AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY CONVENTION:
PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR CITIZENS AND POLICYMAKERS

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**INTRODUCTION**

Article V of the United States Constitution allows either Congress or what the Constitution labels a “Constitution for proposing Amendments” to formally propose constitutional amendments for ratification. A convention for proposing amendments also has been called an *Article V convention*, an *amendments convention*, or a *convention of the states*. The common practice of referring to it as a “constitutional convention” or “con-con,” is inaccurate and improper.

When two thirds of the state legislatures apply to Congress for a convention for proposing amendments, the Constitution requires Congress to call one. This Issue Paper refers to the procedure as the *state application and convention process*. The Framers inserted it, and the Ratifiers approved it, primarily to enable the people, through their state legislatures, to amend the Constitution without the consent of Congress. They contemplated that it would be used if the people concluded the federal government had too much power or if it should exceed or abuse its powers.

In some ways, the state application and convention process is a federal analogue of state constitutional procedures allowing voter initiatives. Both serve as ways of bypassing the legislature if lawmakers fail to adopt needed reforms.

Although the state application and convention process has not been carried to completion, throughout American history there have been many efforts to obtain an amendments convention. Some failed only because Congress responded by proposing the sought-for amendments. Other efforts enjoyed insufficient popular support. In recent years, a principal deterrent has been uncertainty about the governing law and how the process is supposed to work. The uncertainty arises partly from a lack of reliable scholarship on the subject, and partly from misinformation campaigns waged by opponents of change.

This is the third in a series of three Issue Papers providing objective, accurate information about the state application and convention process. The first Paper, entitled *Amending the Constitution by Convention: A More Complete View of the Founders’ Plan*, undertook the most thorough examination to date of relevant Founding-Era sources and explained how the Founders intended the process to work. Among its many conclusions was that a convention for proposing amendments was to be a limited-purpose assembly composed of delegates acting as agents of the state legislatures. The Constitution, as understood by the Founders, permits state legislatures to apply for a convention unlimited as to subject matter, but it also permits the state legislatures to define the topic the convention is to address. The Founders believed the latter would be the more common practice.

The first Issue Paper further concluded that under the Founders’ design, state applications cannot limit the convention to specific amendment language. Rather, the convention is a deliberative body that drafts and proposes (or opts not to propose) amendments. However, as explained in this third Paper, delegates are subject to instructions from their home states while the convention is in session.

Finally, the first Issue Paper concluded that under the Founders’ plan, convention proposals within the scope of the prescribed subject are eligible for state ratification or rejection; those outside that scope are recommendations for future action only, not subject to ratification.

The second Issue Paper in the series was *Amending the Constitution by Convention: Lessons for Today*.
from the Constitution’s First Century. It surveyed actual practice from the time of the Founding through adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913. During this time, there were dozens of state applications, accompanied by revealing public discussion and relevant Supreme Court cases. The second Issue Paper showed that from 1789 through 1913, prevailing practice and understanding remained consistent with the Founders’ views. Most policymakers continued to think of a convention for proposing amendments as a “convention of the states.” Most applications contemplated a convention limited to one or more issues, but none tried to restrict the convention to particular amendment language. Most applications identified subjects that Congress had failed to address effectively. Some applications sought conventions that would propose amendments to clarify constitutional meaning, resolve constitutional crises, or both.

This third Issue Paper offers guidance and recommendations for those seeking to implement the state application and convention process. The guidance and recommendations are based on the findings of the two earlier Papers, additional Founding-Era evidence unearthed since the first Paper was published, and on authoritative court cases issued at all stages of our history.

Two caveats for the reader:

1. Recent history shows that as promoters of the process approach success, supporters of the status quo will campaign furiously to abort it. In the past, powerful opposition has come from key figures in Congress, in the judiciary, in the media, and in academia. Opponents have advanced legal objections designed to induce Congress to disregard applications and to persuade the courts to invalidate them. The claim that a convention would be inherently uncontrollable usually has been the most prominent weapon in their arsenal. More recently, however, as the claim of uncontrollability have become increasingly untenable, some opponents have returned to other assertions of uncertainty. This Issue Paper recommends ways to anticipate, and avoid, some of those objections; it also recommends ways to respond to others.

2. The reader should rely on this document only for general background. It is not a substitute for legal advice. Those seeking legislative applications for a convention for proposing amendments should consult competent legal counsel qualified to practice within their own state, and ask counsel to respond only after reading all three Issue Papers.

The Article V Convention in Context

Some people believe that the only precedent for a convention for proposing amendments is the 1787 gathering in Philadelphia that wrote the Constitution. From that, they characterize an Article V convention as a “constitutional convention.” The truth is quite different.

At the time of the Founding, a “convention” was any assembly, other than the legislature, designed to serve a governmental function. Although convention practice began in Great Britain during the 17th century, Americans put it to very wide use. During the 18th century there were dozens of conventions.

Some conventions were held purely within a single colony or state. They represented the towns, counties, or people of the colony or state. Others were meetings of colonial or state governments. They consisted of “commissioners” (delegates) sent by the respective state legislatures to consult on problems prescribed by the commissions that empowered them. Each state delegation formed a unit, often called a “committee,” and the gathering as a whole sometimes was referred to a convention of “the states” or a convention of “committees.” Each delegation represented its state and was subject to instructions from the state legislature or

The Constitution, as understood by the Founders, permits state legislatures to apply for a convention unlimited as to subject matter, but it also permits the state legislatures to define the topic the convention is to address.
Within the limits of pre-set subject matter and subsequent instruction, conventions enjoyed considerable deliberative freedom: they were, after all, convened to act as problem-solvers. They elected their own officers and adopted their own rules. In general, interstate conventions were modeled on those attended by international diplomats.

Although there were many intercolonial conventions earlier in the century, the initial multi-government convention of the Founding Era was the First Continental Congress (1774), which despite being denoted a “Congress,” both qualified as a convention and was understood to be one. There were at least ten interstate conventions held between the Declaration of Independence and 1787: two in Providence, Rhode Island (1776-77 and 1781); one in Springfield, Massachusetts (1777); one in York Town, Pennsylvania (1777); one in New Haven, Connecticut (1778); two in Hartford, Connecticut (1779 and 1780); one in Philadelphia (1780), one in Boston (1780), and one in Annapolis (1786).

Some single-state conventions served only a narrow purpose. For example, the Georgia Constitution of 1777 authorized an intrastate convention solely to draft constitutional amendments suggested by a majority of counties. This provision may have been the direct inspiration for the U.S. Constitution’s “Convention for proposing Amendments.” Other conventions served broad, constitutive purposes. They were called “plenipotentiary” conventions. Among these were the bodies that erected independent state governments after eviction of the colonial governors.

Among interstate conventions, the First Continental Congress was the most nearly plenipotentiary: it was empowered to “to consult and advise [i.e., deliberate] with the Commissioners or Committees of the several English Colonies in America, on proper measures for advancing the best good of the Colonies.” The 1787 Philadelphia gathering (contrary to common belief) was nearly plenipotentiary: it enjoyed very broad power to suggest a new form of government, and was not, as so often claimed, a “runaway” convention.

Most interstate conventions, however, were far more limited—that is, they were targeted at particular problems. The delegates deliberated on the subject or subjects they were empowered to consider, perhaps issued recommendations, and then went home. Thus, the famous Annapolis Convention of 1786 was to focus on “the trade and Commerce of the United States”—whose important but limited scope induced James Madison explicitly to distinguish it from a plenipotentiary convention. The first assembly at Providence (1776-77) was restricted to currency and defense measures, and the second (1781) was entrusted only with ascertaining how to provide army supplies in a single year. The gatherings at New Haven and Philadelphia (1780) dealt with to price regulation only. The first Hartford Convention was empowered to address currency and trade, and the second met “for the purpose of advising and consulting upon measures for furnishing the necessary supplies of men and provision for the army.” In 1777, Congress recommended to the states that they sponsor conventions in York Town, Pennsylvania and Charlestown, South Carolina to consider price-stabilization measures.

The records left from the Founders’ frequent conventions, both within states and colonies and among polities, are sources of convention customs, protocols, and usage. As explained below, these customs, protocols, and usages are of distinct value in clarifying and explaining the legal rules laid down by Article V.

