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The Impact of Direct Election on Reform Votes in the U.S. Senate*

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Objective. This investigation examines the extent to which direct election rendered the U.S. Senate more supportive of Progressive reforms, as indicated through roll-call outcomes. *Methods.* Pre- and postaggregate support coalitions are compared in a 16-year period bifurcated by passage of the Seventeenth Amendment (1905–1921), utilizing difference in means and ordinary least squares regression. An alternate test considers the aggregate impact of the rising percentage of states adopting pre-Amendment direct-election mechanisms. A difference in means test between Senate and House votes on similar bills is also provided. *Results.* Neither the Amendment nor the statewide movement toward direct election exerted the conventionally assumed, positive impact on reform support; House and Senate support scores were similar throughout the period. *Conclusions.* The data suggest a strong pro-reform tendency in the Senate throughout the timeframe. The probable reason direct election demonstrates so little of the expected impact on outcomes is that the Senate had already begun to move in that direction.

Ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution on May 31, 1913 signified a fundamental structural change in U.S. government. Accurately or not, many advocates viewed adoption not only as a step toward greater democracy but as a means to break the hold of special interests on the Senate, thus promoting further change. Yet, close to a century later, our knowledge of the effect of this transition is limited, particularly in regard to whether it facilitated passage of subsequent reform legislation. Even modern accounts may presume or reject this putative influence in the absence of appropriate, empirically-based evidence. Although a growing literature provides a variety of perspectives on direct election's influence, this basic and historically important question remains unanswered.

This investigation therefore examines a 16-year period, bisected by passage of the Amendment, to determine whether roll-call support for the Progressive agenda rose significantly in the post-Amendment phase.

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In short, I find no such increase, with support rates actually declining marginally in the latter years. Furthermore, in a structured comparison of roll-calls, the Senate appeared no more conservative than the House, either before or after ratification. In an alternate measure of direct election, the pre-1913 gradual proliferation of state-level mechanisms also had no positive impact on reform support. Rather than suggest that direct election was ineffective or even detrimental, however, the findings indicate that the Senate of the early Progressive era was already largely in favor of numerous reforms. Neither the evolutionary state-level movement toward greater voter involvement nor the Amendment itself triggered a transformation, but only because there was little remaining progress to be made.

Literature Review

The matter of direct election's influence on the U.S. Senate may be approached by a number of different paths. For one thing, the independent variable of interest can conceivably take two forms. The simplest and clearest version utilizes the Seventeenth Amendment itself, relying on passage of this revolutionary national policy shift as a bright line of demarcation. However, the concept can be more loosely contemplated as an *evolutionary* shift driven by an assortment of mechanisms, such as direct primaries or preference polls, adopted by various states over the early years of the 20th century. On the other side of the equation, impact may also be variously defined, assessed in terms of institutional composition, individual behavior (e.g., roll-call votes; committee participation), or policy outputs. In this section, I organize existing scholarship in terms of these sundry approaches to the variables. This will serve to justify the utility of my own research question—whether direct election precipitated a change in policy output, specifically in regard to increased support for reform legislation.

I begin with a closer look at the independent variable of interest. Surprisingly, since almost all scholarship recognizes the potentially confounding effect of the pre-1913 movement away from purely indirect elections in a number of states, the effect of that trend has not been satisfactorily measured, with almost all work relying on the Amendment itself as an independent variable. This is partly because it is both objectively and subjectively difficult to identify unequivocally the year in which any given state adopted such a mechanism. Although few scholars would disagree with Harrison's (2004:184) claim that by 1910 voters played a part in the selection of nearly half of all senators (see also Amar, 1996; Haynes, 1938; Riker, 1955; Swift, 1996), available data on the appearance of these innovations in particular states have been imprecise and contradictory. For example, the state/year combinations listed in Engstrom and Kernell (2001) conflict with the information provided in the *Congressional Record* of May 31, 1910 (7113–

7120).¹ A more substantive reason scholars have operationalized the concept of direct election as adoption of the Amendment is simply that it did represent a sharp alteration in the nation's electoral rules, which no accrual of state-level modifications could rival. As Stewart (1992:71) observes, "we should not lightly dismiss the Seventeenth Amendment as a mere epiphenomenal expression of popular will and part of inevitable historical progress." In sum, although the creeping progression toward direct election is commonly viewed as diminishing the Amendment's autonomous effect, the consequences of this predecessor movement have not been tested in published research.

