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THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR RANKED CHOICE VOTING

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INTRODUCTION

This paper evaluates the compatibility of Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) with conservative principles.

Americans have become so accustomed to our voting system we forget how strange it is. Many countries admire our Constitution to the point of imitation, and have adopted our system of checks and balances by dividing government into executive, legislative and judicial branches. Yet absolutely none of them elect candidates to political office the way we do. That's because democracies want to avoid precisely those problems besetting America today: citizen apathy, low voter turnout, bitter partisanship, a lack of political competition, the lack of a political center, and the resulting division of the country into two warring factions that see each other as the enemy. To name a few.

The Framers were exceptionally well-read and intelligent men, perched at the right point in history to create an exceptional system of government for an exceptional nation. We are right to consider significant changes to their legacy institutions only with great reluctance and deliberation. Experiments should be tried at the local level first, then the states, and only then at the level of national government.

On the other hand, we should also note that our present conundrum is exactly what the Framers warned against over two hundred years ago. Their writings in this regard seem downright prophetic.

Consider this excerpt from George Washington's Farewell Address:

"[We must be wary of] the alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened

*by the spirit of revenge, natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities."*¹

Or this from his successor:

*"There is nothing I dread So much, as a Division of the Republick into two great Parties, each arranged under its Leader, and concerting Measures in opposition to each other. This, in my humble Apprehension is to be dreaded as the greatest political Evil, under our Constitution."*²

James Madison's concerns about parties rooted in geography are eerily accurate today (bolding is mine).

*"Should a state of parties arise founded on geographical boundaries and other **physical and permanent distinctions** which happen to coincide with them, what is to control these great repulsive Masses from awful shocks against each other?"*³

This could have been written yesterday, about urban Democrats vs. rural Republicans.

If we're honest with ourselves, we must conclude that we are now in the very situation the Framers worked so hard to avoid. We need to look at how we got here, and experiment with other ideas that might help move us forward. Let us not forget that experimentation with alternative voting systems at the state level, as for example Maine and Alaska have done, is a great example of Federalism, and completely consistent with both conservatism and the Framers'

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vision of distinct states united into a democratic republic.

I assume the reader is familiar with Ranked Choice Voting (RCV). If not, I refer the reader to my companion paper “Comparing Approval Voting and Ranked Choice Voting,” as it provides useful background material. It compares and contrasts these two alternative

voting systems and provides a detailed description of RCV, complete with examples. Numerous online sources are available as well.

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WHAT DOES “THE CONSERVATIVE CASE” MEAN?

Good voting systems do not favor any one political party or perspective. That is what makes them good. Making a conservative case for RCV does not mean showing how it makes conservatives more likely to win, that it favors Republicans over Democrats, and so forth. If it did that, no one would trust it, no one would accept it, and it quite rightly wouldn't be adopted. For every election lost by a Republican who would've won under RCV, there will be one lost by a Democrat that RCV would have propelled to victory.

Making the conservative case, then, does not mean showing how RCV helps the right at the expense of the left. It does not do that, any more than it helps the left at the expense of the right. What this paper tries to do is (a) show how conservative principles are compatible with and supportive of RCV, (b) address specific concerns about RCV from conservative sources, and (c) appeal to conservatives' sense of a “moral order” to justify the use of RCV.

CONSERVATIVE PRINCIPLES AND RCV

I find no conservative principles that conflict with RCV, and many that harmonize with it.

Free markets and competition

Conservatives have, for most of their existence, been the party of capitalism, free markets, and competition. The Heritage Foundation, a leading conservative think tank, cites the following as one of their “True North” principles:

America's economy and the prosperity of individual citizens are best served by a system built

on free enterprise, economic freedom, private property rights and the rule of law. This system is best sustained by policies that promote general economic freedom and eliminate governmental preferences for special interests, including free trade, deregulation, and opposing government interventions in the economy that distort free markets and impair innovation.

Our present political system, however, is a duopoly with artificially high barriers to entry; barriers created by the duopolists themselves. This is generally

believed to be the likely end-state of any first-past-the-post (simple plurality) system, summed up in Duverger's Law.⁴ The endorsement of a duopoly with artificial barriers to competition is an inappropriate position for champions of the free market, entrepreneurship, and competition.⁵

RCV by itself is not a significant threat to political duopoly, but it does permit that duopoly to be better informed and more inclusive. Voters whose views are normally shut out of the political process have more options under RCV, and more ways to communicate their preferences to the major parties.