Significantly, the convention journals reveal that all of these assemblies remained essentially within the scope of their calls.” There were no “runaways.”
The Constitution authorized three kinds of conventions, all serving limited purposes. Two kinds are intrastate: (1) conventions to ratify the Constitution and (2) conventions to ratify particular amendments.\(^{10}\) The other is interstate or federal: the convention for proposing amendments.\(^{31}\) Its purpose is to draft and propose for ratification constitutional amendments addressing subjects designated by applying states.\(^{32}\) It pinch-hits for Congress when Congress refuses to act. Like all federal conventions, its members are delegates sent by the state legislatures, and they serve as agents for those legislatures.\(^{33}\)

**The Constitution’s Express Grants of Amending Power**

Article V of the Constitution reads in relevant part:

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress. . . \(^{34}\)

Article V envisions roles in the amendment process for four distinct sorts of assemblies:

- Congress;
- state legislatures;
- state ratifying conventions; and
- conventions for proposing amendments.

Note that in each of these grants, the people bestow on one of these assemblies authority to perform a specific function. When a state legislature or state convention performs an Article V function, it does not act as an organ of the state, nor does it exercise powers reserved to the states under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.\(^{35}\) Each amendment task is bestowed by Article V alone. It is what the Supreme Court calls a “federal function.”\(^{36}\) Similarly, under Article V Congress does not act as the federal legislature, but as an assetting body. In the amendment context, therefore, this Issue Paper designates all four bodies by the label Article V assemblies.

**Article V’s Grants of “Incidental” Powers**

Unlike the Articles of Confederation,\(^{37}\) the Constitution recognized and incorporated the agency-law rule of incidental powers.\(^{38}\) Under the doctrine of incidental powers, unless there are words to the contrary, a grant of an express or...
“principal” power carries with it a grant of implied or “incidental” powers. The doctrine of incidental powers assures that an agent receive sufficient authority to carry out the intent or purpose behind the grant. For example, an agency document entrusting a person with “management of my store, including the power to hire personnel and purchase inventory” generally includes incidental authority to fire personnel and sell inventory.

The doctrine of incidental authority was a well-developed component of Founding-Era jurisprudence. That is the doctrine that defines the outer limits of the Constitution’s granted powers. Under the law of the time, for Power B to be incidental to a principal power (Power A), Power B had to meet certain requirements. It had to be less “worthy” than Power A—less valuable, less important, subsidiary. Thus, authority to manage a store would include authority to sell inventory in the ordinary course of business, but not to sell the entire enterprise. In addition, one of two other requirements had to be met. Power B had to either (1) allow only actions customary for exercising Power A or (2) be so necessary to exercise of Power A that the agent’s work would be crippled (subject to “great prejudice”) unless Power B were included. For example, under the Founders’ law, the sale of inventory would be incidental to the management of a store, because it is customarily part of store management. Whether the power to advertise was incidental to management required that it be customary for store managers to advertise—or that the circumstances be such that otherwise the store could not prosper. Note also that either custom or “great prejudice” was not enough. To be incidental, Power B had to be both subsidiary AND customary or reasonably necessary to the exercise of Power A.

Outside of the anomalous world of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Power and Taxing Power jurisdiction, pretty much the same standards of incidence apply today.

The Constitution expressly acknowledges the grant of incidental powers to Congress by the Necessary and Proper Clause. (The word “necessary” in the Clause is a legal term of art meaning “incidental.”) The Founders explained that the Necessary and Proper Clause bestowed no authority. It was merely an acknowledgment—in the language of the law, a “recital”—that, unlike the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution included incidental powers. Those powers would have been included even if there were no Necessary and Proper Clause.

Accordingly, incidental powers also accompany grants not within the literal scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause. For example, that Clause does not cover the President’s powers, but it always has been understood that the President enjoys incidental authority. The Necessary and Proper Clause does not embrace the grants to conventions and state legislatures in Article V, because that Clause applies only to the “Government of the United States” and “Department[s] or Officer[s] thereof”). Those grants carry incidental powers with them nevertheless.

How can we define the incidental powers of each Article V assembly? By referring to Founding-Era custom. The many conventions and convention calls during the Founding Era left us a record of practices and customs. By virtue of the incidental powers doctrine, those practices and customs are literally part of the Article V. When we cannot find a relevant custom, we must ask what the underlying purposes of a provision are, and how requisite a proposed power is to those purposes.

**Judicial Review**

History is not the only guide in this area. Court decisions assist us as well. At one time, some argued that the courts should take no jurisdiction over Article V matters—that Congress, not the judiciary, should referee the process. Article V matters, it was said, were “political questions” of the kind inappropriate for the judiciary. Support for this view came from a four-justice concurring opinion and a brief dictum (uncontrolling side
opinion) in a 1939 Supreme Court case, Coleman v. Miller.\(^{53}\)

In Coleman, a six-judge majority of an eight-justice bench refused to review whether Kansas had ratified a proposed “anti-child labor” amendment. Doing so would have required the Court to disregard the official state certification of ratification and delve into potentially unsolvable issues of Kansas legislative procedure. The Court’s dictum added that Congress, not the courts, should determine whether a state could ratify an amendment after earlier rejecting it. Four of the six justices separately concurred. They contended that all questions of proper ratification should be left to Congress.

The Coleman dictum and the four-justice concurrence violated a famous aphorism of Chief Justice John Marshall: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”\(^{54}\) This “province and duty” necessarily includes an obligation to say what the Constitution is, including any amendments. That, in turn, requires the Court to determine whether a putative amendment is really part of the Constitution.\(^{55}\)

Fortunately for our inquiry, Coleman has not been followed. As Professor Walter Dellinger once wrote, the case is an “aberration.”\(^{56}\) Today the courts consciously reject the “hands-off” rule of the dictum and concurrence.\(^{57}\) Although the judiciary has applied the “political question” doctrine to some Article V cases, in each of those cases, special facts called for abstention.\(^{48}\) There is no general principle that Article V issues are not justiciable.

The proof has been a respectably-long series of court rulings on Article V extending from 1798 to modern times. For the most part the results are consistent with the intended force of Article V, even if the reasoning sometimes is different.

**Applications for a Convention for Proposing Amendments**

**What is an application, and how is it adopted?**

Article V gives the name “Application” to the resolution by which a state legislature demands that Congress call a convention for proposing amendments. As an Article V assembly, a state legislature is generally free to adopt its own procedures for issuing an application.\(^{59}\) There are some basic rules, however. Both Founding-Era precedent\(^{60}\) and modern case law\(^{61}\) tell us that the governor has no role in the process. He need not sign the application, and may not veto it—no matter what the local state law is on the subject. This is consistent with a very early Supreme Court case dealing with another Article V assembly—Congress.\(^{62}\) That case held that the President is not part of the procedure by which Congress proposes amendments.

The reason state and federal executives are excluded from the amendment process is that Article V confers powers on the named assemblies, not on the lawmaker apparatus per se.\(^{63}\) Resolutions pursuant to Article V, including votes approving applications, are not legislative in nature.\(^{64}\)

For the same reason, state constitutional provisions governing the legislative process do not apply to an Article V application. The courts have invalidated as to Article V resolutions state requirements of legislative super-majorities\(^{65}\) and referenda.\(^{66}\) Restrictions on how an Article V assembly approves resolutions are valid only if freely adopted by the assembly itself.\(^{67}\)

**May an application be limited to particular subject matter?**

The history of the state application and convention process firmly supports the conclusion that an application may request a convention unlimited as to subject.\(^{49}\) That conclusion is uncontroversial, but many have claimed that the applying states do not have the complementary power of limiting a convention to one or more subjects. However, the same history that confirms the states’ power
to apply for an open convention even more clearly confirms their power to apply for a convention limited in subject matter. Before and during the Founding Era, the overwhelming majority of inter-colonial and interstate conventions were limited to one or more prescribed subjects. During the debates over ratification of the Constitution, participants frequently referred to the prospect of states applying for an Article V convention focusing on prescribed reforms. The conclusion is clear: The Constitution’s grant of power to apply for a convention carries with it the incidental power to limit the subject matter of the convention.

