind promoted by Senator Ervin.38

Still other commentators agreed that the uncertainty was great and Congress should fix it.39 Even those who preferred that the states, rather than Congress, set convention standards, did not question the claims of uncertainty.40

36Diamond, supra note 1, at 114.
37Id. at 144.
38Id. at 135.
40E.g., Douglas G. Voegler, Amending the Constitution by the Article V Convention Method, 55 N. D. L. REV. 355 (1979) (arguing from constitutional structure and minimal historical data that states should choose their own delegates and that representation should be on a one-state/one-vote basis); James Kenneth Rogers, The Other Way to Amend the Constitution: The Article V Constitutional Convention Amendment Process, 30 HARVARD J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1005 (2007) (claiming, largely on structural and minimal historical arguments, that state should choose their own delegates and representation should be on a one-state/one-vote basis).
In 1988, Russell L. Caplan published the first scholarly book on the application-and-convention process. Caplan’s collection of historical evidence—while far from comprehensive—was greater than that of any previous author, and it should have suggested that the scope of uncertainty was not quite as wide as most commentators were saying it was. Caplan’s research further suggested that determining convention protocols was more the concern of the states than of Congress. But most academics disregarded Caplan’s work.

Today the uncertainty narrative continues to dominate in academic circles. In 2011 Professor Tribe presented an edited version of his 1979 list of “unanswerable questions” at a Harvard Law School forum on the convention process. In 2016, Professor John Vile offered four possible “models” for structuring a convention as if each had equal claim to validity. The same year, Georgetown law professor David Super claimed that a convention “would be free to rewrite or scrap any parts” of the Constitution. In 2018, Professor Vikram Amar published a partial list of (two dozen) important and relatively open questions concerning a new federal constitutional convention to propose amendments. Almost all of these are drawn from an excellent essay by

41CAPLAN, supra note 1.
42Id. at 118 (stating that “Congress is therefore limited to decisions on the ‘housekeeping’ provisions of the call—the time and place of the convention, the apportionment and qualifications of the delegates); see also id. at 119 (“since the Constitution does not specify the method of selecting convention delegates, currently the states may decide the matter for themselves. Congress . . . has no power over choosing the delegates.”).
44VILE, supra note 1, at 125-41 (speculating on different convention models).
my friend and esteemed constitutional law colleague Laurence Tribe of the Harvard Law School that was penned over three decades ago and remains instructional today.46

Thus, the prevailing view—especially at the highest levels of academia—remains that the composition and protocols of an Article V convention are unknown, presently unknowable, and must be determined by Congress.

Activists opposing a convention have distributed these conclusions widely during their lobbying47 and media campaigns.48 They have been assisted by two widespread popular misconceptions: The first is that any convention related to the Constitution must be a “constitutional convention”—i.e., an assembly charged with writing an entirely new basic law. The second is that a convention for proposing amendments must be akin to the mob-scenes sponsored quadrennially by the national Republican and Democratic Parties.49


49The late Phyllis Schlafly, a conservative Republican activist with wide experience in party politics but apparently little knowledge of the amendment convention procedure, relied on both of these memes in opposing amendment conventions. E.g., Phyllis Schlafly, Failed Republicans Want To Rewrite Constitution, INVESTORS
The result has been, as Professor Michael Rappaport points out, to impose an “uncertainty tax” on the state-initiated amendment procedure,\(^{50}\) disheartening convention advocates. Indeed, advocates have more to deal with than mere uncertainty. Not only are experts insisting that convention advocates are buying a pig in a poke, but that Congress—the very agency convention advocates wish to curb or reform—gets to choose the pig. “Even if you trigger a convention,” advocates are told, “Congress can rig the convention so it proposes amendments other than, and even in direct contradiction to, those you’ve applied for.” Indeed, some academics contend that convention subject matter cannot be limited in any way.\(^{51}\)

No wonder widespread disillusionment with Congress has translated neither into a convention nor (as in earlier times) into congressionally-proposed amendments to preempt one.

II. **Silence is not necessarily “Vague”**

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\(^{50}\) *Rappaport, supra* note 1, at 89.

\(^{51}\) *E.g.*, *Dellinger, supra* note 1, at 1636 (“the authority to determine the agenda and to draft the amendments to be proposed should rest with the convention rather than with Congress or the state legislatures.”); Charles L. Black, Jr., *Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman*, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 198 (1972) (claiming that Article V conventions are “illimitable”).

Black’s conclusion was based, in part, on the (inaccurate) belief that during the Constitution’s first century no legislative applications clearly limited the scope of convention authority. However, rather than personally examining the applications, he based his conclusion on another’s tabulation that led him to his conclusion “[a]s far as I can make out.” *Id.* at 202. [!] Personally examining the applications would have corrected this impression, and also informed him that an amendments convention is a convention of the states. *Infra* notes 74 & 93 and accompanying text.
A fundamental assumption behind the narrative of uncertainty is that because the Constitution does not specify convention composition and protocols, they are unknowable: hence Professor Tribe’s remark that Article V’s convention language is “strikingly vague.”52 Seeming to buttress this view is James Madison’s record of an episode at the Constitutional Convention in which he asked his colleagues about the convention’s composition and protocols but received no answer.53

Of course, Madison’s failure to record an answer does not mean there was none. His notes are incomplete, and the question may have been answered later. Certainly his colleagues were satisfied, because they voted overwhelmingly for the final language.54 Supporting the hypothesis that the question eventually was answered is that Madison did not press the issue and his later writings suggest his questions had been resolved.55

More to the point, competent constitutional scholars do not assume a phrase has no meaning merely because the Constitution and the framers’ records do not define it. The Constitution contains many terms undefined by either the instrument or by the framers’ records. The usual reason for the lack of definition is that the term was so well understood that there was no need to explain it.56 Illustrative are phrases

52 Supra note 33 and accompanying text. Cf. VILE, supra note 1, at 228-29 n.22 (arguing that the failure of the framers to “incorporate a particular common-law understanding of a mechanism” justifies changes in the nature of the convention congruent with “the transition from a confederal to a federal system and the subsequent democratization of Congress.”).

532 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 558 (Sept. 10, 1787) (James Madison) (“How was a Convention to be formed? By what rule decided? What was the force of its acts?”).

54 Id. (showing the language approved by a vote of the states against reconsideration of nine states in favor, one against, one delegation divided).

55 Infra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing Madison’s formulation in THE FEDERALIST); see also Letter from James Madison to Everett Everett (Aug. 28, 1830), in 9 JAMES MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 398 (Galliard Hunt ed., 1900) (endorsing the convention procedure).

56 Many of my publications are reconstructions of Founding-era meanings of
such as “the writ of habeas corpus,”57 “original Jurisdiction,”58 and “Trial . . . by Jury.”59 Although neither the Constitution nor the framers’ records define those phrases, we know their precise meaning because other Founding-era sources tell us.

For example, the Constitution and the records of the framing do not outline the composition and rules inherent in the constitutional term “jury.” Other Founding-era sources fill that gap.60 Similarly, other sources inform us of the composition and protocols of the constitutional term “convention.” Officially-sponsored political conventions were ad hoc assemblies that substituted for legislatures on designated occasions. In-state conventions (in the Constitution’s language, “Conventions . . . in [the states]”)61 were elected assemblies in which majority per capita voting was the rule of decision.62 As explained below, interstate conventions such as the “Conven

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57U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.”).

58Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.”).

59Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury”).

60In his first draft of the Bill of Rights, Madison listed a series of “accustomed requisites” for what became the Sixth Amendment right of jury trial. ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 1, at 452 (Jun. 8, 1789). Congress later dropped this list, presumably because essential protections were included in the common understanding of trial by jury.

61U.S. CONST. amend. 5 (“when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Convention in three fourths thereof”).

62Cf. In re Opinion of the Justices, 167 A. 176, 179 (Me. 1933) (applying Founding-era in-state convention practice to rule that delegates to an Article V ratifying convention must be popularly elected by district).
for proposing Amendments” were conventions of the states, a term communicating universally-understood rules of composition and protocol.
III. THE FIRST OMISSION IN THE UNCERTAINTY NARRATIVE: *Smith v. Union Bank* as Reflecting the Post-Ratification Understanding

The initial authors, or at least publicizers, of the uncertainty narrative were law professors. One might expect, therefore, that their research would have included a case law search on the nature of a convention for proposing amendments. Yet none seem to have found a Supreme Court pronouncement on this very subject:63 *Smith v. Union Bank.*64

*Union Bank* was an 1831 choice of law case.65 The principal issue was whether Maryland or Virginia’s priority rules governed distribution of a debt payable in the District of Columbia (which followed Maryland law) and owed to a District of Columbia creditor by a deceased debtor whose home had been in Virginia. It was a difficult question, with compelling and learned arguments, as well as considerations of interstate comity, pressed by both sides.

In deciding that Maryland law governed, Justice William Johnson, who delivered the opinion of the Court, acknowledged that some might favor the alternative result. However, he wrote, “[w]hether it would or would not be politic to establish a different rule by a convention of the states, under constitutional sanction,

63None of the law review articles promoting the uncertainty narrative mention *Union Bank*, although it is discussed in two books: VILE, *supra* note 1, at 83; CAPLAN, *supra* note 1, at 45-46 & 99. Although omission of *Union Bank* is the most salient legal research failure in “uncertainty narrative” writings, it is not the only one. Those writings also neglect most reported Article V cases and other legal materials. See generally LAW OF ARTICLE V, *supra* note 1 (treating cases and other precedent in detail).

6430 U.S. 518 (1831). They also missed a pronouncement by the Tennessee Supreme Court. State v. Foreman, 16 Tenn. 256, 304 (1835) (referring to an amendments convention as a convention of the states); *see also infra* note 72 and accompanying text.