Incremental but necessary change

It is either a myth or a deliberate mischaracterization of conservatives that they are by their very nature opposed to political change. They are simply more skeptical of grand social engineering schemes than liberals, and rightly so. The great conservative philosopher and thought leader Russell Kirk has this to say about conservatives and change:

The thinking conservative understands that permanence and change must be recognized and reconciled in a vigorous society. The conservative is not opposed to social improvement...

The conservative knows that any healthy society is influenced by two forces... its Permanence and its Progression. The Permanence of a society is formed by those enduring interests and convictions that gives us stability and continuity; ... The Progression in a society is that spirit and that body of talents which urge us on to prudent reform and improvement; without that Progression, a people

stagnate ...The conservative, in short, favors reasoned and temperate progress...

*Change is essential to the body social, the conservative reasons, just as it is essential to the human body. A body that has ceased to renew itself has begun to die. But if that body is to be vigorous, the change must occur in a regular manner, harmonizing with the form and nature of that body...*⁶

I would argue that RCV is exactly the type of prudent reform and improvement mentioned above. It is not being imposed from above, but adopted from below, in cities and municipalities across the nation. Two states (Alaska and Maine) have now adopted it for state and federal elections. Continued state-by-state experimentation will be "change in a regular manner," conservative Federalism at its best. A better example of "reasoned and temperate progress" would be difficult to find.

Improved access for diverse conservative voices and candidates within the Republican Party

Conservatism is not a monolithic creed; the Republican Party should not be a monolithic entity. The American electorate holds views far more sophisticated and nuanced than the conservative/liberal two-party spectrum can adequately embrace. As the political scientist Lee Drutman points out, for a long while America used to have four *de facto* parties: Conservative Republicans, Conservative Democrats, Liberal Republicans, and Liberal Democrats.⁷ The second and third coalitions, typified by Strom Thurmond (before he switched parties) and Dwight Eisenhower (who never did), respectively, began to collapse

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in the later part of the 20th century and no longer wield significant influence within their respective parties. Hence the increasing importance of independent voters.

RCV provides a greater opportunity for other conservative and Republican voices to be heard, beyond those currently dominating the Republican party (and who have been less than successful at building a competitive Republican coalition, let alone a Republican majority). Given the clear objectives of the liberal left in establishing one-party rule in America (as they have done in California, New York, and the vast majority of America's largest cities), I would argue the Republican Party, at its peril, ignores alternatives to capture independent voters.

For example, neoconservatism is not the only conservative view of foreign policy. There is a large population of voters who favor a strong defense but are skeptical of nation building abroad, democracy promotion in the Middle East, and engaging in alliances with corrupt regimes openly hostile to Western values. Senator Robert Taft was a dedicated Republican and conservative

who exemplified this view, as did the conservative firebrand Pat Buchanan much later. Voters with this perspective are out there, waiting to support a GOP that turns in this direction. The Log Cabin Republicans have proved themselves loyal to Republican and conservative causes despite outright hostility from within the party to LGBT conservatives, and could easily provide more outreach, votes, and influence under RCV. Finally, fiscal conservatism, limited government, and free trade seem to have completely disappeared from Republicans' and conservatives' radar screens over the past few decades, particularly in recent years. RCV can give voters concerned about getting America's fiscal house in order and embracing freer markets a stronger voice in the Republican Party than they currently enjoy. I would argue this development in particular ought to be welcomed by modern conservatives.

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CONSERVATIVE CRITICISMS OF RCV

Conservative criticism of RCV, as articulated by von Spakovsky and Adams,⁸ comes in three parts:

- It disconnects elections from issues and allows candidates with marginal support from voters to win.
- It obscures true debates and issue-driven dialogs among candidates and eliminates genuine binary choices between two top tier candidates.

- It disenfranchises voters, because ballots that do not include the two ultimate finalists are cast aside to manufacture a faux majority for the winner.

These all overlap, but I will endeavor to take each one in turn.

RCV and issues

Spakovsky and Adams' raise two concerns about RCV and issues. The first appears

to arise from a misconception about RCV and political parties:

When we have Republicans versus Democrats versus Greens and Libertarians, we know who is running against whom and what the actual distinctions are between the candidates on issues.