Early post-ratification practice was consistent with the view at the Founding. Applications limited as to subject matter included the 1832 application from South Carolina, the petition from Alabama the following year, the 1864 application from Oregon and arguably the 1789 application from Virginia. The ensuing decades witnessed a veritable flood of single-subject applications on such topics as direct election of U.S. Senators and control of polygamy.

Case law in the subject is scanty, but what is available also is consistent with the power of legislatures to limit convention subject matter.

May an application limit the convention to particular language?

Some comparatively recent applications have tried to impose restrictions beyond subject-matter limits. For example, some have sought to require the convention to take an up-or-down vote on an amendment whose precise wording is set forth in the application. Applications also have imposed conditions the effectiveness of the application. These have included conditions precedent (providing that the application becomes effective only when a certain event or events occur) and conditions subsequent (providing that the application becomes ineffective if a particular event or events intervene). Some have imposed both kinds of conditions. There also have been suggestions that applications might impose operating rules for the convention.

Such limitations are constrained by both practical and legal restrictions. As a practical matter, the more terms and conditions placed in applications, the less likely they will match each other sufficiently to be aggregated together to reach the two thirds threshold. If Congress or the courts dislike the contemplated amendments, they may well seize upon wording differences to justify refusal to aggregate.

The courts also are likely to reject any effort by state legislatures to impose rules on the convention. Before and during the Founding Era, conventions enjoyed the power to enact their own rules, suggesting that such is an incident of an Article V convention’s authority to convene, deliberate, and propose. The same practice has prevailed in later years with intrastate conventions. The issue has not been presented squarely to the courts because an Article V convention has been held. However, the courts have protected the right of state legislatures, when acting under Article V, to make their own rules, and they have defended the deliberative independence of state ratifying conventions in other ways. Opponents may well argue that if an application purports to prescribe rules to the convention, it is void for attempting to obtain an illegal result.

Another issue is how far applying legislatures can go in restricting the convention’s deliberations and discretion in advance—by, for example, requiring an up-and-down vote on particular wording or imposing conditions on applications. History provides a short answer: Although up-or-down votes occasionally were required of intrastate gatherings, interstate conventions invariably were deliberative entities, if not always among delegates, then at least among state delegations.
power “for proposing Amendments.” The Framers could have drafted the language otherwise, but they did not. The state legislatures were to enjoy their amendment power not directly, but through a gathering in which the delegates represented them, and while in session were subject to their instructions.84

Why did the Framers insert a convention in the process? Presumably because it was a proven device for collective deliberation, compromise, and conciliation. By deliberation I mean common consideration and weighing of possible alternatives. By compromise and conciliation, I mean hearing and responding to the viewpoints of all states, including those that did not apply for the convention. It is true that a large number of applications with similar restrictions also are likely to be the product of considerable deliberation and some compromise and conciliation. But the convention setting encourages more, and includes the non-applying states. An independent level between state applications and state ratification subjects the process of decision to additional “refinement,” to use James Madison’s term.85

This is another topic on which most subsequent history is consistent with the Founders’ vision. Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries there were many applications for conventions limited as to subject matter, but none sought to dictate precise wording or terms to the convention. At least one application was subject to a condition: An 1861 New Jersey resolution was to be effective only if Congress did not act.86 But that condition did not infringe the assembly’s deliberative freedom once the convention had been called.

In the 1930s, state legislatures did try to restrict the deliberative freedom of Article V assemblies to assure adherence to the popular will. This effort won judicial approval in 1933 in the Alabama Supreme Court advisory opinion, In Re Opinion of the Justices.87 The issue was a state law governing the convention called for ratifying or rejecting the Twenty-First Amendment, which repealed Prohibition. The statute provided that an elector’s vote for convention delegates would not be counted unless the elector first voted “yes” or “no” on the question of whether Prohibition should be repealed. The law required delegates to take an oath promising to support the result of the referendum. The court sustained this procedure as promoting the popular will. The court gave little or no weight to the goal of assuring a deliberative process.

If Assembly X effectively restricts the deliberation of Assembly Y, some of Assembly Y’s decision-making authority is transferred to Assembly X. By absolutely binding the convention to the popular will, the Alabama statute effectively transferred ratification from the convention to the voters. They became the true ratifiers. For this reason, other courts have not followed the rule of In Re Opinion of the Justices.

Even before that case, the Supreme Court had decided that legislative ratification could not be displaced by a referendum88—that the state legislature’s discretion could not be compromised by extraneous rules.89 Further, in the same year as In Re Opinion of the Justices, the Supreme Court of Maine ruled that a referendum cannot bind a ratifying convention because the “convention must be free to exercise the essential and characteristic function of rational deliberation.”90 (Obviously, however, the scope of convention deliberation cannot exceed the subject-matter for which it is empowered.) Since that time, a string of cases have recognized explicitly the connection between control and deliberation, and have done so in the context of state applications as well as in the context of ratification. In 1978 Justice Rehnquist upheld a referendum to influence the application process while emphasizing that the referendum was purely advisory.91 Six years later, the Montana Supreme Court voided an initiative that would have required state lawmakers to apply for a convention for proposing a balanced budget amendment. Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court cases disallowing transfer of ratification power to the voters, the Montana tribunal held that, “[a] legislature making...
an application to Congress for a constitutional [sic] convention under Article V must be a freely deliberating representative body. The deliberative process must be unfettered by any limitations imposed by the people of the state.”

The same year, the California Supreme Court invalidated a voter initiative imposing financial penalties on lawmakers who failed to support an application for a balanced budget amendment.92 The court observed that this was inconsistent with a goal of Article V, which “envisions legislators free to vote their best judgment.”93

During the 1990s battle for federal term limits, activists used the state initiative process to induce lawmakers to support term limits. Members of Congress were instructed to support congressional proposal of a term limits amendment. State lawmakers were instructed to support applications for a convention that would propose term limits. Voter-adopted initiatives inflicted negative ballot language on politicians who refused. Again and again courts invalidated these measures, because by impeding the deliberative function they transferred discretion from Article V assemblies to other actors.94

Although one could interpret those measures as a form of aggressive advice rather than actual coercion, the courts consistently invalidated them.

As an application campaign nears apparent success, it will be opposed by hostile opinion makers, judges, and members of Congress. They will contend that applications restricting convention discretion are inherently void.95 As to the specification of subject matter, there is ample response: The interstate convention was created as a body to recommend resolutions for specifically-identified issues, and was expected to limit its recommendations to those issues.96 It also is clear that a state may go beyond specifying subject matter by offering recommendations in its application.97 However, legislatures that go much beyond that place their applications at risk.

As explained below, during the sitting of the convention the individual delegates can be governed by instructions from the state legislatures they represent. (If instructions clash, the process becomes one of deliberation among states.) Instead of imposing detailed restrictions in the applications, therefore, legislatures should wait until the convention opens.98

**MAY STATES RESCIND APPLICATIONS?**

Some have argued that states cannot rescind applications, and that once adopted an application continues in effect forever, unless a convention is called. This position is contrary to the principles of agency the Founders incorporated into the process. An application is a deputation from the state legislature to Congress to call a convention. Just as one may withdraw authority from an agent before the interest of other parties “vests,” so may the state legislature withdraw authority from Congress before the two thirds threshold is reached.