65“Choice of law” is a process by which courts decide which state’s or nation’s law applies where the event or its participants have connections to more than one state or nation. The text offers one example; another is an automobile accident in Illinois between a car driven by a resident of Indiana and another driven by a resident of Ontario, Canada.
is not a question for our consideration.”66 *Union Bank* is the only Supreme Court to address the nature of the convention.67

The date of the case, and the fact that Justice Johnson was a Southerner, might provoke the question of whether his comment was the product of nullification fever.68 The answer is “no.” Justice Johnson was a South Carolinian, but he was also a competent jurist who firmly opposed John C. Calhoun’s nullification theories. Johnson generally took an expansive view of federal power, particularly the Commerce Power.69

Moreover, Justice Johnson’s opinion was joined by all his colleagues except Justice Henry Baldwin, who dissented without opinion. Among those in the majority was Chief Justice John Marshall, who as a young Richmond, Virginia lawyer had played a central role in expounding and defending the Constitution at his state’s ratifying convention.70 Also in the majority was Justice Joseph Story, Harvard law professor and constitutional commentator *par excellence*. As Justices who—like Johnson—were “nationalists” by the standards of the time, neither Marshall nor Story had any reason for inventing, or even advertising, amendment prerogatives for the states. So it is safe to conclude that when Justice Johnson described a convention

6630 U.S. at 528. (Italics added.)


68See *VILE, supra* note 1, at 83 (minimizing the comments in the case as dicta and possibly the product of the nullification controversy—although in milder terms than I use in the text).


70Marshall was a prominent speaker at the Virginia ratifying convention. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, *supra* note 1, at 222-36, 419-21, 551-62, 578 (reporting Marshall’s speeches).
for proposing amendments as a “convention of the states,” he was reflecting the common understanding of the entire bench except, perhaps, Baldwin.71 (Since Baldwin issued no opinion, we have no evidence of his views on the issue.) Thus, while the Court’s description of an amendments convention is *obiter dictum*, it is *obiter dictum* of an informative sort.

Other evidence informs us that the characterization in *Union Bank* reflected the dominant understanding, not only at the time but throughout much of American history. In a case decided four years after *Union Bank*, the Tennessee Supreme Court identified an amendments convention as a convention of the states.72 During the nineteenth century, the same terminology was routinely employed in the popular press73 and in formal legislative applications.74

After the turn of the twentieth century, it became more common to use the constitutional name “convention for proposing amendments”75—but “convention of

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71 Story did not address directly the composition of the convention in his *Commentaries on the Constitution*, but he did write that “[t]wo thirds of congress, or of the legislatures of the states, must concur in proposing, or requiring amendments to be proposed . . . .” JOSEPH L. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1824 (1833), https://www.constitution.org/js/js_005.htm.

72 State v. Foreman, 16 Tenn. 256, 304 (1835).

73 E.g., The Maryland Resolutions, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 4, 1850 (opining that a convention of “all the States” was “the only sort of Convention which the Constitution of the United States authorizes or permits”); *Washington*, NAT’L INTELLIGENCER, May 28, 1866 (“convention of the states”); *Washington: A Convention of States to Propose Constitutional Amendments*, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Apr. 1, 1884, p. 5 (“convention of states”).


75 The application formula adopted by the popular campaign for direct election of Senators used the phrase “convention for proposing amendments” rather than
the states” continued to appear as well. In 1905, Professor Black’s home law review published an article quoting the “convention of the states” language from *Union Bank*,76 and in 1913 the same periodical published an article describing an amendments convention the same way.77 In 1906, the governor of Iowa announced that he would campaign for an amendments convention, which *The New York Times* described as a “Convention of the States.”78 In 1909, newspapers throughout the country carried a syndicated story about how state legislative applications for an amendment mandating direct election of Senators were approaching the number required to trigger a convention of the states.79

A backlash against one of the Progressive Era’s reforms, Prohibition, provoked discussion about a convention of the states to propose repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. For example, in 1926 *The New York Times* and the *Hartford Courant* reported on a Nevada referendum asking Congress “to call a convention of the States for amending or repealing the Eighteenth Amendment.”80 The following year the *Racine Journal News* used the term “convention of the states” repeatedly in an article explaining the amendment process.81 Even as late at 1931 *The New York Times*

“convention of the states.” Most states adopted applications with this wording, so when legislators drafted later applications on other subjects they understandably followed their most recent precedent. It was in this period also that the imprecise term “constitutional convention” began to creep into applications. See THE ARTICLE V LIBRARY, http://article5library.org/applications.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2020) (collecting all applications).


78*Fight for Income Tax,* N.Y TIMES, May 12, 1906, at 1.

79*E.g., Revision of Federal Constitution,* MONROE J., Oct 21, 1909, at 1; *Big Task in Sight,* HADDAM LEADER, Oct. 22, 1909, at 2; *Dems Look Ahead,* EVENING TIMES-REPUBLICAN, Oct. 15, 1909, at 7 (all reprinting the same story about the effort to call a convention of the states to propose direct election of Senators).

80*Nevada for Change in Law,* N.Y TIMES, Nov. 4, 1926, at 9; *Hartford Sees a National Demand,* N.Y TIMES, Nov. 5, 1926, at 4 (reprinting item from the *Courant*).

81*That Proposed Constitutional Convention,* RACINE JOURNAL-NEWS, Mar. 30, 1927,
reported that the Massachusetts state senate had adopted resolutions calling for repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment and suggesting that an amendment for this purpose be proposed either by Congress or by “a convention of the States.”

Were these nineteenth and early twentieth century characterizations faithful to the views of those who ratified the Constitutions? As explained below, they clearly were.

IV. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING: EXPLICIT RATIFICATION-ERA DESCRIPTIONS OF AN AMENDMENT CONVENTION AS A “CONVENTION OF THE STATES”

The ratification era extended from September 17, 1787, the day the Constitution was signed and transmitted to Congress, until May 29, 1790, when the thirteenth state, Rhode Island, ratified. During this period writers and speakers frequently alluded to a possible second general convention. Depending on context, the allusion could be to (1) a second plenipotentiary (broadly-empowered)

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at 6.  

82Massachusetts Asks for Dry Law Repeal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1931, at 12.  

83Although lawyers sometimes speak loosely of the “intent of the framers,” the decisive inquiry for determining the Constitution’s original legal effect is how the ratifiers—those who converted it into law—understood the document or, if that cannot be determined, the text’s public meaning at the time. I have explored these refinements in depth in Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’ Hermeneutic: The Real Original Understanding of Original Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239 (2007).

For a chronology of the ratification period, see 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at xviii – xx. One might argue for extending the period until January 10, 1791, the day of Vermont’s ratification. However, proceedings during the ratification debates in Vermont could have no effect on decisions of the original thirteen states. Accordingly, statements of constitutional meaning issued during Vermont proceedings offer only weak evidence for the constitutional bargain. But see Robert G. Natelson, The Founders Interpret the Constitution: The Division of Federal and State Powers, 19 FED. SOC. REV. 60, 65 (2018) (discussing statements in Vermont that confirm pre-1790 representations).

84A general convention was one that included all states or at least states from all regions as opposed to a regional or “partial” convention. See note 139 and accompanying text.
constitutional convention, commissioned, like the first, by the states pursuant to their reserved sovereign powers, or (2) an Article V amendments convention.

In this case, a decisive element of context is time: Before the ninth state (New Hampshire) ratified the Constitution on June 21, 1788, when speakers referred to a second convention, they almost invariably meant a plenipotentiary one. After nine states had ratified—and it had become certain the Constitution would go into effect—they almost invariably meant an Article V amendments convention. On June 14, 1788, when ratification by a ninth state was probable but not certain, Edmund Pendleton, Virginia's leading lawyer and later president of his state ratifying convention, wrote a letter alluding to both kinds of gatherings. 85

This Part IV collects instances in which writers and speakers referred to Article V conventions explicitly as “conventions of the states” or “conventions of states.” Part V collects instances in which writers and speakers did so implicitly. Part VI shows that the “convention of states” nomenclature carried with it universally understood rules of composition and protocol.

A. Official Statements

In January, 1788, the South Carolina legislature debated whether to send the Constitution to a state ratifying convention. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, who had

85Letter from Edmund Pendleton to Richard Henry Lee (Jun. 14, 1788) in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1623-24:

You have been truly informed of my Sentiments being in favr. of Amendments, but against the insisting on their Incorporation previous to, and as a Sine qua Non of Adoption, or of a Convention being previously called to consider them, before the Government was brought into Action to give it a fair Experiment, & secure the great good it contains. . . . Prevs. Amendments either as a Sine qua Non, or to be the Subject of Consideration in a Future Convention of the States, impress on my mind a Fatal tendency to rejection, & it’s consequent evils . . . .

(Italics added.)
served as a delegate in Philadelphia, was among the Constitution’s defenders. When responding to questions as to why the Constitution did not protect jury trial in civil cases, he answered that juries should be dispensed with in some kinds of civil cases. If the Constitution had contained such a civil jury requirement, he said, “[I]t could only be altered by a convention of the different states.”

When the North Carolina ratifying convention met in July, 1788, Governor Samuel Johnson warned that if his state remained out of the union, it would not be able to participate in an amendments convention. Antifederalist Willie Jones responded, “I assert the contrary; and that, whenever a convention of states is called, North Carolina will be called upon like the rest.” Jones was almost certainly in error about whether a state outside the union could attend an amendments convention. However, language in a committee report adopted by the full ratifying convention reveals agreement as to its composition. The report favored laying amendments before “the convention of the states that shall or may be called for the purpose of amending the said Constitution.”