While RCV has been used primarily to rank preferences for candidates in non-partisan elections as opposed to parties, there is no reason why it cannot do so. Candidates can run in an RCV election with their party affiliation, giving exactly the same attention to issues as any system with political parties, including our own. Ireland, in fact, uses an RCV system where voters can rank both parties and individual candidates. I thus find this particular objection lacking.

The next sentence is equally problematic:

Second- or third-choice votes should not matter in America; they do not provide the mandate that ensures that the representatives in a republic have the confidence and support of a majority of the public in the legitimacy of their decisions.

This mistakenly equates “support” with “exclusive support.” It is gross intellectual error, what Hayek calls a “fatal conceit,” to presume knowledge of how to translate a voter’s subjective ranked preferences into objective levels of support. Voters who do not support candidates will either not rank them at all or rank them very low. But I find no reason to assume that a second- or even third-choice candidate of a voter is not supported by that voter, particularly if they are chosen from several alternatives.

In fact, it is equally wrong to assume *prima facie* in a two-party system that

a vote for one of two candidates equals “support.” That may be true, but it also may be the case, particularly for independent and nonaligned voters, that the voter is simply voting for the candidate they dislike the least, the “lesser of two evils.” The conclusion of support would be considerably strengthened if that candidate were chosen from multiple alternatives, as RCV provides.

The second objection concerning RCV and issues mistakenly equates two-candidate contests with issue-driven contests. The report notes correctly that ballots without mention of the top two candidates will eventually be discarded (assuming a majority winner has not been found on the first round), giving that voter no say in the final contest. By contrast, “had that election been between just those two candidates in the first place, that same voter would have heard debates, listened to the issues discussed, and made an informed choice between those two.” This last statement has a number of problems.

First, it assumes all debates must be between two people. Anyone who has watched the candidate debates for the party out of power in a presidential election knows that statement to be false. Second, it assumes that debates between two candidates (presumably a Republican and a Democrat) have a sufficiently wide range of difference on the issues to satisfy most voters, and a debate between them will cover those differences satisfactorily. The existence of a large number of independent and/or nonaligned voters suggests this is also false. Third, debates between top two candidates can also include debates between the top three, four, or five candidates, complete with party labels if they so desire. Finally, and most importantly, the statement “between just those two candidates in the first place” assumes *we always know*

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in advance who those two candidates are. The whole point of elections, especially nonpartisan ones, is that we can't predict candidate performance in advance. Voting is how we determine that; it is a form of Hayekian knowledge discovery. At the very least, if conservatives believe that always having a Republican and a Democrat as the top two candidates is descriptive, predictive, and normative, then they should say so *a priori*. Since virtually every other democracy in the world has more than two parties, most voters on the planet would disagree.

RCV and the elimination of “genuine binary choices”

Von Spakovsky and Adams appear to *define* a genuine binary choice as one provided in a two-candidate election, whereas the last two candidates standing in an RCV instant runoff offer a “faux” or “artificial” binary choice. There is no reason, however, why a reader should accept their definitions.

First, if the top two candidates in a two-way election under the present system would still be the top two contenders in a multi-candidate race, RCV will find them and produce the same result. Yet von Spakovsky and Adams would somehow have us believe the first choice is genuine while the second is somehow not. The RCV election would also have provided more information about the electorate's preferences, due to its more nuanced voting options, information the top contenders and/or parties can use in future elections to better align their stances on issues with those of the constituents they represent.

I find nothing “faux” about a majority produced from voters whose first and second choices were not as popular as their third and fourth choices, particularly in a crowded field of candidates. In fact,

much of von Spakovsky and Adams' objection goes away if voters are not required to rank all candidates. In that case, the ranking of a candidate indicates as least some degree of support, a degree that is deserving of counting toward a majority winner. In fact, rather than regarding a two-candidate election as a “genuine” binary choice, we might just as well call it a *forced* binary choice, because it artificially restricts the options of voters to a mere two.

RCV and voter disenfranchisement

Von Spakovsky and Adams regard the discarding of ballots that do not contain the top two choices as a form of disenfranchisement. Although never stated, their implied solution to this problem is to only have two-candidate elections. How this somehow empowers voters more, particularly those who are independent or non-aligned, is never explained.

In fact, using their logic, it is just as true to say discarding ballots in a two-candidate race that do not contain the winner's name is a form of disenfranchisement. Their implicit assumption seems to be that participating in a two-ray race is using the franchise, but participating in three-, four-, or five-way races is not. I find no reason to make this distinction.