As author Russell Caplan has shown, the power of a state to rescind its resolutions, offers, and ratifications was well established when Article V was adopted.99 This power ends only when the culmination of a joint process was reached. Thus, a state may rescind ratification of a constitutional amendment any time before three fourths of the states have ratified, but not after. Similarly, a state can withdraw its application any time before two thirds of states have applied. At least one modern court has agreed.100

**CAN AN APPLICATION GROW “STALE” WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME?**

Some have argued that applications automatically become “stale” after an unspecified period of time, and no longer count toward a two thirds majority. There are several reasons for concluding that applications do not become stale. First, as far as I have discovered, there is no evidence from the Founding Era or from early American practice that applications can become stale. Second, although a 1921 Supreme Court case, *Dillon v. Gloss*,...
suggesting that ratifications, to be valid, must be issued within reasonable time of each other,\(^{102}\) the Court essentially disavowed much of the Dillon "staleness" language eighteen years later.\(^{103}\) Third, the staleness issue pertaining to ratification seems to have been resolved by the universally-recognized adoption of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, based on ratifications stretching over two centuries.\(^{104}\)

Fourth, even if ratifications can become stale, it does not follow that applications should follow the same rule. One reason for the "staleness" discussion in Dillon was the Court's interpretation of congressional power to choose a mode of ratification.\(^{105}\) However, congressional authority over the calling of a convention is narrower than the power over ratification: Congress's mode-of-ratification decision is partly discretionary; its duty to call a convention is ministerial.\(^{106}\)

Finally, there is the problem of who is to judge staleness. Because the Constitution prescribes no time period, whether an application is "stale" is a matter of judgment. As the Supreme Court has noted, the courts are not in a position to make this judgment, because they have no legal criteria by which to judge.\(^{107}\) Leaving the decision to Congress would be the worst possible solution,\(^{108}\) because doing so could defeat the central purpose of the state application and convention process—that is, to allow the states to bypass Congress. Comparatively recent history strongly suggests that Congress would manipulate the period to interfere with the process. For example, during the 1960s Senators opposed to state-suggested amendments argued that all applications should be deemed stale (and therefore invalid) after a period of no more than two or three years.\(^{109}\) Because of the biennial schedule of many state legislatures, this would have effectively excised the state application and convention process from the Constitution. On the other hand, a decade later, when many states balked at approving a congressionally-proposed amendment Congress purported to intervene by extending the ratification period from seven to ten years.\(^{110}\)

In the final analysis, the only proper judge of whether an application is fresh or stale is the legislature that adopted it. Any time a legislature deems an application (or a ratification) outdated, the legislature may rescind it, as many have done.

### The Convention Call

**What Power Does Congress Have When Calling the Convention?**

The central purpose of the state application and convention process—to enable the states to promote amendments without congressional obstruction—is reflected in Article V's requirement that after two thirds of states have applied, Congress "shall" call a convention.

The Constitution occasionally bestows authority of a kind normally exercised by one branch on another branch. The President is the chief executive, but he may veto bills, which is essentially a legislative power.\(^{111}\) The Senate is usually a legislative body, but it tries impeachments, a judicial power,\(^{112}\) and approves nominations, an executive power.\(^{113}\) Congress usually exercises legislative authority, but the Constitution grants it authority to declare war, which previous to Independence had been considered an executive power.\(^{114}\)

The Founding-Era record establishes that the role of Congress in calling an amendments convention is to serve as a ministerial agent for the state legislatures.\(^{115}\) In this role, Congress acts in an executive rather than a legislative capacity. Because calling a convention is a mandatory executive duty, it should be enforceable judicially. One potential remedy against a recalcitrant Congress is a declaratory judgment.\(^{116}\) Furthermore, because the duty is "plain, imperative, and entirely ministerial" a writ of mandamus is appropriate.\(^{117}\) Courts also may grant equitable relief, such as an injunction, even against a legislature, if it is violating the Constitution.\(^{118}\)

To assure that Congress does not "gerrymander" the process to defeat its central purpose, powers incidental to its call must be minimal. They certainly
do not include broad authority, as some have suggested, to determine how many delegates there will be, how they will be apportioned, and what the rules of the convention will be. During the Founding Era, an entity asking for an interstate (federal) convention requested states to send delegates of their own choosing. The states themselves, not the “caller,” determined how the delegates were chosen. Conventions elected their own officers, decided after they convened where they would meet, and adopted their own rules, including voting rules. In interstate conventions, the default rule of suffrage was “one state, one vote,” although the convention theoretically had power to alter this. In modern times, the general rule that a convention, or a legislature, operating under Article V controls its own voting rules and procedures was applied by the future Justice Stevens in his much-quoted opinion in Dyer v. Blair.

Based on Founding-era custom, the powers of Congress incidental to the call are to determine if the two thirds threshold has been met, and to specify the time and initial place of meeting, and any subject-matter restrictions imposed by the applications. The decisions over other matters are the prerogatives of other Article V assemblies.

What other formalities are required for the call? The Supreme Court has held that Congress may propose amendments by a two thirds vote of members present (assuming a quorum), not of the entire membership.

By parity of reasoning, Congress should be able to call the convention by majority of members present, assuming a quorum.

As noted above, the evidence strongly supports the view that the President has no role in the amendment process. This is because, as explained earlier, Article V bestows power on particular assemblies, not on the entire legislative apparatus.

The Convention
Who establishes the rules for selecting delegates? Some have suggested that, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress might specify how delegates to an Article V convention are to be chosen. However, Founding-Era practice informs us that delegate selection is incidental to the powers of the state legislature, not to the powers of Congress. Subsequent history is fully consistent: Applications and other documents from the Founding through the 19th century generally referred to Article V conventions as “federal conventions” and “conventions of the states,” rather than as conventions of the people. The Supreme Court also has used the term “convention of the states.” On the one occasion when Congress opted for a proposed constitutional amendment to be ratified by state conventions rather than state legislatures, the states were left in full command of delegate-selection.

Of course, state legislative decisions are subject to general rules imposed on the states by the Constitution, particularly the guarantees of due process, equal protection, and voting rights defined by the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments.

Who sets the rules of the Convention? As noted above, Founding-era custom and modern case law both hold that control over the convention’s proceedings is its own prerogative. As incidents to its power to propose amendments, the convention may establish its own rules, elect its own officers, determine where it continues to sit, fix the hours of sitting, judge the credentials of members, and otherwise oversee housekeeping. If the convention wishes to alter the “one state, one vote” rule, it may do so. During the Founding Era, conventions could punish members of the general public for such “breaches of privilege” as slander of the convention or of members, but this power...
was removed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

**How Are Delegates to Deliberate and What is the Role of State Instructions?**

The Constitution grants the convention, not the states, the power to propose Amendments. This suggests that, within its prescribed subject, the convention has full authority to draft and propose, or refuse to propose, one or more amendments. It need not adopt specific language set forth in state applications.

This conclusion is strengthened by important comments in the Founding-era record—such as Madison’s observation that the convention could refuse to propose anything, by contemporaneous practice, by how the states drafted their applications in the subsequent 125 years, and (as explained above) by a string of court decisions designed to protect the deliberative freedom of Article V assemblies.

Yet the deliberative quality of the convention does not mean that the delegates are completely free actors. American convention delegates have long been subject to instructions from those they represent. As in all prior federal conventions, they are representatives of the state legislatures, and therefore subject to instructions. This is not at all inconsistent with the deliberative quality of the convention: Delegates will discuss issues among themselves and with officials back home, and officials back home will discuss issues with their counterparts in other states. The result will be a textured, multi-layered deliberation likely superior to anything that either the state legislators or the delegates could have produced alone.

**What Happens If the Convention “Proposes” an Amendment Outside the Subject-Matter Assigned by the Applications?**

Because the convention ultimately serves the state legislatures, proposals outside the call are ultra vires; only those within the scope of authority, as fixed by the applications, have legal force. Under agency law (both at the Founding and today), an agent may suggest to his principal a course of action outside the agent’s sphere of authority—but it has no legal effect. For example, if a convention called to consider a balanced budget amendment recommends both a balanced budget amendment and a term limits amendment, only the former is a “proposal” within the meaning of Article V. The latter is merely a recommendation for future consideration. Congress may specify a “Mode of Ratification” only for the balanced budget amendment, and states may ratify only that proposal. If Congress, the legislatures, or the public agrees with the convention’s term limits recommendation, the states may apply anew for a convention with authority to propose it, or Congress itself may propose it.

**Transmittal of Proposals to the States**

Although a convention’s proposal does not technically pass through Congress to the states, the Constitution does require and empower Congress to select one of two “Modes of Ratification.” Congress’s power in this regard is the same as if it had proposed the amendment.

Congress has no choice as to whether to choose a “Mode.” The Constitution requires it to do so. Because selecting, like calling an Article V convention, is a mandatory rather than discretionary duty (see above), it should be enforceable judicially. On the other hand, the congressional decision to select one mode rather than the other is unreviewable.