In New York, the ratifying convention recommended an amendments convention, which Melancton Smith, one of the New York convention’s leading members, referred to as a “convention of the states.” On July 28, 1788, in response

864 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 1, at 308.
872 Id. at 225.
884 Id. at 242; see also id. at 251 (recording adoption of the report).
89 Melancton Smith, Draft of New York Circular Letter, in 23 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 2338

Our opinion is that the most eligible method mode of revising the Constitution will be by calling another general Convention, to consider of and propose such amendments, as will secure the Liberties of the people and accord with the sentiments of the several States. This cannot be effected unless 2/3 of the States apply to the Congress for the purpose—We therefore earnestly invite your State to join with ours in making application to the Congress to call a Convention of the States for this purpose, as soon after they meet as is convenient. (Emphasis added.)
to a request from the New York convention delegates, Governor George Clinton (who had chaired the gathering) sent his convention’s circular letter to the executives of other states.\textsuperscript{90} This expressed a desire for amendments, and requested that other states apply for a new general convention because “it is essential that an application for the purpose should be made to [Congress] by two thirds of the states.”\textsuperscript{91} One of the drafts on which the final version of the letter was based stated that it was preferable for amendments to be offered by a general convention rather than by Congress, in part because “on such an occasion the states would depute men in whose ability & dispositions . . . they could repose the fullest confidence.”\textsuperscript{92}

Partly in response to Governor Clinton’s circular letter, on November 14, 1788, the Virginia legislature adopted the first Article V application ever submitted. The Virginia application employed both the phrase “convention of the States” and one of its recognized variants:

\begin{quote}
Happily for their wishes, the Constitution hath presented an alternative, by admitting the submission to a convention of the States . . .
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
We do, therefore, in behalf of our constituents, in the most earnest and solemn manner, make this application to Congress, that a convention be immediately called, of deputies from the several States, with full power to take into their consideration the defects of this Constitution that have been suggested by the State Conventions, and report such amendments thereto as they shall find best suited to promote our common interests.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{93}

The Rhode Island legislature could not apply formally for an amendments

\textsuperscript{90}\textit{Elliot’s Debates, supra} note 1, at 413-14 (reproducing the letter).
\textsuperscript{91}\textit{Id., supra} note 1, at 414.
\textsuperscript{92}23 \textit{Documentary History, supra} note 1, at 2339. (Italics added).
\textsuperscript{93}\textit{Annals of Cong., supra} note 2, at 258-59 (May 5, 1789).
convention, because that state had not yet joined the Union. Nevertheless, the state’s lawmakers resolved to consult the state’s voters on the question of amendments by sending the New York circular letter to all Rhode Island towns. The legislature’s resolution described the proposed gathering as a “general convention of the states” and asked whether Rhode Island should “meet in convention with the state of New York, and such other states as shall appoint the same.”

Less than a month after the Rhode Island legislature submitted the convention issue to the electorate, the North Carolina legislature authorized calling a second ratifying convention. The final resolution of the legislature provided that it was summoned “for the purpose of deliberating and determining on the proposed Federal Constitution . . . and on such amendments, if any, as Shall or may be made to the said Constitution, by a Convention of the States, previous to the meeting of the said Convention of this state . . . .” The legislature staffed its delegation for a prospective

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94Partial records of town deliberations on the New York circular letter are reproduced in 25 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 435-49.

95Resolution of the Rhode Island General Assembly (Oct. 27, 1788), in 10 RECORDS OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 309-10 (John Russell Barlett ed., 1865):

Whereas, His Excellency George Clinton, president of the convention of New York, hath transmitted to the legislature of this state a proposal, that a general convention of the states should take place, in order that such necessary amendments may be made in the constitution proposed for a federal government. . . .

It is therefore voted and resolved, that the secretary forthwith cause to be printed a sufficient number of copies of Governor Clinton’s letter, with the amendments proposed by the convention of the state of New York, and transmit one as soon as possible to each town clerk in the state; who is hereby directed, upon receipt thereof, to issue his warrant to call the freemen of such town to convene in town meeting, to take the same into consideration, and thereupon to give their deputies instructions whether they will have delegates appointed to meet in convention with the state of New York, and such other states as shall appoint the same . . . .

(Emphasis added.)

96North Carolina Resolutions Calling a New Convention (Nov. 17-21, 1788), in 31 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 712 (emphasis added.).
Article V convention: On November, 21, 1788, the state house of commons received senate approval of a “resolution . . . for appointing five persons by ballot to represent this State in a Convention of the States, should one be called.”97

Back in Virginia, the state legislature dispatched a letter to Governor Clinton of New York notifying Clinton of the Virginia application. On November 20, 1788, the letter was read in the New York legislature. That letter described the desired amendments convention as a “Convention of the States.”98

On February 4, 1789, the New York Assembly debated a proposed application. Two lawmakers referred to an amendments convention explicitly as a “convention of the states.” One was Samuel Jones, formerly a moderate Antifederalist in the New York ratifying convention.99 The other was John Lansing, Jr.,100 who had served as a

97N.C. MINUTES, supra note 1 (Nov. 21, 1788); 31 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 711 (emphasis added.).

98Letter from John Jones, Secretary of the Senate, and Thomas Mathews, Secretary of the House of Delegates, to New York Governor George Clinton (Nov. 20, 1788), in N.Y. ASSEMB. J. 12th session (Dec. 1788), at 25 (urging “The propriety of immediately calling a Convention of the States, to take into consideration the defects of the Constitution.”). The complete text is as follows:

S I R,

THE letter from the Convention of the State of New-York hath been laid before us, since our present session. The subject which it contemplated was taken up, and we have the pleasure to inform you of the entire concurrence in sentiment between that Honorable Body, and the Representatives, in Senate and Assembly, of the freemen of this Commonwealth. The propriety of immediately calling a Convention of the States, to take into consideration the defects of the Constitution, was admitted, and, in consequence thereof, an application agreed to, to be presented to the Congress, so soon as it shall be convened, for the accomplishment of that important end. We herewith transmit to your Excellency a copy of this application, which we request may be laid before your Assembly at their next meeting. We take occasion to express our most earnest wishes, that it may obtain the approbation of New-York, and of all our sister States.

9923 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 2522.

100Id. at 2523.

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delegate to the Constitutional Convention.

The following day, the New York legislature adopted its application. It employed a synonym for a convention of the states employed by Virginia:

The People of the State of New York having ratified the Constitution . . . in the fullest confidence of obtaining a revision of the said Constitution by a General Convention . . . In compliance, therefore, with the unanimous sense of the Convention of this State, who all united in opinion that such a revision was necessary to recommend the said Constitution . . . we, the Legislature of the State of New York do, . . . make this application to Congress, that a Convention of Deputies from the several States be called as early as possible . . .101

The Pennsylvania legislature was firmly set against an amendments convention. On March 5, 1789, it defeated a motion to apply for “a convention of deputies from the several states.”102 Later that day, lawmakers passed a resolution declining to apply:

Resolved, That his Excellency the President [i.e., of Pennsylvania, then Thomas Mifflin] be requested to assure his Excellency Governor Randolph, that, accustomed to sentiments of the highest respect and deference for the legislature of Virginia, it must ever be [pain?] ful to the House, when obliged to dissent from the opinion of that Assembly upon any point of common concern to the two states, as members of the union; and particularly, on a measure of such importance as the one proposed, the calling of a convention of the states for amending the constitution, the necessity of which they are not able to discern, though it is so apparent to and so earnestly insisted on by that legislature.

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101N.Y. ASSEMB. J. 12TH SESSION, DEC. 1788 at 105-06 (Feb. 5, 1789). (First two italics in original; third one added).

102MINUTES OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 123 (March 5, 1789) (emphasis in original).
That under such forcible impressions, the House cannot, consistently with the special duty they owe to the good people of this state, or with the affection, which, in the enlarged spirit of patriotism, they bear to the citizens of the United States at large, concur with the Legislature of Virginia in their proposed application to Congress, for calling a Convention of the states for the above mentioned purpose.”

To summarize: Within a few months amid the ratification debates, five states in different regions of the country—three in favor, one against, and one neutral—issued eight official documents identifying an amendments convention as a convention of the states. In addition, five individuals, both Antifederalists and Federalists, are on record as employing the same designation when speaking in official contexts. Two of those individuals had been delegates to the Constitutional Convention. I have been unable to find any document suggesting that an amendments convention was anything other than a convention of the states.

