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STATE LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA AND SUBNATIONAL VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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“[I]f we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations.” -James Madison, Federalist 42²

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In November 2012, voters in the states of Colorado and Washington passed ballot initiatives to legalize recreational marijuana industries. Since then, six additional states and the District of Columbia have followed suit, and many more have seen legalization debates in their legislative halls and among their electorates. Over twenty bills introduced in the 115th Congress seek to break federal marijuana laws away from prohibition. Although the national debate is indeed a vibrant one, it has neglected to address how legalization may be jeopardizing the compliance status of the United States under international drug treaties, and what the consequences may be if legalization means breach. For decision-making over marijuana policy to produce creditable outcomes, it must take into consideration the factor of international relations. Subnational conduct implicating treaty commitments is in fact not without precedent in America, and one episode in particular—notable for its contributions to the nation’s constitutional origins—reveals how treaty noncompliance can degrade a nation’s diplomatic standing. This article examines both past and present controversies, and uses the advantages of historical perspective to draw international drug law issues into the legalization debate.³

¹ Latin for “contracts must be adhered to.” Edmund Jan Osmanczyk, ed., *ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS* 597 (1988). *Pacta Sunt Servanda* is a doctrine of international law ennobling the sanctity of treaties made between nations. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 3, 1969 1155 U.N.T.S 339 (“Pacta Sunt Servanda: Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”).


INTRODUCTION: THE MADISONIAN APPROACH

In March 1784, James Madison wrote a letter to Thomas Jefferson, who was then U.S. Ambassador to France, requesting that Jefferson ship back to Virginia every book he could find that “may throw light on the general Constitution…of the several confederacies which have existed….The operations of our own must render all such lights of consequence.”\(^4\) A year later Madison wanted more, this time asking for “treatises on the ancient or modern federal republics, on the law of nations, and the history natural and political of the New World.”\(^5\) Jefferson obliged Madison in every request, and throughout the winter and spring months of 1786 Madison shut himself into his study at Montpelier to pore over the “literary cargo” that Jefferson corralled for him in Europe.\(^6\)

Carefully dissecting the governments of history and the theories of history’s greatest political writers, Madison knew the task that lay before

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\(^4\) Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (March 16, 1784) in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 6-15 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1973) [hereinafter 8 MADISON PAPERS].


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him and his coadjutants was nothing less than the crafting of a more perfect union out of a seaboard of disparate states. To help along the way Madison took diligent notes on history’s confederations, citing their functions and their faults, confident that the more he knew of the successes and failures of times past, the better equipped he would be when facing the challenges of his own.\(^7\)

Madison is certainly famous for his studies in history to prepare for the Constitutional Convention, and for his deployment of various historical exempla at Philadelphia, in the Federalist Papers, and against antifederalists in the Richmond ratification debates.\(^8\) Yet even Madison-the-scholar cautioned against over-reverence of the past. Writing as Publius in Federalist fourteen, Madison shrewdly asked:

> Is it not the glory of the people of America, whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for customs, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience?\(^9\)

Madison’s historiographic duality sets a good example. Following its dictates, the point of the juxtaposition here is not to draw static lessons from history to be neatly applied to more or less relatable problems in the present. Instead, the point is to instantiate the Madisonian principle that knowing history is always an advantage when grappling with contemporary problems; and that any available precedent, however distinguishable in particulars or assailable as antimodel, will prove itself useful in myriad ways.

The founding generation, following the Revolutionary War, faced the dilemma of state actions clashing with the terms of the peace treaty.\(^10\) Today, state legalization of marijuana is clashing with the terms of

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\(^9\) THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), supra note 2, at 140-145.

\(^10\) See infra Part I.
international drug control treaties. Reviewing the historical record reveals certain diplomatic risks inescapably tied to questions of treaty noncompliance, and provides instructive examples for how these risks and their consequences have unfolded in our nation’s past. Turning to the contemporary issues with this historical frame of reference highlights the potential costs from marijuana legalization that are external to strictly domestic policy considerations; and above all, underscores the imprudence of leaving international issues out of the legalization debate.

I. THE TREATY OF PARIS & THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION

A. The Terms of the Peace

When the Treaty of Paris was signed by Great Britain and the United States on September 3, 1783, it not only concluded the Revolutionary War, it also initiated a diplomatic conflict between the former belligerents that would have lasting consequences for the infant United States. Ratified by the Confederation Congress in January 1784, enforcement of the treaty proved problematic from the outset. Political, legal and diplomatic contention over the substantive terms of the treaty—in the states, between the states and Congress, and at London’s Court of St. James—all contributed to the reform movement culminating in the Philadelphia Convention of 1787.

The first article of the treaty, if not counted among the most memorable passages in American history, is certainly one of the most triumphant. After almost a decade of bloody conflict with their former sovereign, the newly minted American states finally received word that:

His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States…to be free, sovereign & Independent States; that he treats with them as such, and for himself his Heirs & Successors, relinquishes all Claims to the Government, Propriety & Territorial Rights of the same & every Part thereof.

But recognition from Great Britain did not come free of charge. Aside from the military, economic and humanitarian deprivations suffered during wartime, the United States also had to perform certain duties during peacetime.

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11 See infra Part II.
12 For this paragraph, see infra Parts I.C.-I.D.
Three articles from the treaty stand out as most conciliatory:

- Article IV, though worded neutrally, was meant to ensure that American debtors repaid their loans to British and Tory creditors.\(^\text{15}\)
- Article V stated that property confiscated from British subjects or Tories during the war should be either returned or compensated for, and that British subjects had at minimum twelve months to stay within the United States to settle their affairs.\(^\text{16}\)
- Article VI was meant to protect individuals on either side of the conflict from liability to prosecution or suit based on their conduct relating to the war.\(^\text{17}\)

Though straightforward enough on their face, when it came time to put these obligations into practice, they proved an incorrigible source of conflict and confusion that busied domestic politicians and complicated the conducting of foreign affairs. One reason for this can be gleaned from a more careful reading of the treaty itself. As with all legal documents (a treaty being a contract writ international), and perhaps most of all with diplomatic agreements, the precise language used is foundational to understanding how the policies engrossed will play out.\(^\text{18}\)

Article V is worded so that Congress will “earnestly recommend” that the states execute the restoration and restitution of property provisions. In articles IV and VI there is no such “recommend” clause, and instead the operative language is the imperative “shall.”\(^\text{19}\) Does that mean that those articles are obligatory and article V is not? And on a more fundamental level, did the body ratifying the treaty—the United States in Congress Assembled—even have the authority to commit the states to, or enforce their compliance with, any obligations at all? Such ambiguities in treaty language, authority delegation, and enforcement capacity invited the ultimate question: would the parties perform?\(^\text{20}\) As a constitutional matter for the Americans, the place to start looking for answers was the Articles of

\(^{15}\) Treaty of Peace, supra note 13, art. IV.
\(^{16}\) Id. art. V.
\(^{17}\) Id. art. VI.
\(^{19}\) Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union art. IV-VI; see also Charles R. Ritcheson, Aftermath of the Revolution: British Policy Toward the United States, 1783-1795 50, 63 (1969) (commenting on the variation in language use).
\(^{20}\) David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 101, 122 [hereinafter Golove & Hulsebosch] (“The resultant language in the treaty, which alternated between the imperative and permissive, reflected the ‘commissioners’ concern that Congress would be unable to enforce its provisions directly.”).
Confederation: What did they say about powers over foreign affairs, and how could the Confederation Congress operating under the constraints of its charter hope to uphold its end of the treaty?

B. Powers Under the Articles of Confederation

In American public memory, perhaps the only textual recollection of our first constitution comes from Article III, which branded the relationship between the states as “a firm league of friendship.” The Articles of Confederation of course did more than that, addressing issues of governance over both domestic and foreign affairs, and establishing a Congress that orchestrated an ultimately successful, if at times fumbling, war effort. But for purposes of understanding the diplomatic drama surrounding the implementation of the peace treaty, two provisions are seminal.

Article VI is written in the negative, prohibiting states from conducting foreign diplomacy on their own without congressional approval. Article IX, in symmetrical contrast, positively grants these powers to Congress. For example, “Congress…shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war…of sending and receiving ambassadors [and] entering into treaties and alliances[.]”

Although the locus of the foreign affairs power is thus definitively delegated, the Articles were conspicuously missing the executive component of governance. Nowhere is Congress granted the powers or machinery to enforce its own decrees, and therefore state compliance with congressional enactments was, in practice, voluntary. James Madison, when diagnosing the ills of the confederacy, titled this ailment a “Want of the Sanction to the Laws, and of Coercion in the Government of the Confederacy.” Madison elaborated on how “[a] sanction is essential to the idea of law, as coercion is to that of Government. The federal system being destitute of both, wants the great vital principles of a Political Constitution.”