Congress may enjoy some powers incidental to selecting the mode of ratification. But as explained earlier, a power incidental to selecting the mode of ratification must be both subsidiary to it and coupled with it by custom or strong necessity. The power to select the mode is obviously a limited and discrete choice, and certainly does not justify sprawling congressional authority over the state
ratification process. The Supreme Court’s holding in *Dillon v. Gloss*—that Congress may specify a time period for ratification as an incident of selecting the mode—may or may not be correct, but it should apply only when the proposal comes from Congress. Congress may specify a time period for its own proposed amendments, since proposers generally may impose time limits on their proposals. But when a convention proposes amendments, the convention, not Congress, is the correct agency for setting the time limit. Vesting the power in Congress would be inconsistent with the purpose of the state-application-and-amendment process, since it would enable Congress to throttle proposals it disliked by imposing very short time limits.141

**Recommendations for Advocates**

**Anticipate Objections**

In recent years, most of the visible opposition to the state application and convention process has some from small political groups claiming the convention would be uncontrollable and might even stage a *coup d’etat*. My previous two Issue Papers have demonstrated that such claims are insubstantial, and can be disregarded. Much more threatening will be the potent and sophisticated opposition that will mobilize as the state application and convention process gains ground. Opponents will include members of Congress and the executive branch, media apologists for the federal government, and representatives of the far-flung web of interests now enjoying access to federal power or receiving federal largess: tax-supported foundations and policy centers, lobbyists, academics, and others. They will be well funded and aggressive.

We can predict some of their tactics from how they resisted state application campaigns in the latter half of the 20th century, as well as from ways in which entrenched special interests battle citizen initiatives at the state level. For example, we can expect them to subject leaders of the application process to harassment and personal abuse and to tell the public that a successful convention will rob them of jobs and government benefits.

In addition to summoning the ghoul of the “runaway convention,” opponents may claim that the process is “minority rule” because if all the least-populous states—and only the least populous states—applied for a convention, then one could be called at the behest of states with less than a third of the population. (The implausibility of that scenario has not deterred some from raising it in the past.)144 Opponents also will raise legal objections. Politicians, lawyers, and academics who would never apply the same standard to amendments increasing federal power, will assert that to be valid the state application and convention process must be legally picture-perfect.143 They will sue to invalidate state applications, and perhaps sue to prevent Congress from aggregating applications or issuing a call. They also will rely on legal grounds to induce Congress to disregard applications.

It follows that advocates must proceed in a manner that is as legally bulletproof as is consistent with success. That requires advocates to anticipate legal obstacles, avoid those that can be avoided, and prepare defenses against those that are unavoidable. Some impediments are unforeseeable, and will have to be met as they arise.144

Legal arguments, of course, vary in their degree of credibility. Among the more specious objections raised against the application campaigns of the 1960s and 1970s were the following: (1) Despite the Constitution’s use of the word “shall,” Congress has no obligation to call a convention when it receives proper applications from two thirds of the states,145 (2) the state application and convention process is no longer part of the Constitution and may be ignored,146 (3) applications from “mal-apportioned” legislatures do not count,149 (4) applications dating from before a legislature is re-apportioned do not count,148 (5) applications more than a few years old are “stale,”148 (6) single subject applications are...
invalid, and Congress may use its power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to control delegate-selection and convention rules. Reliance by Congress or the courts on such arguments to abort or hobble a convention could ignite a constitutional crisis of the first magnitude.

Potential legal objections with more merit include: (1) A rescinded application is no longer valid; (2) varying and inartfully-drawn applications, even if targeted at the same subject, are too imprecise to be aggregated; and (3) applications are void if they try to control the convention unduly—if, for example, they mandate precise language or convention rules.

**Promote the right amendments**

Most people have one or more causes dear to their hearts that they would love to see written into the Constitution. But the state application and convention process is no place for unpopular, ineffective, or idiosyncratic causes. Each potential amendment should comply with at least four criteria:

1. Like most amendments already adopted, it should move America back toward Founding principles.
2. It should promise substantial, rather than merely symbolic or marginal, effect on public policy.
3. It should be widely popular.
4. It should be a subject that most state lawmakers, of any political party, can understand and appreciate.

History’s most successful application campaign—for direct election of U.S. Senators—met all of these criteria. The proposal was widely popular and well understood by state lawmakers because year after year legislative election of senators had fostered legislative deadlocks, corruption, and submersion of state elections by federal issues. Direct-election advocates represented the campaign as necessary to restore Founding principles, and predicted substantial improvement in the quality of government.

As of this writing, an amendment addressing federal deficit spending or imposing a single-subject rule on Congress probably meets all four criteria; an amendment to abolish the income tax or ban abortion probably does not.

**Coordinate**

Some of America’s most successful reform campaigns took advantage of close cooperation among states. The American Revolution was coordinated first through “committees of correspondence” and later by the Continental Congress. Other interstate campaigns failed for lack of coordination, notably the effort to call an Article V convention to stave off the Civil War.

During the battle for direct election of senators, the legislatures of several states erected standing committees with funded command centers to prepare common forms and assist the common effort. In future application campaigns, state legislatures may do the same, or an independent organization may take the lead. There should be a common presence on the World Wide Web. Each applying legislature should designate a contact person for official communications from other states. Each applying legislature should notify all other state legislatures of its actions. All applications should be sent to as many recipients as possible, especially (of course) Congress.

As the campaign builds steam, states should communicate on such subjects as: how they will choose their delegates, what the convention rules will be, and the size of state delegations. The exchange of information, including information about America’s long history of conventions, will enable states to address differences in advance of the meeting, maintain momentum and control over the process, and protect it from congressional interference.

**Adopt simple common forms**

History shows that legislative resolutions applying
for a convention must be carefully and simply worded and follow a common formula. This reduces the risk of the kind of misunderstandings that plagued the application process during the nullification controversy. It also reduces the risk that different applications will be deemed to cover different subjects. The resolutions (in most states, probably concurrent rather than joint, since the governor’s signature is unnecessary) should be relatively short. Each resolution should say that it is an application pursuant to Article V and clearly call for (not just recommend) a “convention for proposing amendments” rather than a “constitutional” or some other kind of convention. Lengthy or argumentative “whereas” clauses are inadvisable. If political conditions call for explanations, they can be inserted into an accompanying document, such as an explanatory resolution.

The organizers of the campaign for direct election of Senators understood these rules. Their “Minnesota form,” used widely in that campaign, remains an excellent starting point for drafters, both because it meets the most important criteria and because it enjoys the imprimatur of historical usage.

I recommend that drafters avoid precatory and recommendatory language. If, however, the legislature wishes to recommend particular terms or wording in the application, the application should be clear that (1) the amendment is being recommended, but (2) the convention is being demanded. Ideally, though, legislative recommendations should be in a separate resolution, adopted either at the time of application or, preferably, after the convention has been called.

ENSURE THAT THE APPLICATION SPECIFIES THE SUBJECT OF THE AMENDMENT WITHOUT DICTATING THE WORDING

For reasons already explained, an application should not require or be conditional on the convention proposing precise wording. This may be construed as an impermissible infringement of the convention’s legal prerogatives or as a narrowing of a subject otherwise common with other applications.

I recommend that each application state a single subject, with wording identical to, or as close as possible to, the applications on that subject issued by other states. Legislatures adopting resolutions after a number of other states already have applied may wish to designate previous applications it considers as addressing the same subject. If the state legislature wishes to apply for a convention to consider several issues, it should approve one application for each. Otherwise, Congress may refuse to aggregate applications because of disparate terms.

The 1901 Minnesota form of application for direct election of senators is probably a good model. It applied “for the calling of a convention to propose an amendment to the Constitution of the United States making United States Senators elective in the several States by direct vote of the people.” That clearly delineated the subject, but left to the convention such details as “grandfathering” of sitting Senators, qualifications of electors, election at large or by districts, filling of vacancies, and whether to specify requirements for plurality or majority voting.