B. Unofficial Statements

Unofficial utterances by both Federalists and Antifederalists—some in newspapers, others in private letters—described an amendments convention as a “convention of the states” or a “convention of states.” Following are ten examples:

In the November 30, 1787 edition of the New York Journal an author writing under the pseudonym “A Baptist” criticized the Philadelphia Baptist Association for endorsing the Constitution under the assumption that the document could be amended easily: “. . . [B]efore any amendment can be proposed, two thirds of both houses of the federal legislature, or two thirds of those of the several states, must agree to it; and after any amendment is agreed to by a convention of the states, three fourths of the legislatures of the respective states must ratify them before they

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103 Id. at 124-25 (March 5, 1789). (All italics in original except for the last).
become valid . . .”\textsuperscript{104}

Despite the difficulty of the procedure, many hoped for a future amendments convention. In a private letter written during the New York ratifying convention Seth Johnson predicted that the conclave

will adopt the new constitution. this manner is proposed. that the state will ratify it for 4 years & if during which time a general \textit{convention of the states} should be called to make amendments then to continue as one of the confederated States, if no convention is called then to have the liberty of withdrawing if the state pleases.\textsuperscript{105}

In a letter written near the end of the convention, Antifederalist delegate Cornelius C. Schoonmaker, related additional information about this effort to make ratification temporary:

We then, as a farther security to obtain a[n] [amendments] convention, brought forward Mr Smith’s plan for an adoption of the Constitution for — years, and if the amendments proposed should not in that time be submitted to a \textit{convention of States} this State should reserve a right to withdraw itself from the Union.\textsuperscript{106}

New York did not limit its ratification, but its delegates did propose an amendments convention, which a Virginia essayist (“the Republican”) identified as “a convention of the states.”\textsuperscript{107}

\textsuperscript{104}“A Baptist,” Opinion, N.Y. J., Nov. 30, 1787, \textit{reprinted in} 29 \textsc{Documentary History}, \textit{supra} note 1, at 331, 336 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{105}Letter from Seth Johnson to Andrew Craigie (July 19, 1788), \textit{in} 21 \textsc{Documentary History}, \textit{supra} note 1, at 1325-26 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{106}Letter from Cornelius C. Schoonmaker to Peter Van Gaasbeek (July 25, 1788), \textit{in} 23 \textsc{Documentary History}, \textit{supra} note 1, at 2298, 2299 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{107}10 \textsc{Documentary History}, \textit{supra} note 1, at 1754 (editor’s note to entry for the \textit{Virginia Independent Chronicle}, July 16, 1788) (“On 27 August the ‘Republican’ published this statement in the Chronicle: ‘Since the publication of my last number, a proposition has been received from the convention of New-York, for a new
Writing from Virginia, Federalist Edmund Pendleton distinguished between a revising convention called before ratification and an amendments convention called after, which he designated a “Future Convention of the States.”\textsuperscript{108} In Massachusetts, an author writing under the pseudonym “An American” suggested “a convention of the States, in some future time, to review the system, and to make such emendations as time and experience, and the wisdom of the world may point out.”\textsuperscript{109} In North Carolina, Federalist James Iredell contended that Antifederalists were wrong when they claimed North Carolina could participate in an Article V convention without joining the Union: “And if a general Convention should be called, we can have no pretences \textit{sic} to form a part of it, unless we are in the union, because the general Convention spoken of in the constitution must mean a convention of those states which are \textit{members of the union}.”\textsuperscript{110}

Another North Carolinian distinguished between the roles of an in-state convention of the people and an interstate convention of the states:

Our legislature ordered a \textit{Convention of the people} to deliberate upon [ratification] and they have resolved not to accept it but upon previous amendments, to be submitted to the Congress and \textit{Convention of the states} which shall be called for the purpose of amending the constitution.”\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{108}Supra note 85.


\textsuperscript{110}Letter from “A Citizen of North Carolina” (James Iredell) to the People of North Carolina (Aug. 18, 1788), \textit{in} 31 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, \textit{supra} note 1, at 507, 515. (Italics in original.)

\textsuperscript{111}“A Citizen and A Soldier,” Opinion Letter VI, Aug. 27, 1788, \textit{reprinted in} 31 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, \textit{supra} note 1, at 527, 545. (Italics added).
The same author stated how a convention of states was triggered: “[N]ine states must first petition for amendments, and a Convention of the separate states will be directed.”\textsuperscript{112}

Some called an amendments convention “a convention of the states” only to oppose calling one. “Tullius,” a Federalist, responded in this way to charges that the initial House of Representatives was too small:

It is to be presumed that there were particular reasons for limiting the number to 65; I do not object to it, as it is but a temporary expedient, from which no real inconvenience can be apprehended. My aim is to shew the propriety of providing a moveable ratio of representation in the federal constitution now to be adopted—thereby avoiding the necessity of calling a future convention of the States upon that account.\textsuperscript{113}

V. INDIRECT RATIFICATION-ERA DESCRIPTIONS OF AN AMENDMENTS CONVENTION AS A “CONVENTION OF THE STATES”

During the ratification debates, Federalists sought to reassure the public by pointing out that if the new government proved abusive or dysfunctional, state legislatures and conventions could secure amendments. Many of these reassurances are coherent only if one assumes the states would control any convention for proposing amendments. Otherwise, all these statements—including some issued by Founders with the highest reputation for integrity—were untrue and perhaps fraudulent.

Perhaps the best-known statement in this category was penned by James Madison in Federalist No. 43. Madison assured his readers that the Constitution “equally enables the general and the State governments to originate the amendment

\textsuperscript{112}Id. at 545-546.

of errors, as they may be pointed out by the experience on one side, or on the other.”114 Congress, of course, may “originate” amendments by proposing them, so the only way for the states to be “equally enable[d]” is for states to have power to propose. Since Article V provides that the convention proposes, a necessary predicate to the accuracy of Madison’s observation is that the convention is a creature of the states—just as all other interstate conventions had been.

The same predicate is necessary to understand a comment by another Federalist essayist, “Cassius:” “[T]he states may propose any alterations which they see fit, and . . . Congress shall take measures for having them carried into effect.”115

“Solon, Jr.,” A Rhode Island Federalist, after explaining Article V’s two methods of proposing amendments, added:

[I]t is clear that the non-complying States can have no agency whatever in the [amendment] business. They will not be represented on the floor of the New Congress, and so cannot act in amendments originating with that body; nor can they have a seat in any future Convention directed by that body, in which amendments may originate . . . 116

Note the wording: Each state has a seat at the convention.

Alexander Contee Hanson of Maryland opposed a convention to re-write the entire Constitution, but was open to an amendments convention:

If there be any man, who approves the great outlines of the plan, and at the same time, would reject it, because he views some of the minute parts as imperfect, he should reflect, that, if the states think as he does,

114The Federalist No. 43, supra note 1, at 228 (James Madison).
an alteration may be hereafter effected.117

In this passage Hanson strongly implies the will of the states was sufficient for obtaining amendments—which means they must control both the proposal and ratification stages. Hanson was a lawyer, judge, later chancellor of Maryland, and the author of Maryland’s digest of laws (Hanson’s Digest).118 Presumably he was speaking accurately.

Another outstanding lawyer, Samuel Jones of New York, served both in his state’s legislature and ratifying convention.119 He explained Article V this way:

The reason why there are two modes of obtaining amendments prescribed by the constitution I suppose to be this—it could not be known to the framers of the constitution, whether there was too much power given by it or too little; they therefore prescribed a mode by which Congress might procure more, if in the operation of the government it was found necessary; and they prescribed for the states a mode of restraining the powers of the government, if upon trial it should be found they had given too much.120

Of course, the states enjoy the ability to “restrain[]” the federal government through amendments only if they control the proposing convention as well as the legislatures or conventions that ratify amendments.

Tench Coxe had represented Pennsylvania at the Annapolis Convention and later served in the final (1788-89) Confederation Congress. Still later he became

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120 N.Y. Assemb. Debates (Feb. 4, 1789), reprinted in 23 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 2522 (emphasis added).
Alexander Hamilton’s assistant in the Treasury Department. Coxe’s pro-Constitution writings were more accessible than the difficult essays of *The Federalist*, and probably more widely read by the general public.\(^{121}\) In urging approval of the Constitution, Coxe wrote—

\[\text{The sovereign power of altering and amending the constitution . . . does not lie with this foederal legislature, whom some have erroneously apprehended to be supreme—That power, which is truly and evidently the real point of sovereignty, is vested in the several legislatures and [ratifying] conventions of the states, chosen by the people respectively within them. The foederal government cannot alter the constitution, but the representative bodies of the states, that is, their legislatures and conventions, only can execute these acts of sovereign power.}\]

From the foregoing circumstances results another reflection equally satisfactory and important, which is, that . . . the foederal legislature . . . cannot prevent such wholesome alterations and amendments as are now desired, or which experience may hereafter suggest. Let us suppose any one or more alterations to be in contemplation by the people at large, or by the state legislatures. If two thirds of those legislatures require it, Congress must call a general convention, even though they dislike the proposed amendments, and if three fourths of the state legislatures or conventions approve such amendments, they become an actual and binding part of the constitution, without any possible interference of Congress. If then . . . the foederal government should prove dangerous, it seems the members of the confederacy will have a full and uncontrollable power to alter its nature, and render it completely safe.

\(^{121}\)For Coxe’s biography, see generally JACOB COOKE, TENCH COXE AND THE EARLY REPUBLIC (1978); see particularly *id.* at 111 (discussing the influence of Coxe’s essays).
and useful.\textsuperscript{122}

There is more, but we must first address some numbers. Of the initial thirteen states,\textsuperscript{123} the two thirds necessary to trigger a convention amounted to \textit{nine}. However, the three fourths necessary to ratify amendments amounted to \textit{ten}. One might think, therefore, that participants in the ratification debates would use the larger number to specify how many states must cooperate to amend the Constitution. Yet most participants on both sides of the debate used the number “nine.”