Other problems with the report

I use this section to highlight some specific statements from the report. I'll start with an analogy of their own making, that of a supermarket purchase:

In reality, you are choosing one elected official to represent you, just like you might choose one type of steak sauce to buy when you are splurging for steaks. At the supermarket you ponder whether

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to buy AI, Heinz 57, HP, or the really cheap generic brand you have never tried. In the real world, you compare price, taste, mood, and maybe even the size of the bottle and then decide on your steak sauce. You know nothing about the generic brand, so you rank it last among your choices, while AI is ranked a distant third. In your mind, it comes down to Heinz or HP, and you choose the Heinz. You buy that bottle and head home to the grill. Now imagine if, instead, you had to rank-order all the steak sauces—even the ones you dislike—and at checkout the cashier swaps out your bottle of Heinz 57 with the cheap generic you ranked dead last.

First, notice that the first sentence implicitly assumes elections with a single winner, in itself a significant problem with the status quo. Supermarkets don't limit their customers to a single flavor of steak sauce, with good reason. RCV easily supports elections with multiple winners,⁹ while our current system does not. But I'll set that aside for now.

Second, "it comes down to Heinz or HP" is an implicit endorsement of the two-party system and elections with two obvious frontrunners. This is only one possible variation of the type of elections that RCV can support.

The conclusion implies a shopper who had no understanding of the rules of the shop in advance, who didn't know that all customers ultimately had to get the same sauce, that other customers might rank their sauce preferences differently, and the resulting sauce that everyone gets would be determined by everyone's preferences, not just his. A more accurate scenario would be where the customer

goes to the cashier, hands in her ranked list of preferences, and then waits by the door with all the other customers. At 9:00 p.m., when the store closes, it announces the steak sauce that best reflects the preferences of everyone who shopped that day and gives a bottle of it to everyone. Only then do they "head home to the grill."

When put this way, the problems of the grocery store metaphor are a little clearer. It's not the best metaphor precisely because electoral politics are not pluralistic (although RCV is more so than its alternatives). That said, let's retell the story of the grocery store. This time I'll apply the metaphor to both our current system and RCV, with a little bit of proportional representation thrown in.

Sauce Selection Day is coming up, and your neighborhood needs some steak sauce. You've read articles on how to properly season a steak, what spices work best, and you've decided you like Indie Sauce because it contains just the right combination of ingredients. Your neighborhood can only have one steak sauce, so you walk around the neighborhood singing the praises of Indie and urging others to vote for it. Many people like it, but they tell you it's a waste of time to bother voting for it because the makers of Red Sauce and Blue Sauce own the grocery store.

You walk into your local Red and Blue Market and find out they make pretty much everything on the shelves. They don't stock Indie, or for that matter any sauces other than Red and Blue because that would be "too confusing for the shopper." You look at the ingredients for Red Sauce and Blue Sauce and find something to like

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in each, but the right combination for you is Indie. You ask the manager if they'll ever stock it. They say they might consider it if you can bring ten percent of the neighborhood down to the grocery store to sign a petition. "In the meantime," they say, "let us know which sauce you like better: Red or Blue. We'll tell you which sauce the neighborhood gets when the doors close tonight."

That night, you learn Red Sauce is the choice of your neighborhood. The 45 percent of those who wanted Blue are not happy, but your community has spoken. Nobody even bothers about the remainder who wrote their preferences on their receipt and turned it in to customer service.

Two years later, you learn about a new grocery store promising "reliable, consistent validation" of shopper preferences. In their store, you can vote for a whole bunch of sauces, including Red and Blue, but you don't have to vote for either and you can order your preferences however you want. That way, if Indie doesn't win, you can say what you'd rather have next, and so on. Red still wins, but because more people felt comfortable expressing their preference for Indie, Blue takes a look at Indie's ingredients and decides to change its formula. You decide Blue might be worth a shot next time.

Still later, you find the rules of sauce selection change, thanks to the new store's promise of reliable, consistent validation of shopper preferences. Red still won the majority Sauce Selection, but now

everybody on the block gets to pick either a full-size bottle of Red, a medium-size bottle of Blue, or a small bottle of Indie. The old Red and Blue business model couldn't support that. Finally, you get the steak sauce you wanted. Although your bottle is smaller than others, you give out free spoonfuls to your neighbors. After all, there's always the next Sauce Selection Day to consider.