OPERATE CONTEMPORANEOUSLY AND QUICKLY

As discussed earlier, by a proper interpretation of the law, state applications do not grow “stale.” They remain effective until either rescinded or two thirds of states have applied for a convention on the same subject. Because the Supreme Court never has ruled authoritatively on the point, advocates must take care to give opponents no grounds for plausible objection on the basis of time. If possible, the entire campaign must be planned for completion in three to four years.

MAKE CLEAR THAT THE PROCESS IS A STATE, NOT A FEDERAL, PROCEDURE

Advocates must be very clear that congressional intervention into this state-based procedure is unwelcome, and will be resisted. From the very beginning, advocates must announce clearly that
state legislatures will govern the application process, Congress has no discretion over whether to call the convention, the states will determine how their delegates are chosen, and the convention itself will determine its own rules, including its voting rules.

**Respond to the “minority rule” argument**

As in the past, opponents will claim the state application and convention process is a license for “minority rule” because, in theory, states with a minority of the American population could trigger a convention. Advocates should respond by pointing out that this is improbable as a practical matter because political realities will put larger states on the same side as smaller states: Texas, for example, is much more politically akin to a small state like South Dakota than to a large state like Massachusetts. Further, the application stage is only an initial step in a three-step process. A majority of states at the convention will have to propose any suggested amendments; in the glare of public view they are unlikely to advance proposals most Americans find distasteful. Finally, any proposal will have to be ratified by 38 states—including, in all probability, some that failed to apply. They will almost certainly represent a super-majority of the American people.

**Consider carefully how, and how many, delegates are to be chosen.**

Under a proper interpretation of Article V, each state legislature determines how delegates are to be chosen and how many will be chosen. These should be matters of interstate discussion once it appears an application campaign will be successful.

The three most obvious methods of selection are designation by the governor, selection by the legislature, and election by the people. The force of uniform historical precedent favors selection by the legislature, and under Article V it is the state legislatures rather than the governor or the people that are immediate participants in the amendment process. Furthermore, legislative selection is more democratic than gubernatorial choice, but may be a better way than popular election to select designees for what is essentially a large legal and political drafting committee. In addition, delegates will be subject to legislative instruction, and are more likely to respond to that instruction if the legislature selected them and can replace them.

The principal objection to legislative selection will be that it is not as democratic as direct election. In one sense this is true, but in another it is not: Delegates amendable to legislative instruction can be guided according to their state legislature’s sense of evolving public opinion. Delegates elected directly, and presumably not subject to replacement, may pursue their own agenda irrespective of how public opinion evolves.

Of course, however the delegates are chosen, their work will be subject to popular review through the difficult ratification process.

Where political conditions require that delegates be elected directly, each state legislature will have to determine whether election at-large or in districts is most appropriate.

As to the size of delegations: The delegations at the 1787 ranged from two (New Hampshire) to eight (Pennsylvania). Several factors argue for limiting the size of modern delegations to three or at most five per state. (An odd number will tend to avoid deadlock within a state delegation and resultant loss of that state’s vote.) One factor is that while the delegates in Philadelphia needed to assess fundamental principles of American government, those in a convention for proposing amendments will face a much more limited task. Another is that there are now far more states to be represented. Delegates today are less likely to be absent due to transportation difficulties and bad health, and if a delegate can no longer serve, he or she can be replaced almost instantly.

Consultation among the states well in advance of the convention probably will result in general agreement on the proper size of delegations. If some states, either through an abundance of
enthusiasm or a desire to cripple the process, send delegations of excessive size, the convention may adopting a rule limiting the number on the floor from each state at any time.

**Conclusion**
The Founders inserted the state application and convention process to be used, especially when the federal government has abused or exceeded its authority. Not employing it in such circumstances is literally to dishonor and threaten the Founders’ design.

Because a convention for proposing amendments has never been called, the process seems mysterious to some. Some have taken advantage of the mystery by calling up specters of their own devising.

There need be no mystery. The nature of the process is recoverable from American history and American law. We know how other federal conventions worked during the Founding, and we have nearly two centuries of experience after the Founding with state applications and with other kinds of conventions.

These Issue Papers have largely recovered that history, and while they do not answer all questions, they do answer the fundamental ones.

The issues that remain will be resolved as state lawmakers and other citizens invoke the process. Those issues will be resolved by mutual consultation and, perhaps in a few instances, by judicial decision. There is nothing unusual in this: As the Founders recognized, some constitutional questions can be elucidated only through practice. The venture is worth the price, for as events over the past few decades have shown, without a vigorous state application and convention procedure, our Constitution is not fully effective after all.

* Robert G. Natelson, the author of The Original Constitution: What It Actually Said and Meant (2d ed. 2011) and co-author of The Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause (Cambridge Univ. Press 2010), is a constitutional historian. He is Senior Fellow in Constitutional Jurisprudence at the Independence Institute in Denver, Colorado and at the Montana Policy Institute in Bozeman, Montana, and Senior Fellow at the Goldwater Institute in Phoenix Arizona. He served as Professor of Law at The University of Montana for a quarter of a century. He is best known for his studies of the Constitution’s original understanding, and for bringing formerly-neglected sources of evidence to the attention of constitutional scholars. His works are listed at [http://constitution.i2i.org/about/](http://constitution.i2i.org/about/).

We acknowledge the Goldwater Institute for publishing an earlier version of this Issue Paper.

**This Paper provides some background on legal issues, but is not intended to be legal advice. Local counsel should be consulted before taking action.**

**Endnotes**

1 Bibliographical Note:


In addition, this Paper includes many more specific citations. Works referred to more than once are as follows:

Charles L. Black, Jr., The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster, 72 Yale. L.J. 957 (1963) [hereinafter Black]

Arthur E. Bonfield, The Dirksen Amendment and the

RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY NATIONAL CONVENTION (Oxford Univ. Press, 1988) [hereinafter Caplan]


Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (5 vols; 1941 ed. inserted in 2 vols.) (2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter Elliot's Debates]

Roger Sherman Hoar, Constitutional Conventions: The Nature, Powers, and Limitations (1917) [hereinafter Hoar]

Journals of the Continental Congress (34 vols., various dates) [hereinafter JCC]


1 Technically, however, state ratifying conventions also are “Article V conventions.”

2 See generally, Natelson, Founders’ Plan, supra note 1.

It may also serve to give “political cover” to those in Congress who believe change necessary, but who dare not act to promote it. For example, a member of Congress may believe that “earmarks” are wrong—but without a constitutional ban on earmarks he cannot abstain from seeking them without endangering re-election.

3 See generally, Natelson, First Century, supra note 1.

4 Natelson, Founders’ Plan, supra note 1. See also In Re Opinion of the Justices, 132 Me. 491, 167 A. 176 (1933) (“The principal distinction between a convention and a Legislature is that the former is called for a specific purpose, the latter for general purposes”). Id., 167 A. at 179.

5 Natelson, Founders’ Plan, supra note 1. See also Hoar, supra note 1, at 2-10 (describing state constitutional conventions at the Founding); In Re Opinion of the Justices, 132 Me. 491, 167 A. 176, 179 (1933) (noting that conventions within states directly represented the people).

6 E.g., 2 Hoadley, supra note 1, at 578 (reproducing a resolution of the 1780 Philadelphia convention, referring to it as a “meeting of the several states”). After the Constitution was ratified, early state applications applied similar nomenclature to a convention for proposing amendments. Natelson, First Century, supra note 1.

7 E.g., 17 JCC, supra note 1, at 790 (Aug. 29, 1780).

8 Natelson, Founders’ Plan, supra note 1.

9 Id., Natelson, supra note 1, at 95-96.

10 The term was commonly used to denote a meeting of sovereignties. See, e.g., Thomas Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of the English Language (1789) (unpaginated) (defining “congress” in part as “an appointed meeting for settlement of affairs between different nations”).

11 E.g., 1 JCC, supra note 1, at 17 (quoting the credentials of the Connecticut delegates, empowering them to attend the “congress, or convention of commissioners, or committees of the several Colonies in British America”). The Second Continental Congress (1775-81) arguably also was a convention, but because it acted as a regular government for more than six years, I have not treated it as such. The Confederation Congress (1781-89) was a regularly-established government.