For example, in November, 1787, James Iredell of North Carolina wrote in the \textit{Resolutions of the Inhabitants of Chowan County and the Town of Edenton}:

\begin{quote}
It is also a part of the Constitution that we observe with particular pleasure, that nine States may at any time make alterations, so that any changes which experience may point out can be made without the danger of such calamities as are incident upon changes of Government in all other Countries, where they can be only brought about by a civil
\end{quote}

\begin{footnote}\textsuperscript{122}\textsuperscript{122}Tench Coxe, \textit{A Pennsylvanian to the New York Convention}, PA. Gazette, Jun. 11, 1788, \textit{reprinted in} 20 Documentary History, supra note 1, at 1139, l142-43. Coxe made a similar argument a few weeks later:

\begin{quote}
It is provided, in the clearest words, that Congress shall be \textit{obliged} to call a convention on the application of two thirds of the legislatures; and all amendments proposed by such convention, are to be \textit{valid} when approved by the conventions or legislatures of three fourths of the states. It must therefore be evident to every candid man, that two thirds of the states can always procure a general convention for the purpose of amending the constitution, and that three fourths of them can introduce those amendments into the constitution, although the President, Senate and Federal House of Representatives, should be \textit{unanimously} opposed to each and all of them. Congress therefore cannot hold \textit{any power}, which three fourths of the states shall not approve, on \textit{experience}.
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{123}\textsuperscript{123}U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, cl. 3 (listing temporary representation in the House of Representatives for thirteen states).
war.124

Similarly, George Washington wrote that if the Constitution were adopted, “a constitutional door is open for such amendments as shall be thought necessary by nine States.”125 At the Massachusetts ratifying convention, Federalist Charles Jarvis said that if the Constitution were ratified, “Nine states may insert amendments into the Constitution; but if we reject it, the vote must be unanimous.”126 At the Maryland ratifying convention Antifederalist Samuel Chase (subsequently a Supreme Court justice) also observed that nine states were necessary to obtain amendments.127

Possibly the use of the number “nine” reflects an expectation that Rhode Island would not join the union, and that among the remaining twelve states, nine would be sufficient to ratify amendments. This is unlikely, however. The Constitution itself envisions thirteen original states128 and Founding-era writers consistently described ratification as a thirteen-state process.129 So it is more probable that the focus on “nine” signified the power of nine applying state legislatures to force an amendments convention and then control its output. Alexander Hamilton was more precise:

If, on the contrary, the Constitution proposed should once be ratified by

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124James Iredell, *Resolutions of the Inhabitants of Chowan County and the Town of Edenton*, Nov. 8, 1787, in 30 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 20, 23.
1262 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 157.
128U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, c. 3 (providing for congressional representation of thirteen states, even though Rhode Island was not represented at the framing convention).
129The raising of thirteen pillars “was perhaps the most widely used metaphor of the ratification process.” Thus, “An item published in the *Massachusetts Gazette*, 7 December, compared ‘the disunited states of America’ to ‘thirteen distinct, separate, independent, unsupported columns.’”). 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 525 (editor’s note).
all the States as it stands, alterations in it may at any time be effected by nine States . . . whenever nine, or rather ten States, were united in the desire of a particular amendment, that amendment must infallibly take place.”  

All of the statements surveyed in this Part—by Madison, Washington, Hamilton, Coxe and the rest—imply that the states can control the amendment process and, therefore necessarily, the proposal mechanism. None of these statements disclose any doubt about the procedure. This, in turn, suggests that a convention for proposing amendments was of the same general nature as all previous American interstate assemblies. In other words, it was a convention of the states. As explained in the next Part, this designation carried with it universally-understood protocols and rules of composition.

VI. THE COMPOSITION AND PROTOCOLS OF A CONVENTION OF THE STATES

Before Independence, the colonies of British North America often addressed common problems by sending official representatives to consult with each other.  

Sometimes these consultations were bilateral; sometimes they included three or more colonies. Occasionally, other sovereignties, such as Indian tribes or the British Crown, participated. During the century before Independence, such conferences were exceedingly common: There were at least twenty, and possibly more.

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130THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note 1, at 455-56 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added). After the portion before the ellipsis, Hamilton included the following footnote: “It may rather be said ten, for though two-thirds may set on foot the measure, three-fourths must ratify.”

131The following discussion, where not otherwise footnoted, summarizes the findings in Natelson, Conventions, supra note 1 (surveying conventions and convention practice before and during the Founding).

The Declaration of Independence converted the colonies into states, but even
the institution of a permanent Continental Congress did not alter the practice of
holding inter-governmental conclaves operating under the same protocols. In fact, the
frequency increased: In the eleven years between 1776 and 1787, interstate
conferences met, on average, annually.\textsuperscript{133} Other conferences were called but did not
materialize.\textsuperscript{134} Individual states issued most of the invitations, Congress issued a few,
and on some occasions prior conferences called later ones.\textsuperscript{135}

These conferences were known by any of four synonyms, and people favoring
periphrasis might use more than one synonym to describe the same gathering.\textsuperscript{136}
Before 1775, they were commonly labeled “congresses,” in imitation of congresses of
diplomats from sovereign governments. Occasionally, they were referred to as
“councils”\textsuperscript{137} or “committees.” This use of the word “committees” is distinct from the
term “committees” to mean delegations representing governments at a particular
conference.

Still another synonym was \textit{convention}. The word appears to have been a
popular alternative to “congress” from the beginning, but after 1775 it became the
prevailing designation, presumably to avoid confusion with the Continental
Congress.\textsuperscript{138} This helps explain the framers’ choice of that term for Article V.

\textsuperscript{133}\textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{134}\textit{Natelson, Conventions, supra} note 1, at 645 (referring to a congressionally-called
Charleston, South Carolina convention that never met).
\textsuperscript{135}\textit{Id. passim.}
\textsuperscript{136}\textit{E.g., id.} at 667 (citing Massachusetts governor James Bowdoin as proposing a
“Convention or Congress” of “special delegates from the States”).
\textsuperscript{137}Only the 1684 Albany Council seems to have been so designated.
\textsuperscript{138}All the interstate gatherings between 1776 and 1787 were known primarily,
although not exclusively, by the term “convention.” \textit{See, e.g., I THE PUBLIC RECORDS
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT} 585-620 (Charles J. Hoadley ed., 1894) (setting forth
the records of the first Providence, Springfield, and New Haven “conventions”); \textit{id.} at
619-20 (containing self-identification of the New Haven gathering as a convention);
\textit{Natelson, Conventions, supra} note 1, at 654 (reproducing the call for the 1780
Both before and after Independence, most convention calls invited only colonies or states within a particular geographic region: A call might summon the (then) four New England states, or the New England states and New York, or states in the mid-Atlantic region. These gatherings were partial conventions. At other times, however, both before and after 1776, a call invited all states, or at least states from all regions. These were general conventions.\textsuperscript{139} General conventions were held in 1754, 1765, 1774, 1780, 1786, and, of course, 1787.\textsuperscript{140} During the debates over the Constitution, there was agreement among both Federalists\textsuperscript{141} and Antifederalists\textsuperscript{142} that a convention for proposing amendments would be a general convention including all the states.

Just as there were well-recognized synonyms for interstate conferences, there were accepted synonyms for the partial and general categories. A regional gathering

\textsuperscript{139}Natelson, Conventions, supra note 1, at 62.

\textsuperscript{140}Thus, in describing the proposed 1754 Albany Congress to his colonial legislature, New Hampshire Governor Wentworth stated that it “will be more general, and not confined to one particular Colony, but that all his Majesty’s Provinces that are present by their Commissioners will be included”). 6 N.H. STATE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 132. He subsequently described it as “the “General Congress held at Albany.” Id at 292


\textsuperscript{142}E.g., N.Y. ASSEMB. J. 12\textsuperscript{TH} SESSION, DEC. 1788 at 105-06 (Feb. 5, 1789) (reproducing a New York legislative application referring to an amendments convention as a “General Convention”); Resolution of the Rhode Island General Assembly (Oct. 27, 1788), in 10 RECORDS OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 309-10 (John Russell Bartlett ed., 1865) (describing an amendments convention as a “general convention of the states”).
might be described as a “Convention of Commissioners from the States of [naming states]”143 or “the Convention of Delegates from the four eastern [i.e., New England] states,”144 or a “convention of committees from the states of [named states].”145 A general conclave might be referred to as a “convention of delegates from all the states,”146 a “federal convention,”147 a “convention of the United States,”148 or a convention of “such commissioners as may be appointed by the . . . States.”149

143Natelson, Conventions, supra note 1, at 654 (quoting the call for the Philadelphia Price Convention of 1780); cf. 5 N.H. STATE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 115 (reproducing a letter of Jun. 29, 1747 from Massachusetts Governor William Shirley, referring to a convention with “such Commissioners as may be appointed by all his Majestys Governments from New Hampshire to Virginia inclusively”).

144E.g., Letter from George Washington to Mass. Governor James Bowdoin (Aug. 28, 1780), in BOSTON CONVENTION, supra note 1, at xxxi-xxxii (so naming the Boston Convention of 1780); id. at 52 (calling for a “meeting of Commissioners from the several States” at Hartford, Connecticut).

145E.g., Letter from N.Y. Governor George Clinton to George Washington (Sept. 1, 1780), in BOSTON CONVENTION, supra note 1, at xxxi - xxxii (so naming the Boston Convention of 1780).

146Resolve Recommending a Convention of Delegates from all the States, 1784-1785 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 666 (July 1, 1785); cf. 2 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 51 (May 15, 1775) (setting forth instructions recommending “an annual Convention of Delegates or Representatives from all the Colonies”); 31 id. at 679 (Sept. 20, 1786) (reproducing a letter from John Dickinson as chairman of the Annapolis convention to Congress recommending “a Convention of deputies from the different States”); 32 id., at 74 (Feb. 21, 1787) (reproducing congressional opinion in favor of “a Convention of delegates who shall have been appointed by the several States”).

147N.C. MINUTES, supra note 1 (Nov. 24, 1788) (“resolving, with respect to a future amendments convention, “We consent and propose that five persons to represent this State in a Federal Convention be also balloted for at the same time.’.”).

148Id. (Nov. 18, 1788) (“Resolved, That the present General Assembly proceed to ballot for five persons to represent this State in a Convention of the United States, in case such Convention is appointed for the purpose of amending the Constitution, proposed at Philadelphia the 17th September, 1787.”).

149This was the form of the resolution by which the Virginia legislature authorized a circular letter that served as the call to Annapolis. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (session beginning Oct. 17, 1785), at 153 (Jan. 21, 1786); cf. 5 N.H. STATE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 425 (reproducing a
However, the most common designation for a general convention probably was the phrase *convention of the states* \(^{150}\) (sometimes shortened to *convention of states*). \(^{151}\) For house of representatives journal reference to “a convention of commissioners from each Government on this Continent”).