21 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION art. III.
22 See, e.g., ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION arts. IV, VI. For fumbling war effort, see, e.g., JACK RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 275-284 (1979) [hereinafter RAKOVE, BEGINNINGS].
23 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION art. VI (in relevant part).
24 Id. art. IX para. 1 (emphasis added).
26 James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, reprinted in MEYERS, MIND OF THE FOUNDER, supra note 7, at 83-92 [hereinafter Madison, Vices].
When Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and John Jay were sent to Paris in 1782 to conclude the peace, they confessed to their British counterparts that performance of treaty obligations was essentially the prerogative of the states.\textsuperscript{27} Adams, perhaps overwrought amidst days of round-the-clock negotiations, blurted to British negotiators that “[w]e had no Power, and Congress had no Power, and therefore we must consider how [the treaty] would be reasoned upon in the several Legislatures of the separate States.”\textsuperscript{28}

The British did show signs of reluctance in doing business with representatives of a body possessing potentially illusory authorization.\textsuperscript{29} But a deal was nonetheless struck, and when the aforementioned “recommend” clauses made their way into the treaty, they served as a formal reminder that Congress’s powers were as yet uncertain.

With the treaty ratified in early 1784, the leadership of Congress in foreign affairs was set to be tested in the laboratories of the several states. As the decade shook out, the new American nation—and perhaps more fatefuly, the nations of Europe—witnessed a contest between the states and Congress over the function and viability of their “friendship.”\textsuperscript{30}

\textit{C. Treaty Violations in Virginia \& New York}

Although incidents were reported in all thirteen states, treaty violations were most pronounced, and therefore most intelligible, in Virginia and New York.\textsuperscript{31} The politics of the former enflamed over the repayment of debts under Article IV of the peace treaty, the latter over compensation for property occupation under Article VI. Each encapsulates the major obstacles to treaty enforcement faced by the new nation as it grasped toward acceptance into the international community.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{27} RITCHESON, supra note 19, at 35-37.
\textsuperscript{28} Draft Report of the Committee for Trade (March 6, 1780), quoted in RITCHESON, supra note 19, at 35.
\textsuperscript{29} Id. at 36.
\textsuperscript{30} Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 20, at 104, 115-146.
\textsuperscript{32} See, e.g., Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 20, at 104.
1. Virginia. — With its agrarian way of life fueled chiefly by systematic debt spending, Virginia’s domestic economy became heavily leveraged on British credit during the second half of the eighteenth century. On the eve of the Revolution, private debtors in Virginia owed more than £2,000,000 to British creditors, a sum that amounted to roughly half the private debt held throughout all of the other twelve colonies combined. Under the colonial credit systems prevalent at the time, borrowers faced little difficulty in extending such debts year after year. Competition among British merchants for American commerce was robust, and if one failed to extend credit, he did so at the risk of losing that account to another with looser lending standards. When this was coupled with the careening demand for British luxuries trending at the time, especially among the Tidewater gentry, perpetual indebtedness naturally ensued and menacingly compounded.

When war broke out, Virginians began to rethink their obligations to British creditors. Not altogether surprisingly, many debtors used the war as an excuse to relieve their burdens of repayment, and their representatives in the Virginia House of Delegates served as the means for securing their interests.

The first direct form of relief came with passage of the Sequestration Act of 1777. Under its debt provision, Virginians were able to “discharge” themselves of monies owed British creditors by making payments into the state loan office with paper money. Because paper had consistently depreciated throughout the war years, debts were thereby paid off at pennies on the dollar. When Thomas Jefferson, for example, made two payments into the loan office totaling £2,666 in paper money, he was issued a certificate for that amount even though it was only valued at roughly £90

33 See infra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
34 Evans, Private Indebtedness, supra note 31, at 349.
36 See, e.g., Emory G. Evans, Planter Indebtedness and the Coming of the Revolution in Virginia, 19 WM. & MARY Q. 4, 518-523 (1962) [hereinafter Evans, Planter Indebtedness]; Ritcheson, supra note 19, at 65.
37 See, e.g., ISAAC HARRELL, LOYALISM IN VIRGINIA, in CHAPTERS IN THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE REVOLUTION 129 (2nd ed. 1965); see also Evans, Planter Indebtedness, supra note 36, at 532.
39 See Evans, Private Indebtedness, supra note 31, at 353.
sterling.40 All told, Virginians paid off £273,554 of debt with paper money worth only £12,035 sterling.41

As hostilities dragged on, the House of Delegates took up a firmer stance against its wartime enemy. Measures passed in the May 1782 legislative session closed all Virginia courts to suits for recovery by British and Tory creditors. And as access to judicial remedies became more closely tied to citizenship, Britons and Tories were also barred from entering the state or taking an oath of allegiance to become Virginians.42

The following year would see the signing of the Treaty of Paris, and the reaction in the fall session of the House of Delegates was equivocal at best. The state did reopen its borders to anyone other than U.S. citizens who defected to bear arms in service of the crown, and the legislature even paid statutory homage to the peace terms by providing that “nothing herein contained shall be construed so as to contravene the treaty of peace with Great Britain, lately concluded.”43 Yet surging vigilantism obstructed actual debt collection, and out of the very same legislative session came a bill extending the closure of Virginia courts to British and Tory creditors for at least another year—a legal posture in naked violation of the treaty’s debt provision.44

Once the Confederation Congress ratified the treaty in January 1784, the conflict in laws became their problem. Congress sent resolutions to the several states in which it was indeed “earnestly recommended” that all laws be brought into compliance with the peace terms. The nationally-minded James Madison—who in 1784 was back in the Virginia House of Delegates after being term-limited out of the Confederation Congress45—obligingly introduced a bill to repeal all laws incompatible with the treaty.46 Madison’s bill, and others of his like it, were aggressively opposed by a coalition of legislators representing small farmer-debtors. Led by the always formidable Patrick Henry, this opposition consistently and decisively defeated

40 Hobson, supra note 35, at 178.
41 RITCHESON, supra note 19, at 64.
43 Id. at 322-326.
44 Id. at 349; see also EVANS, PRIVATE INDEBTEDNESS, supra note 31, at 356,358. On vigilantism, see HARRELL, supra note 37, at 140.
45 The term limit clause can be found in ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION art. V. On Madison returning to Virginia after reaching his term limit, see JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 8, at 37.
46 Harrell, supra note 37, at 144-146,149.
Madison’s proposals, and thereby managed to keep legal impediments to British debt collection on the Virginia statute books.\textsuperscript{47} Not until December 12, 1787 would Virginia pass a bill repealing all laws conflicting with the treaty, and even this came with the condition that it would only go into effect once Virginia received official notice from Congress that Great Britain had upheld its end of the treaty bargain by evacuating the western forts and paying compensation for stolen slaves.\textsuperscript{48} No such notice was forthcoming, however, and so Virginia remained defiantly in violation of the treaty. It would ultimately take ratification of the new Constitution in 1788, the opening of the federal courts in 1789, the signing of the Jay Treaty in 1794, and the Supreme Court ruling in \textit{Ware v. Hylton} in 1796 before British creditors finally found themselves procedurally situated to call in their loans.\textsuperscript{49}

2. \textit{New York.} — As is perhaps better known than any other date in American history, on July 4, 1776 the Second Continental Congress issued the Declaration of Independence, presenting the case for why “these united colonies are, and by right ought to be Free and Independent States.”\textsuperscript{50} Perhaps lesser known is that just the day before on July 3, British general William Howe sailed into Staten Island, New York with an infantry force that quickly grew to over 30,000 strong. Howe would go on to capture New York City and establish British military headquarters in Manhattan for the duration of the war, 1776-1783.

       After eight years of hostilities and occupation, when peace overtures finally sounded, New Yorkers were less than eager to accommodate their late enemies.\textsuperscript{51} In March 1783 the state passed the Trespass Act, under which anyone who occupied patriot property during the war could be sued for damages and back rent.\textsuperscript{52} Yet when the peace was formalized, article VI of the treaty stated that “there shall be no…prosecutions commenced against any person or persons for, or by reason of, the part which he or they

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Marks}, \textit{supra} note 25, at note 16 and accompanying text; \textit{Harrell}, \textit{supra} note 37, at 150-151.

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Act of Dec. 12, 1787, in William Waller Hening, 12 The Statutes at Large, Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia} 528 (Richmond, Va., 1819-1823).


\textsuperscript{50} \textit{The Declaration of Independence} para. 32 (U.S. 1776).

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Forrest McDonald, Alexander Hamilton: A Biography} 64 (1979).

\textsuperscript{52} N.Y. Laws, 6th sess. ch. 31 (March 17, 1783).
may have taken in the present war, and that no person shall on that account suffer any future loss or damage, either in his person, liberty, or property.”

Predictably, this divergence generated litigation over which should prevail: New York statute or the Treaty of Paris? The question itself presented transcendent issues of sovereignty and law, but the drama that unfolded could be attributed as much to the cast of characters as to the political ramifications. In what became a legal showdown eagerly watched on either side of the Atlantic, New York City mayor and chief justice of the Mayor’s Court, James Duane, presided over the famous Trespass Act case of Rutgers v. Waddington. The state’s Attorney General Egbert Benson represented the plaintiff; and counsel retained by the defendant was founder and director of the Bank of New York, and recent battlefield hero at Yorktown, Alexander Hamilton.

The facts of the case were undisputed by the parties. Plaintiff and patriot Elizabeth Rutgers owned a brewery in Manhattan that she evacuated in 1776 upon British capture of the city. Defendant was Briton Joshua Waddington, agent for his uncle Benjamin Waddington, who had occupied and ran the brewery from 1778-1783, first under orders from the British Commissary-General then directly from the British Commander-in-Chief. In a private cause of action initiated under the Trespass Act, Rutgers sued Waddington for rent payments covering the time of his occupation of the brewery. Arguments for the plaintiff were straightforward enough: the Trespass Act permitted recovery of rent from British occupiers of patriot property during the war, and it explicitly rejected any defense claiming military authorization. Because the facts of record matched the statutory elements, Waddington had to pay up.