12 See 17 JCC, supra note 1, at 790 (Aug. 29, 1780) & 18 id., at 932 (Oct. 16, 1780) (referring to the three-state convention, which met in August of that year).

13 For a summary of multi-colony and multi-state conventions through 1787, see Robert G. Natelson,
Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “Convention for Proposing Amendments.”
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2044296. That article can also be consulted as an additional source for the footnotes immediately following this footnote (i.e., those that deal with 18th-century conventions).

18 Ga. Const. (1777), art. LXIII:

No alteration shall be made in this constitution without petitions from a majority of the counties . . . at which time the assembly shall order a convention to be called for that purpose, specifying the alterations to be made, according to the petitions preferred to the assembly by the majority of the counties as aforesaid.

17 The Committee of Detail’s draft at the 1787 convention looked rather like the Georgia provision. 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 188 (Max Farrand, ed., 1937).

18 1 JCC, supra note 1, at 18 (commission of Connecticut delegates). The Second Continental Congress (1775-81) arguably also was a convention, but because it acted as a regular government for more than six years, I have not treated it as such. The Confederation Congress (1781-89) was a regularly-established government.

19 The charge that the 1787 Philadelphia Convention was a “runaway” is based on misunderstandings of Founding-Era law and vocabulary, Natelson, Founders’ Plan, supra note 1, and of the sequence of events: Congress did not initiate the process, and its resolution for a narrow call was only a non-binding “opinion.” Seven states gave their delegates very broad authority before Congress acted, and ultimately only two of the twelve participating states followed the narrower congressional formula.

20 Id.

21 Proceedings of Commissioners to Remedy Defects of the Federal Government (Annapolis, Sep. 11, 1786), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/annapoli.asp. Because only five states were present, the delegates voted not to proceed with their charge and suggested to Congress that it call a convention with a broader charge.

22 Caplan, supra note 1, at 23. On this usage, see also id., at xx-xxi (explaining usage) & 20 (quoting Hamilton).

23 1 Hoadley, supra note 1, at 585-86.

24 3 Hoadley, supra note 1, at 575-76.

25 Id. at 607 (New Haven) & 2 Hoadley, supra note 1, at 572 (Philadelphia).

26 2 Hoadley, supra note 1, at 562.

27 3 Hoadley, supra note 1, at 565 (commission of New Hampshire delegate).

28 Caplan, supra note 1, at 17. 7 JCC, supra note 1, at 124-25 (Feb. 15, 1777) (reproducing the congressional call, together with a like convention in Charlestown, apparently never held). In 1777, Congress also recommended price conventions in Charleston and Frederickburg, Virginia for the following year.

29 To anticipate objections: The founding generation would have seen the first Providence Convention’s decision to recommend a day of prayer 1 Hoadley, supra note 1, at 598-99, as well within its charge to consult for the common defense. The Boston Convention’s liberality in construing its commission to advise on all affairs “related to the war” was understandable given the broad scope. 3 Hoadley, supra note 1, at 561-64. As noted above, the 1787 convention was not a runaway, as often charged, except perhaps as to a small minority of delegates.

The strongest case for a runaway involves the Annapolis Convention, convened to consider issues of commerce, but soon adjourned because of poor attendance. It recommended that a plenipotentiary convention be held the following year. However, agents may make recommendations outside their commissions, although those recommendations have no legal force. Natelson, Founders’ Plan, supra note 1.

30 U.S. Const., art. V.

31 Id.

32 Natelson, Founders’ Plan, supra note 1.

33 Id.

34 U.S. Const., art. V.


37 Article II of the Articles of Confederation excluded the doctrine of incidental (implied) powers by this language:

Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction,
and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.

38 This subject is fully developed in a new Cambridge University Press book on the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause, Lawson, et al., supra note 1, and the discussion here follows that treatment.

39 Id., at 82-83.

40 Id. at 61-62.

41 Id. at 65.

42 Id. at 64-66.

43 As Chief Justice Marshall pointed out, the goal for exercising the incidental power had to really be to further the principal—an incidental power could not be exercised for its own sake on the “pretext” of seeking an authorized goal. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819). Today, Congress frequently regulates matters, allegedly as incidents of the power to regulate “Commerce . . . among the several States,” that it really is regulating for their own sake, not because they are tied to commerce. Robert G. Natelson, Tempering the Commerce Power, 68 Mont. L. Rev. 95 (2007).

44 Id. at 113-15.

45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

46 Lawson et al., supra note 1, at 64.

47 Id. at 97-108.


49 The famous debate in the First Congress over whether the President could remove federal officers without senatorial consent was won by those who claimed that the power to remove was either incidental to the power to appoint or incidental to the executive power generally. The debate is found at 1 Annals of Cong. 473-608 (June 16-23, 1789), available at http://international.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llac&fileName=001/llac001.db&recNum=51.

50 United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931) (“the fifth article does not purport to delegate any governmental power to the United States . . . On the contrary . . . that article is a grant of authority by the people to Congress, and not to the United States.”).

51 At a conference at Cooley Law School on September 16, 2010, a participant cited United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931) for the proposition that Article V was not open to construction, and so granted no incidental powers. However, Sprague involved not the entirety of Article V, but only unambiguous language where no construction or supplementation was necessary. Id. at 732.

52 Cf. In Re Opinion of the Justices, 132 Me. 491, 167 A. 176 (1933) (relying on custom to determine permissible apportionment of delegates for state ratifying convention).


54 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

55 As the court did in United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217 (1934) (taking judicial notice of the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment).


A reason sometimes given is the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), where the Court eschewed the political question doctrine, and issued a decision directly against Congress.

58 Coleman itself was in this category, for investigation would have required that the Court look behind a state’s certification of ratification. See also Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922) (suggesting that validity of the Fifteenth Amendment was no longer open to question, but resolving the validity of the Nineteenth); White v. Hart, 80 U.S. 646 (1871) (refusing to hear the argument that a provision of the Reconstruction-Era Georgia Constitution had not been freely adopted, when the state professed to adopt that provision voluntarily, and opening the issue would unsettle several ratified constitutional amendments).


60 Natelson, Founders’ Plan, supra note 1.
41 Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 373 Mass. 877, 366 N.E.2d 1226 (1977) (application not subject to gubernatorial veto).

42 Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).


46 Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); Hawke v. Smith ("Hawke II"), 253 U.S. 221 (1920). See also State ex rel. Donnelly v. Myers, 127 Ohio St. 104, 186 N.E. 918 (1933); In Re Opinion of the Justices, 132 Me. 491, 167 A. 176 (1933); In Re Opinion of the Justices, 204 N.C. 306, 172 S.E. 474 (1933); State ex rel. Tate v. Sevier, 333 Mo. 662, 62 S.W.2d 895 (1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 679 (1933); Prior v. Norland, 68 Colo. 263, 188 P. 727 (1916).


47 Dyer, supra.

48 Such applications were submitted by New York in 1789, by Georgia in 1832, and by several other states in the run-up to the Civil War. Natelson, First Century, supra note 1.

49 Natelson, Founders’ Plan, supra note 1, at 15-18.

50 On custom as defining incidental powers, see the section on the subject above.

51 Natelson, First Century, supra note 1.

52 E.g., In Re Opinion of the Justices, 204 N.C. 306, 172 S.E. 474, 477 (1933) (state may limit authority of a ratifying convention). See also Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 373 Mass. 877, 366 N.E.2d 1226 (1977) (holding that a single-subject application is a valid application, and although refusing to hold that it would restrict the convention, noting that the Founders expected the states to specify subject matter in their applications).


54 Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 680 (Feb. 1, 1861) ("unless the remedies before suggested be speedily adopted, then, as a last resort, the State of New Jersey hereby makes application, according to the terms of the Constitution, of the Congress of the United States, to call a convention (of the States) to propose amendments").

55 Supra note 73 (Utah application stating that it becomes void if Congress proposes an identical amendment).

56 139 Cong. Rec.-Senate 14565 (Jun. 29, 1993) (Missouri application containing condition precedent of congressional non-action, followed by condition subsequent of congressional action).

57 Caplan, supra note 1, at 107-08, suggests that refusal to aggregate would be improper, and that applications could be amended to comply with each other.