\(^{150}\) *E.g.*, 5 *DOCUMENTS OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK*, No. 11, Pt. 2, 28–29 (1904) (reproducing a July 21, 1782 resolution of the New York legislature stating that “the foregoing important Ends, can never be attained by partial Deliberations of the States, separately, but that it is essential to the Common Welfare, that there should be . . . a General Convention of the States, specially authorised to revise and amend the Confederation”).

Similarly, in a 1783 “application” and circular letter, the Massachusetts legislature asked Congress “to recommend a *Convention of the States* at some convenient place, on an early day, [so] that the evils so severely experienced from the want of adequate powers in the foederal [sic] Government, may find a remedy as soon as possible.” 1784–1785 MASS. RECORDS, *supra* note 1, at 667 (July 1, 1785) (emphasis added).

*Cf.* “An Elector,” MD J., Mar. 25, 1788, 12 *DOCUMENTARY HISTORY*, *supra* note 1, at 435, 440 (referring to “a Convention of all the states”).

\(^{151}\) *To the Political Freethinkers of America*, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, May 24, 1787, 13 *DOCUMENTARY HISTORY*, *supra* note 1, at 113 (“A Convention of States, created from fear and suffering, are now to sit at Philadelphia”); “Giles Hickory,” Opinion, N.Y. AM. MAG., Feb. 1, 1788, 19 *DOCUMENTARY HISTORY*, *supra* note 1, at 738, 741 (“The distinction between the *Legislature* and a *convention* is, for the first time, introduced into Connecticut by the recommendation of the late convention of States”); Letter from Cornelius C. Schoonmaker to Peter Van Gaasbeek (July 25, 1788), 23 *DOCUMENTARY HISTORY*, *supra* note 1, at 2298, 2299 (“We then, as a farther security to obtain a convention, brought forward Mr Smith’s plan for an adoption of the Constitution for — years, and if the amendments proposed should not in that time be submitted to a convention of States this State should reserve a right to withdraw itself from the Union.”).
example, the 1787 Constitutional Convention was labeled a convention of the states or convention of states in both official\textsuperscript{152} and unofficial\textsuperscript{153} documents.\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{152}Examples are legion. See, e.g., 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 585 (reproducing the Connecticut act for appointing delegates to the Constitutional Convention, describing it as “a convention of the States” and as “a Convention of Delegates, which shall have been appointed by the several States”); 33 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 544 (unsuccessful motion of Nathan Dane of Massachusetts of September 27, 1787 “that there be transmitted to the supreme executive of each State a copy of the report of the Convention of the States lately Assembled in the City of Philadelphia”); 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 3 (“The resolve of the General Court of this commonwealth [Massachusetts], of March, 1787, appointing delegates for the Convention of the states, held at Philadelphia, was ordered to be read”); 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 68-69 (reproducing a Pennsylvania legislative resolution on “the proposition submitted to this House by the deputies of Pennsylvania in the General Convention of the states”); 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 57 (reproducing Delaware legislative records: “With the above mentioned letter of the 28th of September, the Federal Constitution as reported by the late Convention of the states is now transmitted to you”).

\textsuperscript{153}Again, examples are legion. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to the Marquis de LaFayette (Jun. 6, 1787), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 34 (“The pressure of the public voice was so loud, I could not resist the call to a convention of the States”); 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 6 (reproducing the following from John Quincy Adams’ Diary: “The day pass’d as usual, except, that I had some political chat with Mr. Parsons. he favours very much the federal constitution, which has lately been proposed by the Convention of the States.”); “Federal Constitution,” MASS. GAZETTE, Oct. 30, 1787, 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 171, 172 (“At length a Convention of the states has been assembled, they have formed a constitution”); “A Freeman,” Opinion, NEWPORT HERALD, Apr. 3, 1788, reprinted in 24 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 220, 21 (referring to the Constitutional Convention as “the General Convention of the States”); “A Native of Boston,” THOUGHTS UPON THE POLITICAL SITUATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 178 (1788) (referring to the Constitutional Convention as “the late Convention of the States at Philadelphia”).

\textsuperscript{154}There were precedents. The phrases “convention of the states” and “convention of states” formerly designated a meeting of representatives from the three “estates” (or states): nobility, clergy, and commons. E.g., HELKIAH BEDFORD, AN ABRIDGMENT OF THE HISTORY OF HEREDITARY RIGHT 243 (London, 1714) (calling the convention Parliament that offered the English crown to William and Mary a “convention of the states”); 1 JOHN ANDREWS, THE HISTORY OF THE REVOLUTIONS OF DENMARK 240 (London, 1764) (referring to “the convention of the states of the [Danish] kingdom, which placed Frederick I. on the throne”); 4 WILLIAM BLENNERHASSETT, A NEW
The use of words such as “federal” and “states” distinguished interstate meetings from the directly elected, popular assemblies operating solely within a state’s boundaries, such as “the convention of South Carolina”\textsuperscript{155} or a ratifying “Convention of the People.”\textsuperscript{156}

By the time the Constitution was adopted, the protocols for conventions of states had become standardized. They were the same for partial and general conventions. First, to trigger such a meeting a state official or legislature would send to other colonies an invitation known as an \textit{application} or \textit{call}. The call suggested that the host state and invited states convene at a particular place and time to address issues identified in the call. Each invited state decided whether to accept the invitation and, if so, whom to select as its representatives to form its delegation or “committee.”\textsuperscript{157} Each state defined the scope of its representatives’ authority in commissions (or credentials) and instructions.\textsuperscript{158}

Participants in these meetings sometimes were called “deputies” or

\textsuperscript{155}J. CONT. CONG., \textit{supra} note 1, at 274 (Apr. 12, 1776) (producing a letter from the president of the convention of South Carolina); \textit{cf.} MINUTES OF THE NORTH CAROLINA COUNCIL OF SAFETY (Jul 27, 1776), \url{http://docsouth.unc.edu/csr/index.php/document/csr10-0302}, last visited Feb. 4, 2020 (referring to “the convention of that Colony [Virginia]”).

\textsuperscript{156}N.H. HOUSE OF REP. J. (Dec. 13, 1787), \textit{reprinted in} 21 N.H. STATE PAPERS, \textit{supra} note 1, at 165 (so designating a state ratifying convention); Letter from Mass. Governor John Hancock to Governor Richard Caswell (Feb. 16, 1788), \textit{in} 30 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, \textit{supra} note 1, at 69 (referring to the Massachusetts ratifying convention as “the Convention of the people of this Commonwealth” and the federal convention as “the Convention of Delegates from the said United States”).

\textsuperscript{157}E.g., Governor George Clinton, \textit{Message to the N.Y. Legislature}, Aug. 4, 1780, \textit{in} BOSTON CONVENTION, \textit{supra} note 1, at 62 (referring to “a Convention of Committees from three States, lately held at Boston”).

\textsuperscript{158}E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, \textit{supra} note 1, at 199 (James Madison) (“The powers of the convention ought, in strictness, to be determined by an inspection of the commissions given to the members by their respective constituents.”).
“delegates,” but probably the most common term was *commissioner*. The choice of
that term is instructive. In contemporaneous jurisprudence a commissioner was an
agent of a public authority and subject to the restrictions of agency law. Here is how
the most popular law dictionary of the time described the position:

**Commissioner**, (*commissionarius*) Is he that hath a commission,
letters patent, or other lawful warrant to examine any matters, or to
execute any public office . . . *Commissioners* by the Common law must
pursue the authority of the *commission*, and perform the effect thereof . . .
and if they do any thing for which they have not authority, it will be
void . . . The office [i.e., duty] of commissioners is to do what they are
commanded . . .” 159

This description of the commissioner as a subordinate agent is confirmed by
dictionary definitions for “deputy” and “delegate.” For example, Jacob’s dictionary
defines “deputy” in this way:

**Deputy**, (*Deputatus*) Is he that exercises an office, &c, in another man’s
right; whose forfeiture or misdemeanor, shall cause him, whose *deputy*
he is, to lose his office . . . 160

Jacob’s work did not contain a definition for “delegate,” but lay dictionaries made it
plain that the term designated no more than an agent. 161

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159 Giles Jacob, A New Law-Dictionary (10th ed., 1782) (unpaginated) (defining
“commissioner”). Jacob’s Dictionary does not contain relevant definitions of “delegate”
or “deputy,” the other two words commonly used for commissioners. Samuel
Johnson’s dictionary’s non-specialized definition of “delegate” (there was another
meaning inapplicable here) was, “A deputy, a commissioner, a vicar.” His definitions
of “deputy” were “1. A lieutenant, a viceroy,” and “2. Any one that transacts business
for another.” 1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (8th ed.,
1786) (unpaginated); cf. Sheridan, Dictionary, supra note 1, (unpaginated)
(definitions almost identical to Johnson’s). In other words, delegates and deputies
were agents.

160 Id. (defining “deputy”).

161 E.g., 1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (8th ed., 1786)
Thus, commissioners were required to obey state instructions, remain within their authority, and were subject to recall for non-compliance. Not surprisingly, there was discussion at some of these conventions about the scope of authority.\textsuperscript{162}

The delegations from states invited to a convention met at the time and place designated by the call, although after their initial meeting they controlled their schedule and place of meeting.\textsuperscript{163} The convention elected its own officers and committees. If the meeting was of significant size, it adopted procedural rules.