Arguments for the defendant, on the other hand, were both nuanced and sweeping. Citing the leading authorities of the day on the law of nations, Hamilton attempted to reinforce the explicit amnesty in article six of the Treaty of Paris by arguing that the law of nations presupposes all peace treaties to carry a general and absolute amnesty for all wartime participants. Because New York was under British military control during the war, so Hamilton’s logic ran, the amnesty afforded by both the treaty and the law of nations protected Waddington’s occupation of the brewery

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53 Treaty of Peace, supra note 13 art. VI.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 289-291.
57 Id. at 303; John Lawrence, Statement of Benjamin Waddington, in id. at 318-320.
58 Alexander Hamilton, The Rutgers Briefs, Brief No. 5, in id. at 361-362.
from liability under a private cause of action. Hamilton had ground to stand on in making this claim. The New York state constitution formally incorporated the common law, which included the law of nations and the laws of war. More controversial, however, was Hamilton’s attempt to support his position by claiming that in ratifying the Articles of Confederation, which included the power over foreign affairs, the state of New York had subjugated its legislative authority to treaties duly entered into by Congress. In 1784 there was anything but consensus that the Confederation Congress could override state law.

In case the court failed to accept his position on either categorical amnesty or the supremacy of confederal law, Hamilton deployed as his contingency the more politically palatable approach of an as-applied challenge to the Trespass Act based on rules of statutory construction. In this Hamilton would ultimately give Mayor Duane his out. Even if you assume that the statute controls, Hamilton argued in his sixth brief, if the court is able to construe the statute so that its application in a given case would not offend the constitution of New York or common law rights of equity, then the court is bound to do so. Because applying the Trespass Act against defendant Waddington would violate his common law right to wartime amnesty—as conferred by the state constitution’s incorporation of the law of nations—then the court must find that the statute could not have been intended to apply in this specific instance.

In writing the opinion of the court, Mayor Duane followed Hamilton’s lead:

Upon the whole, this [the Trespass Act] being a statute is obligatory, and being general in its provisions, collateral matter arises out of the general words, which happen to be unreasonable. The Court is therefore bound to conclude, that such a consequence was not foreseen by the Legislature, to explain it in equity, and to disregard it in that point only, where it would operate unreasonably.[.] The repeal of the law of nations, or any interference with it, could not have been in contemplation, in our opinion, when the Legislature passed this statute; and we think ourselves bound to exempt the law from its operation.

59 Alexander Hamilton, The Rutgers Briefs, Brief No. 6, in id. at 368 [hereinafter Hamilton, Brief No. 6].
60 Alexander Hamilton, The Rutgers Briefs, Brief No. 3, in id. at 350-352.
61 See, e.g., MC DONALD, supra note 51, at 67.
62 Hamilton, Brief No. 6, supra note 59, at 382-392.
63 Opinion of the Mayor’s Court (Aug. 27, 1784), in 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON at 414-417 [hereinafter Opinion of the Mayor’s Court]. In his statutory construction reasoning, Duane borrowed from, Hamilton, Brief No. 6, supra note 59.
But there in fact the matter did not end, for the court had one more fine distinction to draw. Waddington had occupied the brewery under the orders of the British Commissary-General (a civilian post) from 1778-1780, and under the military orders of the British Commander-in-Chief (a military post) from 1780-1783. The court found that the nature of the former occupation was indeed a civilian matter to which wartime amnesty did not attach. So even though the statute’s application to Waddington was voided during his occupation of the brewery under military orders, he was nonetheless liable for trespass during his occupation under civilian orders.

When taken out of its legalistic context and placed in its geopolitical one, the question the case presented swelled into whether or not a subnational American state could get away with violating the Treaty of Paris. Although the court acknowledged the gravity of the situation in its opening comments, its rather technical ruling managed to please no one. Mrs. Rutgers felt she was cheated out of rent. Mr. Waddington felt he was punished for conduct that only unconstitutionally could be found culpable. New York politicians and their fellow locally-minded patriots felt the state’s legislative sovereignty had been undermined. Alexander Hamilton’s position—that the national interest as embodied in the treaty ought to take precedence over localist state statutes—was at best only partially vindicated, and even then only ambiguously so. And perhaps most importantly, British observers still perceived the whole ordeal as violating the peace treaty. So long as that view stuck among the British, their inclination to otherwise do business with the Americans was to collapse.

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64 Opinion of the Mayor’s Court, supra note 63, at 411-412.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 393.
67 Id. at 311-312.
68 Id. at 310-311.
70 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 54, at 311-312.
71 Id. at 419.
72 See, e.g., Jay Report, supra note 31, at 785-786; see also Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 20, at 135. Years after the Rutgers case, the British still viewed the trespass act and its application in Rutgers as a violation of the Treaty of Peace. See Letter from George Hammond, British Minister to the U.S., to Thomas Jefferson (March 5, 1792), in 23 JEFFERSON PAPERS 196-213 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1990).
73 See infra Part I.E.
D. Consequences

Amidst all the wrangling over implementation of the peace treaty, hitherto unmentioned has been the preamble, which in fact spells out the whole point of the agreement:

[T]o forget all past misunderstandings and differences that have unhappily interrupted the good correspondence and friendship which they [Great Britain and the U.S.] mutually wish to restore, and to establish such a beneficial and satisfactory intercourse, between the two countries upon the ground of reciprocal advantages and mutual convenience as may promote and secure to both perpetual peace and harmony.\(^{74}\)

Not only peace, but a resumption of prosperous relations, were the stated goals of the parties. This was certainly true for the Americans who could attribute their favorable balance-of-trade on the eve of the Revolution to their insider status as a unit of the British imperial-mercantilist system.\(^{75}\) For the British, the goodwill in the preamble might very well have been mere lip service. Only two months before the treaty was signed, the Privy Council issued Orders on July 2, 1783 that effectively closed the British West Indies to American goods and shipping.\(^{76}\) Trade restrictions imposed by Great Britain proved from then on to be a major point of contention between the two nations,\(^{77}\) and became diplomatically tied to violations of the peace treaty.\(^{78}\)

Targeting the British West Indies for trade restriction served to undercut what was the most important market for the American economy.\(^{79}\) James Madison, writing about it to Richard Henry Lee, railed that “the Revolution has robbed us of our trade with the West Indies, the only one which yielded us a favorable balance….In every point of view, indeed, the trade of this country is in a deplorable condition.”\(^{80}\) Prospects, in other words, were not looking good for the Americans.

\(^{74}\) Treaty of Peace, supra note 13 pmbl.

\(^{75}\) See, e.g., MARKS, supra note 25, at 52-53.

\(^{76}\) RITCHESON, supra note 19, at viii.

\(^{77}\) MORRIS, PEACEMAKERS, supra note 14, at 433; MARKS, supra note 25, at 52-95, passim.

\(^{78}\) See, e.g., RITCHESON, supra note 19, at 70-87, passim.

\(^{79}\) The importance of the BWI markets to the American economy has been commented on by many leading scholars. See, e.g., MARKS, supra note 25, at 53-54; Charles Toth, Anglo-American Diplomacy and the British West Indies (1783-1789), 32 THE AMERICAS 3, 418, 420; Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 20, at 137; CURTIS P. NETTELS, The Emergence of a National Economy, in 2 THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 116 (1962).

\(^{80}\) Letter from James Madison to Richard Henry Lee (July 7, 1785), in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 151 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901), quoted in MARKS, supra note 25, at 66.
Meanwhile back in Westminster, the Shelburne ministry, sympathetic to American reconciliation, fell to the protectionist Fox-North coalition in April 1783. At the same time, MP Lord Sheffield published his widely circulated pamphlet, *Observations on the Commerce of the American States*, which strongly swayed public opinion and effectively lobbied to uphold trade restrictions against the former colonies. British creditors, stiffed by American debtors in breach of the treaty, were likewise exerting their political influence on policymakers at Whitehall. All combined, this meant that by the mid-1780s British trade policy toward the United States had become firmly exclusionary.

Leading Americans agreed that at a minimum they had to reopen British West Indian markets if the fledgling nation was to have a chance at economic, and therefore existential, viability. In February 1785 Congress acted by appointing the doughty John Adams as U.S. Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of St. James. From the moment Adams assumed his post, his principal objective was clear: reverse British mercantilist policy and secure an advantageous trade agreement for his countrymen. The new minister was soon to find out that obstacles, perhaps insurmountable, lay in his way.

The unfavorable tone was set almost immediately. A suggestive letter received in March from the Duke of Dorset questioned the good faith of American treaty commitments. Citing the interference British merchant-creditors faced from laws passed by individual states, Dorset asked, “what is the real nature of the powers with which you are invested….towards forming a permanent system of commerce…which it may not be in the power of any one State to render totally fruitless & ineffectual?”