58 E.g., 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1937), at 7-9 & 14-16 (discussion and agreement to rules of Constitutional Convention); 2 The Federalist No. 10 (Madison).

59 Hoar, supra note 1, at 170-84 (discussing the rule-making power of conventions).


61 E.g., In Re Opinion of the Justices, 132 Me. 491, 167 A. 176, 180 (1933).

62 Cf. Bonfield, supra note 1, at 959 (arguing that applications seeking ratification by state legislatures rather than state convention see an illegitimate end and should be disregarded).

63 As explained below, state legislatures may send instructions to delegates while the convention is in process.

64 Infra.

65 See, E.g., The Federalist No. 10 (Madison).

66 Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 680 (Feb. 1, 1861) ("unless
the remedies before suggested be speedily adopted, then, as a last resort, the State of New Jersey hereby makes application, according to the terms of the Constitution, of the Congress of the United States, to call a convention (of the States) to propose amendments”.

*7 148 So. 107 (Ala. 1933).

*8 Hawke I, *supra*.

*9 Leser, *supra*.

*10 In Re Opinion of the Justices, 132 Me. 491, 167 A. 176, 180 (1933). See also Dyer, *supra*, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1307 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (“Article V identifies the body—either a legislature or a convention—which must ratify a proposed amendment. The act of ratification is an expression of consent to the amendment by that body. By what means that body shall decide to consent or not to consent is a matter for that body to determine for itself.”). (Italics added.)


*14 686 P.2d at 613.


*16 See, E.g., Black, *supra* note 1, at 962-64 (arguing that an application referencing specific language should be disregarded).

*17 See Natelson, *Founders’ Plan, supra* note 1; Natelson, *First Century, supra* note 1, and discussion above.


*19 See below.

*100 CAPLAN, *supra* note 1, at 108-110.


*103 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 438, 452-53 (1939): But it does not follow that, whenever Congress has not exercised that power, the Court should take upon itself the responsibility of deciding what constitutes a reasonable time and determine accordingly the validity of ratifications.

*104 See Paulsen, *supra* note 1.

*105 Dillon, 256 U.S. at 376.

*106 See United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931) (discussing congressional discretion at to mode); Natelson, *Founders’ Plan, supra* note 1 (discussing ministerial nature of call after applications).


*108 Cf. Paulsen, *supra* note 1, at 717 (“the least defensible position would seem to be one of plenary congressional power”).


*111 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2 & 3.

*112 Id., art. I, § 3, cl. 6.

*113 Id., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

*114 Id., art. I, §8, cl. 11. On the King’s power to declare war, see NATelson, ORiGINAL COStITUTION, *supra* note 1, at 124.

*115 Natelson, *Founders’ Plan, supra* note 1.
opposed a convention. who addressed the issue in the 1960s and 1970s, (1979), although Professor Gunther, like most academics
875 (1967-68).


Proposed Legislation to Implement the Convention

congressional legislation. See, similar holding in

should not apply to an amendments convention.

referring to a ratifying body, there is no reason this rule

consent or not to consent is a matter for that body to

by that body. By what means that body shall decide to

ratification is an expression of consent to the amendment

identifies the body—either a legislature or a convention—

1. Congress, noted the possibility of mandamus against

Theodore Sedgwick, an attorney speaking the First

relief against the relevant congressional officer). Rep.

502 n.16, 517, 550 (1969) (not ruling out such

232 (1900).

improperly evicted member of Congress).

a declaratory judgment retroactively reinstating an

united states Constitution , 14

in Gerald Gunther, Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster

Article V: A Threatened Disaster

E.g. supra note 1, at 93-94.

supra note 1.

See also In Re Opinion of the Justices, 132 Me.

491, 167 A. 176 (1933) (holding that state ratifying

convention governs questions of qualifications and filling

of vacancies).

James Madison to Philip Mazzei, Dec. 10, 1988, in 11


For example, the Annapolis Convention adjourned without making a recommendation related to its charge. See http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/annapolis.asp.

See generally Natelson, First Century (reproducing various applications, all of which left the convention with considerable drafting discretion).

Hoar, supra note 1, at 127-29.

Natelson, Founders’ Plan, supra note 1, at 5 & 9.

Natelson, Founders’ Plan, supra note 1, at 24 (quoting the conclusion of a study by President Carter’s assistant attorney general, John Harmon).


256 U.S. 368 (1921).

Rees, supra note 1, at 93-94.

See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster, 72 Yale. L.J. 957, 960 (1963); Kauper, supra note 1, at 914 (referencing argument of Theodore Sorenson). See
Natelson, *Founders’ Plan*, supra note 1, and infra for responses to this argument.

14 E.g., Black, *supra* note 1, at 963 ("Generally, a high degree of adherence to exact form, at least in matters of importance, is desirable in this ultimate legitimating process; a constitutional amendment ought to go through a process unequivocally binding on all."); Bonfield, *supra* note 1, at 952 (following Black).

There is a delicious irony behind Professor Black’s position: Black achieved national notice with constitutional arguments based on the Fourteenth Amendment, an amendment whose ratification was a particularly messy affair.

14 A number of unforeseeable legal obstacles have been imposed on the initiative process at the state level. See, *e.g.*, Marshall v. State ex rel. Cooney, 293 Mont. 274, 975 P.2d 325 (1999) (overruling pre-existing election laws after the election and imposing the change retroactively to invalidate adoption of a tax-limitation initiative).

14 To his irritation, the late Senator Sam Ervin encountered this attitude among some of his colleagues. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., *Proposed Legislation to Implement the Convention Method of Amending the Constitution*, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 875, 878 (1967-1968).


14 *Caplan, supra* note 1, at 75 (paraphrasing Sen. Joseph Tydings).


14 *Caplan, supra* note 1, at 75-76 (paraphrasing Sen. Robert Kennedy). See also id. at 110-14 (discussing this issue). *Caplan* paraphrases Professor Paul Freund of Harvard Law School as arguing that shorter time limits should be imposed on states applying for a convention than for ratifying an amendment approved by Congress. The opinion illustrates an elite view, but seems indefensible. Id. at 112-13. See also Bonfield, *supra* note 1, at 963-65 (arguing that applications more than about two-and-a-half years old should be disregarded); Lester Bernhard Orfield, *The Amending of the American Constitution* 41-42 (1942) (suggesting possible time limits).


15 See, *e.g.*, Kauper, *supra* note 1, at 907: Similarly, the power to issue a call for a convention implies the power to fix its time, place, and duration, and the compensation of delegates. Moreover, some questions, such as the composition of the convention, the method of selecting the delegates, and whether each state shall vote as a unit as opposed to voting by individual delegates, are fundamental questions which cannot be resolved by the delegates themselves. A broad supervisory role of Congress inheres in the situation.

15 This problem is discussed in Walter E. Dellinger, 88 Yale L.J. 1623, 1636-38 (1979). See also Natelson, *First Century*, *supra* note 1 (describing confusion over the 1832 South Carolina application).

15 See Natelson, *First Century*, *supra* note 1. The author is not commenting on the advisability of direct election, but is discussing public perceptions during the direct-election campaign.


155 Thus, confusion among applicants and potential applicants during the Nullification Crisis was succeeded by more clarity and standardization during the direct-election campaign. *Id*.


157 34 Cong. Rec. 2560 (Feb. 18, 1901): Be it enacted by the legislature of the State of Minnesota:

SECTION 1. The legislature of the State of Minnesota hereby makes application to the Congress, under the provisions of Article V of the Constitution of the United States, for the calling of a convention to propose an amendment to the Constitution of the United States making United States Senators elective in the several States by direct vote of the people.

SEC. 2. The secretary of state is hereby directed to transmit copies of this application to the Senate, House of Representatives of the Congress and copies to the members of the said Senate and House of Representatives from this State; also to transmit copies hereof to the presiding officers of each of the legislatures now in session in the several States, requesting their cooperation.


159 *Id*.

160 The Seventeenth Amendment ultimately dealt with several, but not all, of those issues. U.S. Const., amend. XVII reads as follows: The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall
have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.

When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointment until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.

This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.

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