The last paragraph is an allegory for proportional representation, another vital electoral reform highlighted by Drutman and already in place in a number of modern democracies. Proportional representation allows for districts with multiple seats, allocated in proportion to the vote totals received by candidates. Winner-take-all systems, by definition, cannot support proportional representation. RCV, by contrast, does so easily. Space prohibits a detailed exploration of this question here. Further exploration of problems with the current system that RCV and proportional representation can solve is a work in progress.

CONSERVATIVE REPUBLICANS WHO ALREADY SUPPORT RCV

Conservatives are rightly suspicious of ambitious social engineering programs proposed by the liberal left, who tend to view themselves as sculptors and citizens as clay for whatever morally impassioned artwork strikes their fancy to create. That being said, the fact that Democrats support a change in electoral systems shouldn't automatically generate reactionary opposition from Republicans. RCV is a neutral voting system with well-studied properties. It should be accepted or rejected on its merits, and not on *ad hominem* attacks.

As an example, I offer two long-time Republican activists who have studied and subsequently endorsed RCV: Mr. Stan

Lockhart and Ms. Jennifer Nassour. Mr. Lockhart has held numerous positions in Utah civic life, including serving as the Chair of the Utah Republican Party,¹⁰ and is an enthusiastic advocate of RCV. Ms. Nassour has had the unenviable task of leading the Republican Party of Massachusetts. Her support of RCV is no doubt influenced by its ability to strengthen support and visibility for those voices normally shouted down in the din of one-party dominance.

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RECENT ELECTIONS AND RCV

I now consider some recent elections and their impact, either because RCV was used or because it wasn't.

GA-9 Republican primary in 2020

Consider first the 2020 Republican primary in Georgia Congressional District 9, with a total of eight candidates.¹¹ The top vote getter was Mark Gurtler, with 21 percent of the vote, followed by Andrew Clyde, with 19 percent. A strict plurality system would have elected Gurtler with barely one-fifth of the vote. To avoid this, a runoff was held, at additional taxpayer expense, of which Clyde was declared the winner with 56 percent of the vote.

In an election as nuanced and a field as wide as this was, while it is theoretically possible, there is little reason to assume this outcome was most reflective of voter preference. Any two of the next three finishers (with 15.5, 13.3, and 12.1 percent respectively) had combined

vote totals higher than both Gurtler and Clyde. In fact, 71.4 percent of the voters did not vote for Clyde in the primary, the supposed "winner" of the election. Had RCV been employed, not only could the runoff have been avoided, but a result would have been produced that was more accurate, less costly, and faster.

While we cannot say for certain how RCV would have responded to differences in fundraising, we note that Clyde spent almost as much money as all the other candidates combined and won the nomination despite losing 71.4 percent of votes in the primary. It is difficult to imagine how differences in campaign spending would have achieved a more distortive result under RCV.

ME-2 Congressional election in 2018

RCV is a neutral voting system, favoring no specific political party or philosophy. In the 2018 election for Maine's 2nd

Congressional District, Republican Bruce Poliquin received 46.3 percent of the vote, compared to Democrat Jared Golden's 45.6 percent (a difference of 2,171 votes).¹² Had this been a first-past-the-post, winner-take-all election, Poliquin would have won the seat.

However, because RCV was used, a second round was required to examine the second choices, if expressed, of the 23,397 ballots who did not rank either Poliquin or Golden first. Of those, the vast majority went to Golden, who was declared the winner. Poliquin initiated a recall and challenged the result, but eventually backed down.

While conservatives presumably did not approve of the outcome, it is difficult to see any failing of RCV here. The thousands of voters who did not prefer either duopoly candidate mattered no less than those who ranked Poliquin or Golden first. Their first choice did not win, but their preferences for Golden to Poliquin were very clear. RCV expressed the will of the people and found the Condorcet winner (candidate who would defeat all other candidates in separate head-to-head contests) with a broad base of support. That's exactly what it was supposed to do. It is difficult to imagine how principled conservatives could endorse the victory of a candidate whom the majority of voters did not prefer, even if that candidate was one of their own.