Once the preliminary arrangements were finished, the group proceeded to discuss the subjects assigned to it. These subjects were always prescribed in advance. Their scope varied considerably. The 1781 convention of the New England states in Providence, Rhode Island assembled only to plan war supply for New England for a single year.\textsuperscript{164} The 1780 general convention in Philadelphia received the much broader assignment of addressing wartime inflation.\textsuperscript{165} The 1787 general convention in Philadelphia received the even more daunting task of recommending measures to “render the Federal Constitution [i.e., the political system] adequate for the Exigencies of the Union.”\textsuperscript{166}

\footnotesize{(unpaginated) (stating, as the first applicable definition of delegate: “A deputy, a commissioner, a vicar”); cf. SHERIDAN, DICTIONARY, supra note 1 (unpaginated) (definition almost identical to Johnson’s).}

\textsuperscript{162} \textit{E.g.} 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 182 (quoting William Paterson interpreting the limits of his authority at the Constitutional Convention).

\textsuperscript{163}\textit{Cf.} 4 CHARLES VINE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY 572 (1746) (“Time and Place is only for the fix’d [first] Meeting of the Commissioners; but after they may adjourn to another Time or another Place”).

\textsuperscript{164}Natelson, Conventions, supra note 1, at 665.

\textsuperscript{165}Id. at 654 (quoting the call), 655.

\textsuperscript{166}Id. at 675 (quoting the call), 675-80 (discussing the scope of that gathering, including the “runaway” narrative—the very common, but false, claim that the 1787 convention exceeded the scope of its call). See also Michael Farris, \textit{Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Constitution Was Not the Product of a Runaway Convention}, 40 HARVARD J. L. & PUB. POL. 61 (2017) (correcting the “runaway” narrative).
Voting on substantive matters was by state; a majority of the state’s delegation determined how the delegation cast its vote. Voting on non-substantive matters usually was on the same basis. The default rule of decision was majority of states present and voting, although some conventions staffed committees by a plurality vote. Theoretically, a convention could change the rule of decision; however, there are no records of Founding-era conventions doing so. If a majority of voting states opted for particular solutions, the convention drafted them in its formal report and arranged for them to be sent back to the sponsoring states for consideration. If a majority did not endorse any particular solution, the convention did not propose one. Either way, the convention then adjourned sine die.

The frequency with which conventions of colonies and states met—on average, every three or four years—rendered them a familiar part of American political life. Leading Founders became acquainted with them by serving in Congress or in the state legislatures, or in the conventions themselves. When Roger Sherman of Connecticut represented his state in Philadelphia in 1787, he was attending his fifth convention of states. Sherman was but one of at least 18 framers who were veterans of convention service.

Promoters of the uncertainty narrative frequently assume the Constitutional Convention was the only meeting of its kind. As we have seen, the Constitutional

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167 Natelson, Conventions, supra note 1, at 681.
168 Id. at 691-700 (setting forth the lists of commissioners at three major conventions of colonies and all conventions of states between 1776 and 1787).
169 E.g., Padgett, supra note 1, at 199 (labeling a convention for proposing amendments a “constitutional convention” and asserting that “The United States held its first, and so far only, Constitutional Convention in 1787”).

There is an obvious problem in labeling an amendments convention a “constitutional convention.” The task of an amendments convention is not to start from scratch, but only to propose amendments to “this Constitution.” U.S. Const. art. V. If one properly limits the term, then America has seen not one constitutional convention, but two: Philadelphia in 1787 and Montgomery, Alabama in 1861 (the Confederate analogue).
Convention had many ancestors. But it also has many successors. States wishing to negotiate with each other met in regional conventions in Hartford, Connecticut in 1814; in two successive sessions in Nashville, Tennessee in 1850; in Montgomery, Alabama in 1861; in St. Louis, Missouri in 1889; in four different cities in 1922; and in several locales from 1946 to 1949. General conventions gathered in Washington, D.C. in 1861 and in Phoenix, Arizona in 2017.\textsuperscript{170}

Convention protocols tend to be consistent over time,\textsuperscript{171} thereby resolving most

\textsuperscript{170}Id. Several books examine post-1787 conventions of states. See, e.g., ROBERT G. GUNDERSON, OLD GENTLEMAN’S CONVENTION (1961) (the 1861 Washington Conference Convention); THELMA JENNINGS, THE NASHVILLE CONVENTION: SOUTHERN MOVEMENT FOR UNITY, 1848-1851 (1980) (the 1850 Southern Convention); DANIEL TYLER, SILVER FOX OF THE ROCKIES: DELPHUS E. CARPENTER AND WESTERN WATER COMPACTS 123-201 (2003) (discussing the Colorado River Compact Commission, a convention of seven states held in 1922). The Article V Information Center, articlevinfocenter.com, which I direct, has collected and published the proceedings of the 1922 conclave, as well as those of several others.

\textsuperscript{171}One can see the relative consistency by comparing the various convention journals. For example, the Washington Conference Convention generally followed the rules of the 1787 Constitutional Convention. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE CONFERENCE CONVENTION HELD AT WASHINGTON CITY, FEBRUARY, 1861, at 19 (Crafts J. Wright, sec’y, 1861), available at https://books.google.com/books?id=J9lsKRBeLycC&pg=PA30&lpg=PA30&dq=Official%20Journal%20of%20the%20Conference%20Convention%20Held%20at%20Washington%20City%2C%20February%2C%201861&source=bl&ots=8-hYSm12-v&sig=ACfU3U1kgDWRSwGnFPMNA-a1BhQWeGD4uA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjxm57bmr3mAhWFB80KHd7aBtsQ6AEwAHoECAsQAQ#v=onepage&q=Official%20Journal%20of%20the%20Conference%20Convention%20Held%20at%20Washington%20City%2C%20February%2C%201861&f=false. The Balanced Budget Planning Convention, held in Phoenix, Arizona, in 2017, adopted more elaborate rules, partly to reduce to writing norms that were implicit earlier in our history, such as the subject matter limitation. Rule 1.1. However, the basic protocols were the same as they always have been. DAVID GULDENSCHUH, JOURNAL OF THE BALANCED BUDGET PLANNING CONVENTION 23-30
of the “uncertainties” touted by commentators.

VII. HOW THE CONVENTION OF STATES MODEL FITS WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

This Part examines how the convention of states model fits into the Constitution’s overall structure.

Some commentators have asserted that for state legislatures to fashion proposed amendments would be to revert to the old system of the Confederation—a reversion necessarily inconsistent with the Constitution’s “national” scheme. Professor Walter Dellinger, for example, has maintained that permitting state legislatures to control the content of a proposed amendment violates the framers’ design. Professor William Swindler adds that state legislatures are not proper parties to amendments that might reduce federal power.


172Dellinger, supra note 1, at 1630. Professor Rappaport, asserts, I think correctly, that such claims are based on presupposing a hostility towards the states that was not held generally when the Constitution was enacted. Instead, the Constitution was based on the view that both the national government and the state governments had virtues and vices and the constitutional structure should be designed accordingly. In the Article V area, this view suggests that both Congress and the state legislatures should be able to propose (and ultimately enact) amendments without the other entity being able to veto the amendment. Thus, the desire to prevent the state legislatures from having an effective mechanism to amend the Constitution is inconsistent with the overall design of the Constitution and the purposes underlying it.

Rappaport, supra note 1, at 90-91.

173Swindler, supra note 1, at 17-18:

If the people of the United States—the amalgam of the people of the thirteen original states and of the subsequently created states—ordained and established this Constitution, the states and their legislatures cannot be proper parties at interest in any amending
As we have seen, the ratification-era record is flatly inconsistent with the Dellinger-Swindler view. On the contrary, a principal reason for the convention procedure was to ensure that state lawmakers could use the amendment process to check the federal government if they deemed it necessary.\textsuperscript{174}

Nor was the convention method merely a discordant confederal concession to necessity. It was a harmonious part of the overall design—not \textit{despite} its confederation heritage\textsuperscript{175} but precisely \textit{because of it}.

The Constitution is, in Madison’s words, only “partly national.” It is also “partly federal.”\textsuperscript{176} When translated from eighteenth century to twenty-first century English, that means that the Constitution is partly unitary (and democratic and relating to individuals) and partly confederal (state-based, relating to states).\textsuperscript{177} Elements of the confederal approach make up a significant portion of the document, which is one reason that during the ratification debates Federalists could emphasize continuity with the Articles of Confederation as well as differences.\textsuperscript{178}

One aspect of the national/federal amalgam is the Constitution’s “pairing”

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{174}\textit{Supra} note 3 and accompanying text.
\end{quote}

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\textsuperscript{175}\textit{Natelson, Rules, supra} note 1, at 732-73 (discussing how Congress acts as an agent for the states in counting applications and calling a convention and commenting, “In this respect, the Framers retained the Confederation way of doing things.”).
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{176}\textit{THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra} note 1, at 193-99 (James Madison).
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{177}At the time Madison wrote, “federal” and “confederal” were synonyms; the two words both referred to a treaty, alliance or league (from the Latin \textit{foedus}, treaty). \textit{See}, \textit{e.g.}, \textit{SHERIDAN, DICTIONARY, supra} note 1 (unpaginated) (defining “federal” as “Relating to a league or contact” and “confederation” as “League, alliance”).
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{178}\textit{E.g.}, \textit{THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, supra} note 1, at 203 (James Madison) (“The truth is, that the great principles of the constitution proposed by the convention, may be considered less, as absolutely new, than as the expansion of principles which are found in the articles of confederation.”); Letter from “A Citizen of North Carolina” (James Iredell), \textit{To the People of North Carolina}, Aug. 18, 1788, 31 \textit{DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra} note 1, at 507 (stating that the nominal powers of the Confederation Congress almost equaled those of the Federal Congress under the Constitution).
\end{quote}
feature. Couplets appear throughout the document, each characterized by one element entirely or mostly “national” and another element entirely or mostly “federal.” These couplets serve different, but often overlapping, functions. Some divide power and responsibility. For example, Congress may regulate congressional elections, but presidential elections are (supposed to be) regulated by the states. Some couplets are mutual checks, such as the division of the treaty power between the president (a national officer) and Senate (a federally-based assembly), and the division of the legislative power between the House of Representatives (national) and the Senate (federal). Other couplets offer alternative routes to the same result. Thus, when the primarily-national Electoral College fails to elect a president, the selection defaults to the primarily-federal procedure of election by the House of Representatives on the basis of one state/one vote. When state-based law enforcement fails, national force is called in: the state militia is transferred to central

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179 U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators.”).