81 RITCHESON, supra note 19, at 4-6.
82 MARKS, supra note 25, at 55-56; see also Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 20, at 124 (“American breaches of the treaty became a rallying point for British ministers who took a hard line against the United States.”).
84 See, e.g., Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 20, at 108, 123; RAKOVE, BEGINNINGS, supra note 22, at 342; MORRIS, FORGING, supra note 31, at 205.
86 See Toth, supra note 79, at, 427; RITCHESON, supra note 19, at 39-40.
87 See, e.g., id. at 37.
88 Letter from the Duke of Dorsett to the American Commissioners (March 26, 1785), in 16 THE PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 577-578 (Gregg L. Lint et al. eds., 2012); see also RITCHESON, supra note 19 (commenting on the Dorsett letter).
It was an affronting but justifiable question; and when Adams removed to London that summer to submit a proposed treaty of commerce directly to British Foreign Minister Lord Carmarthen, his confidence was less than stout. Writing to U.S. Foreign Secretary John Jay about “the laws of certain states impeding the course of law for the recovery of old debts &c.,” Adams grumbled, “it is in vain to expect…a treaty of commerce…or any other relief of any kind, until these laws are all repealed.” Similar frustrations were vented in dispatches to Massachusetts Governor James Bowdoin: “nothing of any material consequence will ever be done, while there remains in force, a law of any one state…inconsistent with the Article of the Treaty of Peace respecting the Tories[.]”

Diplomatic relations between the two nations were to steadily sour. Toward the end of 1785 Adams pressed, perhaps a little too strongly, for Britain to evacuate the western forts pursuant to the peace treaty. Britain’s response to this perceived demand came from Foreign Minister Carmarthen in February 1786 and it was, as one British diplomatic historian put it, “a shower of icewater.” Not only was the answer in the negative regarding the forts, but it was also accompanied by a devastatingly methodic state-by-state review of treaty violations by the Americans. Adams relayed the report back to Secretary Jay in Philadelphia, and it would take Jay a full six months to prepare his response to present to Congress.

It was in this stormy diplomatic climate that Adams—now with Jefferson in London to lend his support—made one last ditch effort to push for a commercial agreement. They met with Lord Carmarthen in April, who despite castigating the states just two months prior, did request an updated

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89 For submission of the proposed commercial treaty, see Letter from John Adams to the Marquis of Carmarthen July 29, 1785), in 17 THE PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 280-282 (Gregg L. Lint et al. ed., 2014). For reasons to have little confidence, see, e.g., DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, PEACE PACT: THE LOST WORLD OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 214 (2003); see also Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 22, at 137 (“Britain made it clear that it would not negotiate a commercial treaty until the United States adhered to the terms of the Treaty of Peace.”).
91 Letter from John Adams to James Bowdoin (June 2, 1786), in 8 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 397-398, supra note 90, quoted in HENDRICKSON, supra note 89, at 214. Adding to Adams’s difficulties was the failure of the states to unite in commercial retaliation against Britain. See, e.g., RITCHESON, supra note 19, at 18-45; MARKS, supra note 25, at 68-95.
92 Adams used the word “require” in his Nov. 30, 1785 memorial to Secretary Carmarthen. See Jay Report, supra note 31, at 781; see also RITCHESON, supra note 19, at 84 (commenting on the affect of this choice of language by Adams).
93 Id. at 83.
commercial proposal; but he did so, as Adams deflatingly reported, only “after harping a little on the old string, the insufficiency of Congress to treat and compel compliance with treaties.” 95 It was in fact mere etiquette when Carmarthen promised to lay the matter before the ministry, and Adams and Jefferson—the seasoned diplomats—knew that the cause was lost. No commercial treaty, nor any further negotiations, would be forthcoming. 96

The Americans seemed to be at the end of their tether as 1786 drew to a close. The economy was severely slumping, as anticipated, and efforts to improve commercial prospects by lifting British trade restrictions were coming up empty. 97 In October, Jay finally presented to Congress his findings on Carmarthen’s indictment, conceding that the British Foreign Minister was essentially right—the states had been violating the treaty, and before the Americans could hope for any diplomatic victories, something concrete had to be done to rehabilitate their good faith. 98

The Confederation Congress tried its best by doing all that it was in its power to do: ask the states to comply. 99 In March, Congress resolved that all “acts or parts of acts as may be now existing in any of the states repugnant to the treaty of peace ought to be forthwith repealed[.]” 100 And on April 13, 1787 a formal circular letter authored by Jay, enclosing the latest resolution and reaching an almost sorrowful pitch, went out to the several states in which it was professed that “we regret that in some of the States too little attention appears to have been paid to the public faith pledged by the treaty.” That because of this, “the good faith of the United States, pledged by that treaty has been drawn into question,” and therefore,

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96 See, e.g., RITCHESON, supra note 19, at 44 (describing the request going “unanswered and even unacknowledged.”). For the etiquette of Carmarthen, see id. at 44.
97 MARKS, supra note 25, at 28 (“The country was faced with a postwar depression, exacerbated by British trade restrictions[,]”; see also MORRIS, FORGING, supra note 31, at 205 (to same effect). For a detailed breakdown of the economic troubles of the 1780s, and their relation to British trade restrictions, see NETTELS, supra note 79, at 35-64.
98 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 31, at 781. For need to rehabilitate good faith, see infra note 101 and accompanying text.
99 See, e.g., Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 20, at 156 (“When at critical junctures the states simply refused to comply—as they did with the Treaty of Peace—Congress could do little more than remonstrate.”).
“it certainly is time that all doubts respecting the public faith be removed.”\textsuperscript{101}

The very next month—May, 1787—state delegates would convene in Philadelphia to discuss “revising” the Articles of Confederation.\textsuperscript{102}

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As is well known among founding-era historians, James Madison arrived at the Pennsylvania State House in 1787 with no lesser intention than that of The Lawgiver.\textsuperscript{103} Conferring with his fellow Virginia delegates while restlessly waiting for the quorum needed to open proceedings, Madison drafted the ambitious Virginia Plan.\textsuperscript{104} Once introduced to the convention, the plan’s fifteen articles set the initial agenda for debate and ultimately served as a blueprint for the outcome document.\textsuperscript{105}

What motivated Madison’s designs?\textsuperscript{106} In his “Vices of the Political System of the United States,” drafted just prior to the convention, Madison laid out the most important reasons why constitutional reform was necessary for the survival of the union.\textsuperscript{107} Listed there is the category of “Violations of the Law of Nations and of Treaties,” where Madison lamented that, “not a year has passed without instances of them in some one or other of the States.”\textsuperscript{108} Although by no means the only contributing


\textsuperscript{102} Resolution of Feb. 21, 1787, \textit{in id.} at 74. For the argument that the authority for calling the convention actually came from the state legislatures, not Congress, and that the extent of the authority granted to the delegates encompassed not mere revision of the Articles, but general constitutional reform, see Michael Farris, \textit{Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Constitution Was Not the Product of a Runaway Convention}, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 62.

\textsuperscript{103} See, e.g., \textsc{Rakove, Original Meanings}, \textit{supra} note 8, at 36; \textsc{Adair, James Madison}, \textit{supra} note 6, at 133-136.

\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Id.} at 59; see also \textsc{Jack Rakove, James Madison and the Creation of the American Republic} 63 (2002) (to similar effect). On Madison as drafter of the Virginia Plan, see, e.g., John P. Roche, \textit{The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action}, 55 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 799, 803 (1961).

\textsuperscript{105} James Madison’s Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), \textit{in The Constitutional Convention: A Narrative History from the Notes of James Madison} 13-15 (Edward Larsen & Michael P. Winship eds., 2005). On the Virginia Plan setting the agenda and serving as blueprint, see \textsc{Rakove, Original Meanings}, \textit{supra} note 8, at 59-92; \textsc{James Madison and the Creation of the American Republic, supra} note 104, 60-79 (2002).

\textsuperscript{106} For the importance of looking at the convention through a Madisonian lens, see \textsc{Rakove, Beginnings, supra} note 22, at 379-380.

\textsuperscript{107} Madison, Vices, \textit{supra} note 26.

\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Id.}
factor, the man history calls the Father of the Constitution saw treaty noncompliance as in desperate need of a constitutional corrective.109

When the final compromise settlement was signed in September 1787, it ‘ordained and established’ a new national government with the authority to guarantee treaty compliance.110 Not only was the executive sufficiently empowered to “take care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” but in case of any doubt, Article VI, clause 2 of the United States Constitution reads:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.111

110 For the compromise nature of the constitution, see id. at 57-58.
111 For the take care clause, see U.S. Const. art. II, §3. For the supremacy clause, see U.S. Const. art. V, cl. 2 (emphasis added). Drawing on an abundance of evidence in the primary record, leading historians studying the 1780s have long asserted that consequences flowing from the Confederation government’s inability to compel state compliance with the Treaty of Paris was one of the chief factors both irritating the movement to the 1787 Constitutional Convention and dictating its outcome. See, e.g., John Fiske, The Critical Period of American History, 1783-1789 (1888), esp. chs. 4-5; Nevins, supra note 31, esp. ch. 13; Jensen, supra note 49, esp. chs. 7, 13; Nettelis, supra note 79, esp. ch. 3; Ritcheson, supra note 19, esp. chs. 2-5; Marks, supra note 25, esp. ch. 2; Morris, Forging, supra note 31, esp. ch. 8; Peter Onuf & Nicholas Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolutions, 1776-1814, esp. ch. 4; Rakove, Beginnings, supra note 22, at 341-346; Rakove, Original Meanings, supra note 8, esp. ch. 2; Toth, supra note 79, at 428; David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1075 (2000), 1127-1132; Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 20, at 103 (“Historians have long recognized that the weakness of the Articles of Confederation created complications for the new nation’s foreign relations and that the founders organized the Philadelphia Convention at least in part to remedy the difficulties that the new nation had encountered during the ‘critical period’ immediately following the Revolution. Diplomatic frustrations resulting from state violations of the Treaty of Peace, in particular, helped create the atmosphere of crisis that motivated profederal forces to organize and write a constitution.”) (emphasis added).
II. INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL TREATIES & THE LEGALIZATION OF RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA

A. The United Nations & the Narcotics Conventions

Residing in Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution is the treaty clause, where the president is granted authority to enter into treaties “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur[.]”\textsuperscript{112} All treaties so made are to be, indeed, “the supreme law of the land.”\textsuperscript{113}

On June 26, 1945 in San Francisco, California, the United States became one of fifty countries to sign the United Nations Charter.\textsuperscript{114} One month later, on July 28, the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty by screaming past the two-thirds vote requirement by a margin of 82-2.\textsuperscript{115} On August 8, President Harry Truman affixed his signature, officially making the United States the first country to complete the ratification process.\textsuperscript{116} The Charter went into effect in October 1945 when under the requirements of Chapter XIX, China, France, Russia, Great Britain, the United States and a majority of the remaining signatory nations completed ratification “in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.”\textsuperscript{117}

The basic institutional framework of the U.N., as laid out in Chapter III, consists of six principal organs: 1) the General Assembly, 2) the Security Council, 3) the Economic and Social Council, 4) the Trusteeship Council (now defunct), 5) the Court of International Justice, and 6) the Secretariat.\textsuperscript{118} Chapter X of the Charter defines the functions, powers and procedures of

\textsuperscript{112} U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
\textsuperscript{113} U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
\textsuperscript{117} U.N. Charter ch. XIX, art. 110, cl. 1, 3. For date of ratification, see U.S. Dept. of State, Office of the Historian. \textit{supra} note 115.
\textsuperscript{118} U.N. Charter, ch. III, art. 7, cl. 1.
the Economic and Social Council, or the ECOSOC, under whose jurisdiction falls drug policy.\footnote{U.N. Charter, ch. X, arts. 62-66.}


The primary enforcement obligations of the treaty are found in two key provisions.

- Article 4(1)(C) reads: “The parties shall take such legislative and administrative measures as may be necessary… to limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of drugs.”\footnote{1961 Single Convention, supra note 120, art. 4(1)(c).}

- Article 36(1)(a) underscores such commitments: “Subject to its constitutional limitations, each Party shall adopt such measures as will ensure that [among others] cultivation, production,
manufacture...possession....sale...of drugs...shall be punishable offences when committed intentionally, and that serious offences shall be liable to adequate punishment particularly by imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation of liberty.”

The treaty categorizes substances into schedules based on harmfulness and liability to abuse.126 Marijuana is found in schedules I and IV, making it subject to the most prohibitive restrictions.127

The current international drug control regime, specifically pertaining to marijuana, is rounded out by two additional treaties. The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances confines Tetrahydrocannabinol, or THC, the active ingredient in marijuana, strictly to medical research and in very limited circumstances to medical treatment.128 The 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances stiffens the criminal sanctions signatory nations are required to impose for the cultivation, trafficking and possession of marijuana, and—perhaps most relevantly—tightens the discretionary latitude available for enforcement.129

Institutionally, the International Narcotics Control Board, or the INCB, was established as the “independent and quasi-judicial monitoring body” within the United Nations charged with “implementing the international drug control conventions.”130 For over a half-century now the INCB has played an integral role in overseeing treaty compliance and facilitating informative coordination among member nations and the ECOSOC in furtherance of treaty objectives.131

125 Id. art. 36(1)(a).
127 Id. The treaty uses the term “cannabis” instead of marijuana.
128 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1019 U.N.T.S. 182-183, art. XII. For THC listed in Schedule I, see id. at 328. This 1971 Convention was amended to the 1961 Convention by the 1972 protocol. 1961 Single Convention, supra note 120.
129 U.N. Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1582 U.N.T.S. 170, 173 (art. 2, para. 1; art. 3 para. 5-6) (Dec. 20 1988) [hereinafter 1988 Convention]; see also TNI, The History of Cannabis in the International Drug Control System, supra note 126, at 25. For discussion of the relevance of the discretionary measure, see infra note 159 and accompanying text.
131 1961 Single Convention, supra note 120, art. 9, paras. 5-6.
B. Legalization of Recreational Marijuana in the United States and the International Drug Control Regime

Looking back over the history of the current international drug control regime, the United States stands out as the primary mover for calling the drug conventions, for the enactment of the prohibitionist policies committed to by all signatory nations, and for championing strict enforcement practices. U.S. domestic law was quick to reflect this. In 1970 Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), which made it a criminal offense for any person, anywhere in America, to knowingly manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any amount of marijuana. The CSA specifically references U.S. obligations under the drug control treaties, thereby statutorily incorporating such international obligations into U.S. domestic law.

For the first four decades after passage of the CSA, state laws covering recreational marijuana use largely paralleled federal prohibition; and it was in fact the states, not the feds, who conducted the vast majority of marijuana enforcement activity throughout the country. Within the last five years, however, a sea change in drug policy has dramatically reshaped the recreational marijuana landscape. On presidential election night 2012, voters in the states of Colorado and Washington, undeterred by continued federal prohibition, passed ballot initiatives to take the globally

132 See TNI, The History of Cannabis in the International Drug Control System, supra note 126, at 13-14,16; see also Wells C. Bennett & John Walsh, Brookings Institute Center for Effective Public Management, Marijuana Legalization is an Opportunity to Modernize International Drug Treaties 2, 18 (Oct. 2014) [hereinafter Bennet & Walsh, Brookings Institute] (“The United States was a—if not the—key protagonist in developing the 1961, 1971, and 1988 Conventions, as well as the 1972 protocol amending the 1961 Convention; the United States has for decades been widely and correctly viewed as the treaties’ chief champion and defender.”).

133 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 844(a) (2012).

134 21 U.S.C. §§ 801(7), 801(a)(1),(2), 811(d)(1). The recent jurisprudential and scholarly excitement over the Supreme Court case of Medellin v. Texas, addressing the self-executing treaty doctrine, is not relevant to the issues here because the CSA explicitly implements the drug conventions and therefore self-execution or non-self-execution is a moot distinction. Furthermore, the now-famous claim in footnote three of that case—denying that even self-executing treaties presumptively create private causes of action—does not pertain to general treaty enforcement by government entities. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, note 3 (2008); see also Oona Hathaway, Sabrina McElroy & Sara A. Solow, International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 51 (2012) (discussing the case decision and its implications for domestic enforcement of treaties).

unprecedented step of establishing state-licensed, regulated and taxed industries for the commercial cultivation, manufacture, and sale of marijuana.\footnote{Chemerinky et al., supra note 3, at 139. For globally unprecedented step, see, e.g., Kamin, supra note 3, at 1340.}


Since then, legalization trends in the U.S. have only continued to grow, with six additional states now permitting recreational marijuana industries.\footnote{See sources cited in supra note 3. Washington, D.C. has also legalized recreational marijuana. Id.} Prominently included among them is California, which alone boasts the seventh largest economy in the world.\footnote{Dave Bewley-Taylor, Martin Jelsma, Steve Rolles & John Walsh, Global Drug Policy Observatory, Transnational Institute & Transform Drug Policy Foundation, Cannabis Regulation and the UN Drug Treaties: Strategies for Reform 6 (June 16, 2016), available at https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/cannabis_regulation_and_the_un_drug_treaties_june_2016_web_0.pdf [hereinafter Taylor, Jelsma, Rolles, Walsh].} All told, this puts over sixty million Americans in jurisdictions where the commercial cultivation, manufacture, sale, possession and use of recreational marijuana is permitted under state law.\footnote{Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2016 (Tbl. 1) (NST-EST2016-01), https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/tables/2010-2016/state/ totals/nst-est2016-01.xlsx (adding together the populations of states that have legalized recreational marijuana, plus Washington, D.C.).}

For states that are now years into their legalization experiments, the industry is booming. In 2017 it took Colorado, for example, only eight months to crack the one billion dollar mark for marijuana sales, and ten
months for the state to collect over 205 million dollars in tax revenue.\textsuperscript{142} The question then begs to be asked: What does all of this mean for the compliance status of the United States under its international drug treaty commitments?

\textbf{C. Treaty Interpretation}

The abovementioned operative articles of the drug treaties do in fact leave room for debate.\textsuperscript{143} Most glaringly, article 36 of the 1961 Convention provides that a member nation’s obligations are “"[s]ubject to its constitutional limitations[,]”\textsuperscript{144} Placing this qualification in the context of marijuana legalization, it would mean that if the U.S. Constitution barred federal enforcement of certain marijuana activity within the states, then the U.S. could potentially be excused for a treaty violation committed at the state level. Because the American system of federalism as established by the Constitution does set parameters for the relationship between the powers of the federal government and the sovereignty of the states, the question naturally arises over whether or not the federal government has the authority to prohibit purely \textit{intra}state marijuana activity.