CONCLUSIONS

It does not require a great deal of insight to see that the status quo of two-party, winner-take-all elections has not delivered the America conservatives claim to want. Taxes and spending have exploded, the national debt is of gargantuan proportions, federal spending as a percent of GDP is at an astonishing

GA Senate runoff in 2020

The most conspicuous example of how RCV could have and should have turned the tide was in last year's Georgia Senate runoff. Republican David Perdue received 49.7 percent of the vote, 13,604 votes shy of a majority. Democrat Joel Ossof won 47.9 percent of the vote, 101,702 votes short. Libertarian Shane Hazel received 2.3 percent of the vote, earning a total of 115,039 votes. Conservatives need no reminding that Ossof won the ensuing runoff, flipping the Senate to the Democrats (with Vice President Harris breaking ties as the speaker).

The small distance between Perdue and a majority, combined with the large number of votes for Hazel, makes the outcome under a hypothetical RCV election easy to predict. Had voters been given the opportunity to rank their choices, and had a mere 12 percent of Hazel's voters marked Perdue as their second favorite, Perdue would have won. In all likelihood, he would have won handily, since Libertarian voters tend to skew Republican. The use of RCV would have produced a more accurate reflection of voter preferences, avoided a costly and time-consuming runoff, and saved the Senate for Republicans.

high of 44 percent. Free trade is routinely ignored by both parties, Presidents wield imperial power through executive order and declare war without asking Congress. Forty percent of births now occur outside of marriage, and almost one-fifth of the US population is on welfare. All this has happened before COVID, through

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Democratic governments, through Republican governments, and through divided governments. How much worse must it get for conservatives before they are ready to consider structural electoral reform?

I have noted that conservatives support gradual, measured change. Two-party, winner-take-all systems, by contrast, do not support incremental change, reasoned discussion, or compromise, and in fact lend themselves to grand social engineering projects once a particular party gains enough power. The other side is demonized, and the most important objective is to get *them* out of power, put *us* in, and then rig the process to keep things the way they are. As tempting as it is to believe in perpetual majorities wielded by people we approve of, history suggests no one party wields total control for very long. Each time the other party gets in power, their agenda becomes more radical and more ambitious. This is not a system that conservatives should welcome.

Most importantly, I believe conservatives should consider the possibility that RCV is a *more moral* voting system. Conservatives, as Russell Kirk points out, believe in an enduring moral order.¹³ I would argue such an order, when applied to elections, includes the following social goods:

- Voter participation
- Voter information
- Competition in parties
- Competition in ideas
- Majority winners (as opposed to plurality)
- Likelihood of a match between a voter's preference and the candidate he/she supports
- Proportional representation of both majorities and minorities
- Positive campaigning¹⁴
- Coalition building

RCV does a better job at promoting these than the alternatives, including the status quo. I would suggest conservative opposition to RCV weakens its claims to the moral high ground and belief in an enduring moral order. Instead, it gives aid and comfort to those who would paint conservatives as reactionaries, opposed to all change on principle, and motivated more by a hunger for political power than by a desire for the common good. Conservative support for RCV, I believe, would show a genuine concern for the common good and the welfare of the body politic.

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ENDNOTES

- ¹ For example, https://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=160
- ² Drutman, Lee “Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop”, cited originally as <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-10-02-0113>
- ³ Drutman, originally cited as https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_9_1s20.html
- ⁴ Duverger F, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, 1964, ISBN 978-0-416-68320-2
- ⁵ <https://www.heritage.org/conservatism/commentary/defining-the-principles-conservatism>
- ⁶ <https://kirkcenter.org/conservatism/ten-conservative-principles/>
- ⁷ Op cit, see footnote 2.
- ⁸ Von Spakovsky and Adams, “Ranked Choice Voting is a Bad Choice”, Issue Brief #4996, Heritage Foundation, August 2019, available online <https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/IB4996.pdf>
- ⁹ This is required for countries with proportional representation.
- ¹⁰ <https://utahrcv.com/about-utahrcv/>
- ¹¹ <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/09/us/elections/results-georgia-house-district-9-primary-election.html>
- ¹² https://ballotpedia.org/Maine%27s_2nd_Congressional_District_election,_2018#Candidates_and_election_results
- ¹³ Op cit, see footnote 6.
- ¹⁴ The June 16th 2018 issue of The Economist, in the article “In Praise of Ranked Choice Voting,” ran a photo of two candidates in an RCV election who were encouraging their supporters to pick the other as their second choice.

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