180 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors”); Robert G. Natelson, The Original Scope of the Congressional Power to Regulate Elections, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. Law 1, 20-21 (2010); but see Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545-46 (1934) (recognizing an apparently extra-constitutional power in Congress to regulate presidential elections).

181 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur”).

182 Id. art. I, § 1, cl. 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”).

183 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (“But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote”); cf. id. amend 12 (“But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote”).
control, \textsuperscript{184} and the nation intervenes pursuant to the Guarantee Clause. \textsuperscript{185} As Madison pointed out, the national/federal amalgam is particularly evident in Article V, \textsuperscript{186} which contains two couplets offering alternative paths to the same results:

- ratification by either (1) state legislatures (seen as leaning “federal”) or (2) state conventions (seen as more “national” in the sense of popular), and
- proposal by either (1) the mostly-national Congress or (2) a convention of the states constituted and staffed in mostly-federal ways. \textsuperscript{187}

As a component of one of many constitutional couplets, Article V’s convention of the states is fully consistent with the constitutional design.

\textsuperscript{184}Id. amend. 10 (reserving general police power in the states and people). Compare id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (“To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”).

\textsuperscript{185}Id. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall . . . protect each [state] . . . on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”).

\textsuperscript{186}THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, supra note 1, at 199 (James Madison):

If we try the Constitution by . . . the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly national nor wholly federal. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the majority of the people of the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times . . . . Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the plan of the convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the proportion by states, not by citizens, it departs from the national and advances towards the federal character; in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of states sufficient, it loses again the federal and partakes of the national character.

\textsuperscript{187}The process is not entirely federal because calling a convention requires two thirds of the states, thereby assuring a critical mass of popular support.
VIII. SOME PRACTICAL OBSERVATIONS

This Article is an exposition of constitutional meaning rather than a political essay. Nevertheless, I would like to address some practical issues.

Political scientist John R. Vile fears the convention of states model reduces the chances of a convention being called because modern Americans would find that model undemocratic and likely to produce unpopular amendments. He particularly fears that the one state/one vote suffrage rule may deter larger states from applying for a convention.188

How weighty is this concern? The public accepts other (con)federal constitutional provisions, such as the allocation scheme of the Senate. Would the public reject the same allocation for an amendments convention? It might, if the procedure permitted a bare majority of the states representing a minority of the population to impose amendments without further check. However, that is not what Article V prescribes. Nor is it even remotely likely that the procedure will lead to imposition of amendments conflicting with the popular will. Actually, the popular will is more likely to be frustrated by continued inaction than by anything the convention might do. There are at least six reasons for these conclusions.

First, to obtain a convention on a given topic requires approval by a constitutional minimum of 67 or 68 dispersed legislative chambers out of a total of 99.189 That seems a formidable requirement, but the reality is more formidable still. Approval by 68 chambers in bicameral legislatures is insufficient if even one of the 68 is a chamber in a state in which the other chamber has demurred. Moreover, if 34 states apply on the same subject matter, but some applications include terms inconsistent with the rest, then presumably additional states will have to submit

188VILE, supra note 1, at 121 (“How many large states will agree to call a convention in which they are equally represented, when they are currently represented according to population in the U.S. House of Representatives and (largely) in the Electoral College?”).

189One state of the fifty, Nebraska, is unicameral.
consistent applications before Congress is obligated to call. In the real world, therefore, the number of legislative chambers demanding a convention call on a discrete topic is likely to number well into the seventies.

Although it is mathematically possible for all these legislative chambers to represent a minority of the population, it is almost politically impossible for them to do so. There are too many large and small states on both sides of the red/blue divide, and too many bicameral states in which the legislative chambers have different interests and different majorities.

Second: In some states, a single powerful lawmaker can block an application favored by majorities in both houses.190

Third: At the convention the rule of decision is a majority of all states attending, not merely a majority of states applying. Moreover, that majority must agree on more than a general concept; it must agree on a specific draft. A majority may favor a concept, but different majorities may oppose any single instantiation of that concept. “The devil,” it is said, “is in the details.”

Fourth: One purportedly undemocratic aspect of the convention-of-states model is that most, if not all, state legislatures will reserve selection of commissioners to themselves rather than delegating it to the people by popular election. However, the public may see this as a reasonable way to appoint an assembly that is not a branch of general government but only an ad hoc task force. Commissioners selected by state lawmakers will be seasoned individuals who need no schooling in parliamentary conduct and who are unlikely to waste time on unpopular proposals that have no chance of ratification.

190For example, in Arizona, Senate President Andy Biggs, imbued with the notion that an amendments convention might be uncontrollable and “run away,” blocked applications favored by the majority of both houses over a course of several years. In 2017, immediately after Biggs departed the legislature for Congress, Arizona adopted two applications and called for a non-Article V convention of states to plan for an Article V convention. Telephone Conversation with Rita Dunaway, Feb. 4, 2020, Senior Vice President for Legislative Affairs, Convention of States Action.
Fifth: Even if an undemocratic proposal should emerge from this complicated process, at that stage it will be only a proposal. Ratification requires approval by 38 states. That means approval by 75 or 76 legislative chambers out of 99. At this stage, too, the approving houses must be allocated properly, and if Congress selects the state legislative mode of ratification (as it almost always has) in some states a single powerful lawmaker will be able to block ratification.

Sixth: Well in advance of the convention, the public will learn that the ratification process is likely to consume several years. There is almost no risk of an unpopular measure being stampeded into ratification without popular support. Indeed, to be successful in navigating such a long process, it will need sustained super-majority support.

As a practical matter, moreover, there is no feasible and publicly acceptable alternative to the convention of states model. For example, allocating commissioners by House districts or by House districts-plus-Senators (as in the Electoral College) is problematic for several reasons. It makes little sense to constitute an assembly designed to bypass Congress in much the same way as we constitute Congress. It is also impractical for a drafting committee that numerous to work effectively. Large size raises the odds of mob-like behavior, particularly if delegates are directly elected without state legislative supervision and perhaps without relevant experience. A common antidote to mob-like behavior is control concentrated in a relative few, which may be even worse.

One could ensure “democratic” apportionment by allocating delegates by population but reducing the overall number, perhaps to eighty or one hundred. But that would require drawing new districts: Less-populous states would have to be combined with other states into single districts and more populous states would have to be divided. The passive voice begs these questions: Who decides the size of the convention? Who combines and divides states? For that matter, who writes the election code? Congress? For a procedure designed to bypass Congress?

Moreover, state lawmakers are now well aware that the amendments
convention is supposed to be their instrumentality and they surely would resist efforts to cut them out of the process. The result would be public outcry, litigation, and state refusal to ratify amendments proposed by a convention not based on the traditional model.

To be sure, Professor Vile worries that lawmakers in large states will be deterred from applying for a convention in which they will enjoy only sovereign equality. It is just as likely, however, that lawmakers in small states would be deterred from applying for a convention in which they would be lost in the mass. In any event, the historical record discloses no instance of large states refusing to apply, even in the days when the state-based composition of the convention was widely understood.

The lack of acceptable alternatives to state-based representation was the same hurdle the framers faced when trying to create an allocation formula for the Senate. All efforts to distribute Senators among states by population or by compromise formulae proved abortive, and the framers were left with interstate equality. More recently, congressional bills to allocate delegates for prospective amendment conventions may have represented “two decades of serious congressional

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191 The “convention of states” model has been accepted widely by state legislators in recent years. Several bipartisan organizations of lawmakers distribute information based on that model, including the State Legislators’ Article V Caucus, articlevcaucus.com/, and the Assembly of State Legislatures. See Robert G. Natelson, Convention Rules from the “Assembly of State Legislatures:” Two Cheers Only, INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTE (August 17, 2016), https://i2i.org/convention-rules-from-the-assembly-of-state-legislatures-two-cheers-only/).

A “planning convention” of nineteen states met in Phoenix, Arizona in September 2017 and both adopted a one-state/one-vote rule for itself and recommended it to any Article V convention for proposing a balanced budget amendment.

192 E.g., 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 1 (July 14, 1787) (Journal); id. at 5, 11 (July 14, 1787) (Madison) (recording failure of Charles Pinckey’s proposed compromise).
consideration”193—but none has ever come close to passing.

So even if the evidence did not make it clear that a convention for proposing amendments is a convention of the states, that model probably would be our only realistic option.

CONCLUSION

Despite the prestige of the commentators subscribing to the narrative of uncertainty, that narrative is contradicted by virtually all the legal and historical evidence. On the contrary, the sources inform us that a convention for proposing amendments is a convention of the states—a sibling to the many other conventions of states and colonies held over the past three centuries.194

The composition and protocols of such gatherings are well established: Each state selects a delegation of commissioners in the manner the state legislature (or its designee) determines. The states meet on terms of sovereign equality, with each delegation enjoying equal voting power. The state legislatures prescribe the subject matter in advance, and the commissioners are empowered only to propose solutions within the scope of that subject matter. State legislatures may instruct and recall their commissioners. The convention establishes its own rules, elects its own officers, and decides whether to propose amendments. Unless those rules specify otherwise, proposals and other substantive decisions are adopted by a majority of states present and voting.195

In other words, there is no “mystery.”


194Supra note 132 and accompanying text.

195Natelson, Rules, supra note 1.