Conveniently, this question was presented to the U.S. Supreme Court in 2005. In the case of \textit{Gonzalez v. Raich}, the court applied long-standing commerce clause jurisprudence to rule that the \textit{inter}state commerce powers under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, when combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause, authorized Congress to prohibit \textit{intra}state marijuana activity. Writing for the court, Justice John Paul Stevens reasoned that because such \textit{intra}state marijuana activity occurs, or could occur, on a scale that is large enough to substantially affect the \textit{inter}state drug market, then Congress may invoke its \textit{inter}state commerce power to reach such \textit{intra}state activity. Looking at it inversely, the court also found that Congress had a rational basis for believing that if they could not prohibit \textit{intra}state marijuana activity, then they would not be able to effectively


\textsuperscript{143} Supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{144} 1961 Single Convention, \textit{supra} note 120, art. 36.
prohibit *inter*state commerce in marijuana—that, in other words, is what made it “necessary.”\footnote{145}{For this paragraph, see \textit{Gonzalez v. Raich} 545 U.S. 1, 19-25 (2005).}

As a result of \textit{Gonzalez}, the constitutional authority of the federal government to enforce marijuana prohibition in all fifty states is well settled American law. What might otherwise be described as the “constitutional limitations” escape clause in the drug treaties is therefore not applicable to the American system of federalism.\footnote{146}{Another influential Supreme Court decision likewise supports this conclusion. In addressing a state challenge to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. ruled in the case of \textit{Missouri v Holland}, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) that so long as the constitution does not prohibit action by the federal government (e.g. in Art. 1, § 9, or in the Bill of Rights), then legislation duly enacted pursuant to treaties duly entered are subject to neither the Constitution’s traditional enumerated powers limitations nor Tenth Amendment federalism guarantees. For the argument that \textit{Holland} should be overturned as bad law, see Curtis A. Bradley, \textit{The Treaty Power and American Federalism}, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998). For a response refuting Professor Bradley’s argument, see Golove, \textit{supra} note 111.}

Corroborating that this was the correct legal outcome, the official U.N. “Commentary” on this provision of the 1961 Convention reads: “The question arises whether a federal State is relieved from obligations…if it is unable to enact the required penal legislation on account of lack of authority under its federal constitution to do so. This question should be answered in the negative.”\footnote{147}{Commentary on the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (UN 1962) at 429.}

Two additional questions of interpretation derived from the text of the treaties remain to be addressed. Article 4 of the 1961 Convention deals with methodology, requiring nations to fulfill their treaty obligations by taking both legislative and administrative measures.\footnote{148}{1961 Single Convention, \textit{supra} note 13p, art. 4(1)(c).} Satisfaction of the first method can be demonstrated easily. As previously mentioned, the federal government has definitively exercised its legislative powers to prohibit marijuana as a matter of law. The Control Substances Act of 1970 makes marijuana possession everywhere in the country a serious criminal offense that subjects violators to hefty fines and lengthy jail sentences.\footnote{149}{21 U.S.C. §§ 801(a), 801(7), 841(a),(b), 844(a) (2012). A slight exception, burdensome to utilize, exists for medical research. \textit{Id.} §821 et seq.} In case of any doubt, the CSA also explicitly incorporates into domestic federal law the U.S. obligations under the drug control treaties.\footnote{150}{\textit{Supra} note 134, and accompanying text.} This law is still on the books and can still be used by the federal government to prosecute marijuana activity—a power that continues to be recognized by and reserved to federal law enforcement. As a result of the CSA, the “legislative measures” requirement under the drug treaties is comfortably satisfied.
The administrative posture of the United States, on the other hand, presents a thornier question. The first step in answering it is to consider how the federal executive has responded since states began legalizing their own recreational marijuana industries. The initial move came in August 2013 when the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) released a “Memorandum for All U.S. Attorneys” providing “Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement.”151 Known popularly as the Cole Memo after its author Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole, the guidance contextualized state legalization initiatives by looking at them through the lens of federal prosecutorial discretion. To that end, the Cole Memo set as the policy of the DOJ that so long as commercial marijuana industries authorized by state law do not implicate eight specified federal drug enforcement priorities, then “enforcement of state law by state and local law enforcement and regulatory bodies should remain the primary means of addressing marijuana-related activity.”152 While acknowledging the importance of setting certain limits to marijuana legalization, and while not forgetting to steadfastly reserve the DOJ’s right to enforce the CSA as a legal matter, the Cole Memo carved out a de facto administrative sphere of tolerance for the commercial production, sale, possession and use of marijuana.153 This sphere of tolerance was the precise location within which state marijuana industries began operating, and expanding.154

Concerned about the permissibility of this situation under international law, the Senate Judiciary Committee questioned Attorney General Cole in a September 2013 congressional hearing “as to whether the policy announced in the August 29, 2013 Cole Memorandum violates the United States’ treaty obligations[.]” Submitting written testimony following the hearing, the Justice Department brusquely responded with the view that the Cole Memo “does not violate the United States’ treaty obligations. Marijuana continues to be a schedule I substance under federal law, and the Department of Justice is continuing to enforce federal drug laws.”155

In 2014, Assistant Secretary of State William Brownfield gave prepared remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies in which he

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151 Cole Memo, supra note 3, at 1.
152 Id. at 3.
153 See, e.g., Bennet & Walsh, Brookings Institute, supra note 132, at 3, 17, 20; Taylor, Jelsma, Rolles, Walsh, supra note 158, at 14.
elaborated on the federal government’s analysis of how the legalization movement fits within the strictures of international law. Borrowing from the toolbox of constitutional interpretation, Brownfield stressed that the drug control treaties are “living documents” that therefore permit “flexible interpretation” when being implemented.\textsuperscript{156} As these are the most extensive comments to come from the federal government to date, they deserve a close look.

The Secretary tellingly admitted that “the conventions explicitly and expressly hold national governments responsible for the conduct, if you will, of the entire nation, including provincial, state, municipal or local governments that form part of the larger nation.”\textsuperscript{157} He then went on to recount a closed meeting held at Vienna where U.S. federal officials presented their case to the INCB:

\begin{quote}
And our argument went: it was the right of the United States government to determine how best to use its limited and in some cases scarce law enforcement and criminal justice resources to best accomplish the objectives of the conventions. And therefore we said we were in compliance with the conventions…[T]he INCB in its annual report for 2013 begged to differ, reached a different conclusion, and…assessed that the argument by the United States government was not sound.\textsuperscript{158}
\end{quote}

In thus responding to the “flexible interpretation” analysis proffered by the U.S., the INCB landed on a more textual approach; and their strongest argument would seem to lean, not only on violations of the “administrative measures” requirement in the 1961 Convention, but perhaps even more so on the provision in the 1988 Convention that directly addresses the issue of prosecutorial discretion:

\begin{quote}
The Parties shall endeavor to ensure that any discretionary legal powers under their domestic law relating to the prosecution of persons for offences established in accordance with this article are exercised to maximize the effectiveness of law enforcement measures in respect of those offences and with due regard to the need to deter the commission of such offences.\textsuperscript{159}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{157} Remarks of Sec. Brownfield, supra note 156 (13:43 – 14:01).

\textsuperscript{158} Id. at 16:37-17:38.

\textsuperscript{159} 1988 Convention, supra note 129, arts. 2, 3(6) (emphases added).
Seeing that U.S. administrative-discretionary measures have thus far failed to deter numerous subnational actors from engaging in commercialized recreational marijuana activity, and instead have created a sphere of tolerance for its growth, the U.S. will remain vulnerable to censure from members of the international community.160

D. Where Do the Issues Currently Stand?

It has now been over five years since passage of the Colorado and Washington initiatives, providing time for U.S. treaty partners and the INCB to observe recreational marijuana industries in practice and ruminate over the niceties of international law. In fact, these issues were playing out as a background to the much anticipated 2016 UNGASS—the U.N. General Assembly Special Session on the world drug problem. In preparation for this high-profile event, INCB President Werner Sipp outlined his major concerns in a speech before the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs:

Recent years have seen legislative developments that permit the non-medical use of controlled substances, notably cannabis. The Board is concerned about these developments because they are not in compliance with the treaties that require that cannabis should be used exclusively for medical or scientific purposes. These legislations [sic] challenged not only the international consensus expressed in the conventions, but also international cooperation and the principle of shared responsibility upon which the international drug control system and international rule of law are founded.161

The integrity and legal standing of the drug control treaties were in the end reaffirmed by the nations participating in the 2016 UNGASS.162 Remarkably, however, legalization of recreational marijuana was not even broached during the proceedings.163 In a briefing paper collaborated on by

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163 Taylor, Jelsma, Rolles, Walsh, supra note 140, at 7.
a number of international drug law and policy scholars, the role played by marijuana during the UNGASS was equated to the proverbial “elephant in the room...obviously present, but studiously ignored.”\textsuperscript{164} Giving their own specialist take on the issue, the authors nonetheless found that “[t]here is no doubt that recent policy developments with regard to cannabis regulation have moved beyond the legal latitude of the treaties.”\textsuperscript{165} And in directly addressing the doctrine of “flexible interpretation,” their conclusion was clear:

“[T]hat the extant treaty framework possesses sufficient flexibility to allow for regulated cannabis markets...is strained by any reasonable understanding of the treaties and their overtly prohibitionist object and purpose—and appears to reflect political expediency rather than convincing legal reasoning.”\textsuperscript{166}

The INCB concurred with this assessment when in March 2017 it issued its latest official annual report. Harping a little on the old string (to poach the words of John Adams), the report disclosed that:

[j]in its discussions with the Government of the United States, the Board has continued to reiterate that the legislative and administrative measures taken by several states in the country to legalize and regulate the sale of cannabis for non-medical purposes cannot be reconciled with the legal obligation contained in article 4, paragraph (c), of the 1961 Convention to limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import and distribution of, trade in and use and possession of drugs.\textsuperscript{167}

The INCB furthermore emphasized that it was the obligation of national governments “to ensure the full implementation, within the entirety of their

\textsuperscript{164} Id. at 6.
\textsuperscript{165} Id. at 7.
\textsuperscript{166} Id. at 14. For similar conclusions by prominent international drug policy experts, see Martin Jelsma, UNGASS 2016: Prospects for Treaty Reform and UN System-Wide Coherence on Drug Policy, Brookings Institute Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence Latin America Initiative, 18-19 (May 1, 2015); Bennet & Walsh, Brookings Institute, supra note 132, at 14. For comment on the political expediency of legalization, see infra note 184.
\textsuperscript{167} 2016 INCB Report, supra note 162, at ¶¶ 196-201. The most recent statements by the INCB on these issues, reiterating the same position, are from its 120th session held in November of 2017, see Press Release, U.N. Info. Serv., INCB Concludes its 120th Session with call from President to take a Human Rights Approach to Treating Drug Disorders, UNIS/NAR/1337 (Nov. 17, 2017), available at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2017/unisnar1337.html. For the Adams quote, see Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 25, 1786), supra note 96 and accompanying text.
territory, of the provision of the 1961 Convention applicable to the use of cannabis[.]

Domestic developments in early 2018 saw current U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions issue a new memorandum to DOJ attorneys (“Sessions Memo”) that officially rescinded the Cole Memo. Citing “well-established general principles” of prosecutorial discretion, Sessions stated that “previous nationwide guidance specific to marijuana enforcement is unnecessary.” Conspicuously, though, the memo did not direct federal prosecutors to enforce the CSA in states that have legalized recreational marijuana. If anything, by characterizing the Cole Memo as “unnecessary” for purposes of exercising discretion, Sessions has written off the Cole Memo priorities as redundant. The appearance of the Sessions Memo nevertheless meddles with federal-state relations over marijuana legalization, chilling (to what degree is yet unknown) the previously expressed tolerance of the DOJ.

Reaction from states with functioning recreational marijuana industries has remained defiant. In Colorado, for example, the state agency charged with governing the marijuana industry, the Marijuana Enforcement Division, issued a bulletin on January 5 in response to the Sessions Memo:

This is a renewed opportunity for the licensed [marijuana] community in our state to display the effectiveness of the commercial regulated system for tracking, testing and taxing marijuana….We will continue to do our job as the voters of Colorado and the General Assembly have directed.

California is likewise committed to their marijuana industry. The California Bureau of Cannabis Control issued a statement only hours after release of the Sessions Memo announcing that they will “continue to move forward with the state’s regulatory processes covering both medicinal and adult-use cannabis consistent with the will of California’s voters, while defending our state’s laws to the fullest extent.”

168 2016 INCB Report, supra note 180, at ¶¶ 196-201 (emphasis added).
170 Id.
172 Bureau of Cannabis Control, A statement from BCC Chief Lori Ajax regarding federal government plans to rescind the Cole Memo, Facebook (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/BCCinfo.dca/posts/732308673645806
Although very few Americans are even aware of it, such subnational marijuana activity continues to place the country as a whole in an increasingly precarious legal position under the international drug control treaties. At least one influential international body has continued to vehemently reject the permissibility of legalization.\footnote{See, e.g., supra notes 137, 158, 161, 167-168 and accompanying text.} Just what might the results of this discrepancy mean for both the reputation of the United States in its foreign dealings, and for the global legitimacy of international law?

\textit{E. Consequences}

Exactly how the consequences of marijuana legalization will play out on the international stage is a live issue that ultimately remains to be seen. Although some nations are proving sympathetic to marijuana legalization as a matter of policy preference,\footnote{See, e.g., Taylor, Jelsma, Rolles, Walsh, supra note 140, at 6 (citing as examples the nations of Uruguay, Canada, Jamaica, and the Netherlands).} the issue of treaty breach continues to linger. Certain world leaders, notably those in Russia and Asia, remain staunch supporters of strict marijuana prohibition.\footnote{See, e.g., Id. at 7, 16 (“[M]ost Asian countries are still fully committed to defending the status quo in its most repressive form.”); see also Report of Expert Seminar, supra note 178, at 37 (“Cuba and Venezuela are basically siding with Russia in a reaffirmation of a repressive prohibitionist doctrine[]’’); Osbeck & Bromber, supra note 3, at 443 (“The recent trends towards legalization of cannabis law should not obscure the fact that most of the world’s governments, at least officially, stand solidly behind the anti-cannabis strictures of the international treaties with no indication of imminent change.”). For a revealing account of the prevalence of prohibition-supporting nations, see Remarks of Harold Trinkunas, Snr. Fellow and Dir., Latin Am. Initiative, The Brookings Institution, Brookings Institution Panel on UNGASS 2016 and Beyond: Seizing the Opportunity to Improve Drug Policy 4 (April 7, 2016) (transcript available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/20160407_drug_policy_ungass_transcript.pdf) (“[C]ountries in Asia, particularly China, as well as Russia, very much are adhering to the [international drug control] regime as it currently stands.”); see also Remarks of John Walsh, id. at 6-7 (“And the truth is that there are very vocal countries who are dissatisfied with the status quo, but they are relatively few, compared to the world at large.”); Remarks of Vanda Felbab-Brown, Snr. Fellow, For. Pol’y, Brookings Institution, id. at 10 (“The division between those [countries] who are calling for reform…and those who are deeply committed to the existing…regime—China and East Asia, Russia, but also the Middle East—is very strong.”).} The European Union, while recognizing allowance for certain non-criminal justice approaches to marijuana use, has stated that licensing and regulating recreational industries exceeds treaty flexibility.\footnote{Taylor, Jelsma, Rolles, Walsh, supra note 140, at 7} So long as there are nations of the world who view marijuana legalization within the United States as violating
the drug treaties, then the U.S. risks certain reputational, reciprocal and institutional consequences—not unlike those, it might be mentioned, that it has faced elsewhere in its history.177

Traditionally, a nation’s reputation for making good faith treaty commitments rests on its track record of treaty compliance.178 If a nation believes that the U.S. will shirk its treaty obligations, not due to some existential threat,179 but because it has become politically convenient to do so, then the credibility of the U.S. to make and maintain treaty commitments will diminish commensurately.180

A helpful method for taking stock of reputation in diplomatic affairs is by analogy. As one leading international law scholar nicely put it:

The value of a good reputation for states can be compared to the value of a high bond rating. Just as a good rating increases investor confidence and, therefore, allows the firm to raise money more cheaply, a strong reputation increases the confidence of counterparties to an international agreement, allowing a state to extract more in exchange for its own promises.181

To borrow those terms, a low reputational rating comes along with the risk of deterring other nations from viewing the U.S. as a trustworthy treaty partner.182 Especially in cases of multilateral agreements—such as the drug treaties are—this reputational consequence could ripple out to influence any

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177 See, e.g., supra Part I.E. For an analysis of a similar situation of subnational acts resulting in violations of treaty commitments, see David A. Koplow, Indisputable Violations: What Happens When the United States Unambiguously Breaches a Treaty, 37 FLETCHER FOR. WORLD AFF. 53, 53-56, 59-64, 68-71 (2013) (discussing state-level violations under the 1963 Convention on Consular Relations). Assessing all the potential consequences from treaty violations, and engaging with all that the international relations literature has to offer on the subject, is outside the scope of this paper. For a helpful place to start such an inquiry, see Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 335 (1989).

178 See, e.g., supra Part I.E; see also, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. R., 1823, note 85 (2002); and sources cited infra notes 179-183.

179 See T. Guzman, supra note 178, at 1862.

180 See id. at 1849 (“When entering into an international commitment, a country offers its reputation for living up to its commitments as a form of collateral….failure to live up to one’s commitments harms one’s reputation and makes future commitments less credible.”); Koplow, supra note 177, at 69 (“[I]t is foolhardy to suppose that other parties will indefinitely continue with treaty compliance if they feel that the United States is taking advantage of them by unilateral avoidance of shared treaty obligations.”).

181 Hathaway, McElroy & Solow, supra note 134, at note 120.

182 Id. at note 16.
number of nations around the globe, and could therefore hamstring diplomatic missions of far greater import than drug policy.\textsuperscript{183}

Similarly, there is the danger that a breach by the U.S. can be used as a bargaining chip against it in negotiations over, or performance of, other foreign policy agreements. When the U.S. enters into a treaty with another nation, it presumably does so because U.S. interests will be served by that other nation’s performance of treaty obligations.\textsuperscript{184} Seeing that there is no guaranteed supervising enforcement authority,\textsuperscript{185} and barring a resort to coercion, then to secure its own interests, the U.S. would do well to induce performance by performing itself. “Reciprocal performance of treaty obligations,” in other words, “depends in part on being able to credibly call out other nations for treaty failings—something which in turn depends on strictly performing our own obligations.”\textsuperscript{186}

If the U.S. can “prosecutorial discretion” its way around the drug treaties, then another nation can just as easily try to “prosecutorial discretion” its way out of some other treaty the U.S. has an interest in holding it to.\textsuperscript{187} In such a scenario, the bind the U.S. might find itself in could be minor, or not.\textsuperscript{188} The ancient tenet of contract law, that when one party breaches an agreement all others are released from their obligations to

\textsuperscript{183} Id. at notes 329-331 and accompanying text (“The United States is party to hundreds of Article II treaties, many of them covering topics of the gravest importance to the country, ranging from the economic, to criminal law enforcement, to national security.”); see also Koplow, supra note 177, at 69 (to similar effect).

\textsuperscript{184} See, e.g., Hathaway, McElroy & Solow, supra note 134, at 55 (“[W]hen treaties provide reciprocal benefits, the United States clearly gains from the enforcement of the agreements by other parties to the treaty.”). It should also be noted that performance under a treaty can sometimes reflect the calculated interests of an actor other than the nation-as-a-whole who that actor represents. For example, if an administration calculates that the electoral benefits accruing from non-performance of treaty obligations outweigh the costs of damaging the nation’s diplomatic reputation (in either real or electoral terms), then under a rational-choice theory of decision-making, the administration should opt to not perform the obligations of the treaty. The result of such non-performance would be diplomatic costs bore by the nation-as-a-whole, with political benefits enjoyed only by the party in power. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 178, at note 132.

\textsuperscript{185} Id. at 1849.

\textsuperscript{186} Bennet & Walsh, Brookings Institute, supra note 132, at 20.

\textsuperscript{187} See Koplow, supra note 177, at 69; see also Report of Expert Seminar, supra note 160, at 26 (“At some point, for example, the U.S. should expect its own “flexibility” argument to be used against it in another context, or that a country will use the breach as a negotiating tool in an area unrelated to drugs, e.g., the U.S.’s claim that Russia is in violation of the 1987 Nuclear Forces Treaty.”).

\textsuperscript{188} See sources cited in supra note 177 and accompanying text.
perform, is perhaps nowhere truer and potentially more lethal than with regard to international treaties.  

Institutionally, the United States could be setting a corrosive precedent. When a nation wiggles out of treaty obligations, and especially when that nation is the most powerful and influential in the world, it tends toward the deterioration of global commitment to the principle of *opinio juris sive necessitatis*. Every instance of treaty breach therefore goes to further undermine the efficacy, and in turn the legitimacy, of international law itself.  

Although by no means uncontroversial, the majority view among international relations theorists is that powerful nations, such as the United States, have it in their best interest to promote institutions of international cooperation that operate according to the rule of law—thereby “locking in favorable arrangements that continue beyond the zenith of [their] power.” To accept that premise is to logically concede that any act by the U.S. jeopardizing the legitimacy of such institutions is patently self-defeating.  

As inchoate as some of these consequences from marijuana legalization may currently be, the potential international relations fallout from them is real enough to warrant serious scrutiny. Whether action should be taken,

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189 See, e.g., Guzman, *supra* note 178, at 1873.
190 See, e.g., Bennet & Walsh, Brookings Institute, *supra* note 132, at 25-26. *Opinio juris sive necessitatis* is a doctrine of international law denoting state action undertaken pursuant to an international legal obligation. For discussion of this doctrine and for the English translation of the Latin in an international law context, see HUGH THIRLWAY, THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 56-57 (2014) (“*opinio juris sive necessitatis*. An adequate translation of this term in English, in light of its application in law, requires rather more words than the economical Latin: it signifies ‘the view (or conviction) that what is involved is (or, perhaps, should be) a requirement of the law, or of necessity’.”).
191 For a particularly impassioned account of this view, with examples, see Koplow, *supra* note 177, at 68-71; *see also* Sipp, INCB Pres., Statements at the 59th Sess. of the Cmnn. on Narcotic Drugs 3, *supra* note 151 and accompanying text.
193 See Koplow, *supra* note 177, at 69.
194 See, e.g., Report of Expert Seminar, *supra* note 160, at 26 (“Many participants agreed that the consequence to the U.S. in particular are not insignificant.”); *see also* Bennet & Walsh, Brookings Institute, *supra* note 132, at 18 (“[W]e wouldn’t be surprised to hear
and if so in what form, are therefore important enough considerations to be included in any decision-making process.

A number of policy options do exist to choose from. The U.S. could, for example, push to amend the treaties, gathering international support for removing marijuana from the list of prohibited substances, or for drafting new language that allows for legalization with tight controls. The U.S. could outright withdraw from the treaties, or withdraw and then “re-accede” with reservations as to marijuana. The U.S. could admit it is in violation of the treaties, but justify that status with a declaration of principled non-compliance. The U.S. could always come down on state-level legalization by enforcing the CSA within those jurisdictions. Or, the U.S. could hold the current line and allow the legalization and operation of recreational marijuana industries to move forward in spite of the drug treaties lex lata. 195

Although not an exhaustive account of the potential consequences of legalization or the options available to address them, and irrespective of what such an inquiry might return, it should nevertheless be clear that the American people, state governments, and the federal government still have landmark decisions to make regarding the legal status of marijuana. 196 In a democracy like our own, deciphering the best policy choices, whatever they may turn out to be, requires informed deliberation. Issues of international relations have been carelessly left out of the otherwise vibrant national marijuana debate. Including them is now long past due. 197

protests from more prohibitionist countries about the United States’ treaty compliance, or to see other nations start pushing the limits of other no less important treaties to which the United States is party.”). 195 For discussion of these different options, see id. at 21-26; Taylor, Jelsma, Rolles, Walsh, supra note 140, at 8-17; Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman & Martin Jelsma, Transnational Institute, The Rise and Fall of Cannabis Prohibition: The History of Cannabis in The UN Drug Control System and Options for Reform: Treaty Reform Options 1-15 (March 2014). The Latin lex lata translates to “the law as it is.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 519 (10th ed. 2009).

196 The advent of the Sessions Memo immediately spurred new movement in Congress to once and for all resolve the federal-state tensions over legalization. Additional cosponsors on marijuana reform bills previously introduced in both houses have been piling up daily. See, e.g., dates cosponsors signed onto the Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2017, H.R. 1227, 115th Cong. (2017), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1227/cosponsors?pageSort=lastToFirst&locclr=cga-bill. Because major congressional action could be coming soon, the need to elbow international issues into the legalization debate is now more urgent than ever.

197 See, e.g., Taylor, Jelsma, Rolles, Walsh, supra note 140, at 16-17.
CONCLUSION

When the founding fathers faced the dilemma of subnational actions clashing with the Treaty of Paris, they did so while operating under a system of national government established by the Articles of Confederation.\textsuperscript{198} The position many of them took was that the states were in violation of the treaty, and formal legislative enactments reflecting this pleaded with the states to comply. When the Confederation Congress surveyed the foreign affairs landscape, it saw its reputation damaged, its effectiveness in securing commercial treaties proportionately impaired, and the domestic economy crumbling at least partially as a result. The situation had become dire, and in a significant degree it could be traced to the poor performance under the peace terms. The subject matter of the founders’ dilemma and the immediate consequences were therefore not only critical to the general welfare of the nation, but contributed to events that set the course of American history.

Marijuana policy, on the other hand, is not a particularly momentous issue on its own terms. It is playing out in an America governed by the Constitution—an entirely different system than that of the Articles. The federal executive does not claim that the states are in violation of any treaties, and at times has even attempted to defend their actions as permitted under the international drug control regime.\textsuperscript{199} Foreign powers have yet to show overt signs that their behavior on the international stage generally or toward the U.S. specifically has been seriously influenced by marijuana legalization. And regardless of how these issues play out, fundamental alteration in the constitutional system or any epoch-defining historical event—such as unfolded in the late 1780s—is scarcely conceivable an outcome.

So why choose these two scenarios to juxtapose? Using the Madisonian Approach to a balanced and cautious treatment of the past, the scenarios examined provide two telling examples—discrete yet akin—of how federated forms of government can face puzzling and consequential predicaments when entering into treaties. The founders learned this through hard diplomacy, and it remains problematic to this day. Thus far, every state initiative to legalize marijuana, every federal marijuana reform bill, and the discourse attending such measures, have all failed to look beyond domestic concerns.\textsuperscript{200} Neglecting to even address the risks that legalization could

\textsuperscript{198} For this whole paragraph, see supra Parts I.D-I.E.

\textsuperscript{199} For this whole paragraph, see supra Parts II.C-II.E.

\textsuperscript{200} See sources cited in supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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pose to the nation’s diplomatic standing is at best irresponsible policymaking.

History helps to demonstrate how breaching any negotiated-for agreement always carries with it the potential to degrade good faith. In international relations, legalistic arguments often count less than perceptions of treaty noncompliance, and whether national or subnational, real or perceived, noncompliance can incur costs external to a strictly domestic policy debate. When weighing the costs and benefits of marijuana legalization, such external costs must be factored into the equation if the product is to accurately represent best policy.

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To conclude by injecting personally, I do believe as a purely domestic policy issue that the legalization of recreational marijuana which includes effective controls to encourage public health, generally discourage drug use, and prevent minors from accessing marijuana, is probably the right thing to do. But the point here is not to advocate any particular drug policy; instead, the point is to advocate looking at these issues with a perspective that goes well beyond simple domestic policy preferences. By expanding the horizons of this perspective to encompass history and international relations, we can only help, never hurt, in any sincere effort to do what is in the best interest of the American people and the nations of the world.