This clears the way, then, to review the work assessing the Amendment's potential consequences, sorted here into three basic categories. The first concentrates on subsequent compositional change in the Senate, premised on the expectation that the transformation from a state-legislative to popular-selection mechanism would result in different sorts of people seeking and winning election. Confirming the Progressive prediction that the Amendment would generate a more meritorious, less politicized body, Crook and Hibbing (1997) demonstrate a post-1913 shift to less wealthy members with greater public experience. In regard to partisan composition, King and Ellis (1996) report that the change resulted in a higher proportion of Democrats in the chamber than would otherwise have been probable, and Bybee (1997) shows that directly elected senators were less likely than their predecessors to mirror the makeup of their own state legislatures. As far as turnover, Amar (1996) describes the closing of the revolving door through which pre-Amendment senators could and did move easily back and forth from cabinet to Senate service. Stewart (1992) shows that average terms of service and partisan swings in the Senate more closely mirrored the House after 1914, but points out several other factors that could account for these trends.

A second way to approach the Amendment's influence is to determine the extent to which it altered behaviors of individual senators. Although this is a reasonable question, very little work of this variety has been accomplished. Harrison (2004) provides a rich narrative of the sorts of senators who supported reform but does not contrast pre- and post-Amendment trends. Some unpublished work, however, has suggested that a combination of state-level direct primaries and the Amendment rendered individuals more likely to moderate their roll-call votes as reelection loomed; support a broad variety of legislative measures; and serve for multiple terms on particular committees.²

¹In an unpublished manuscript, Lapinski (2004) acknowledges these problems and offers his own, putatively superior list of the adoption of direct-primary mechanisms in various states. I will return to his data in the research design.

²See Bernhard and Sala (n.d.) and Lapinski (2004).

Finally, a third category considers the Amendment's effect on substantive policy outputs, generally concentrating on the implications for federalism in the absence of direct accountability to state legislatures. By and large, scholars in this niche conclude that the constitutional revision essentially undermined future legislation promoting states' rights and powers (Amar, 1996; Rossum, 1999, 2001; Zywicki, 1994). While focused on outputs, however, this branch of scholarship is more expository than empirical, emphasizing a narrative of why this trend occurred rather than providing evidence for it.

In sum, the background literature, while valuable in its own right, does not offer a systematic answer to the question I seek to investigate—the impact of the Seventeenth Amendment on the Senate's legislative record. Pointedly missing is an assessment of arguably the most basic question—whether or not the shift rendered the Senate more supportive of various reforms of the Progressive era. Next, I explore that gap, in the process justifying why it should be rectified.

Let me begin this rationale by reemphasizing the dependent variables associated with the first two categories of scholarship referenced above—composition and individual behavior. These investigations clarify certain consequences of the move to direct election in the Senate, and more broadly contribute to the theoretical tradition of the impact of electoral rules on institutional character. However, it is important to keep their boundaries in mind. Although shifts in composition or behavior may imply subsequent alterations in outputs, they are not surrogates for evidence that this occurred. Yet, it is difficult to avoid the inference of a link, filtered through these intervening variables, between direct election and legislative trends.

More specifically, scholarship on this topic tends to subtly but pervasively suggest that the electoral shift produced an environment more conducive to passage of Progressive reforms. For example, Crook and Hibbing (1997:852) conclude that “the change to direct election certainly is implicated in the Senate's abrogation of its duty to be the ‘saucer that cools the coffee,’” thus extrapolating evidence of the institution's replication of national partisan election trends to enhanced receptivity and support for publicly popular bills. Zywicki's (1994) argument that the post-Amendment Senate was more likely to support massive wealth transfer policies is a speculation, inferred from the longer average tenures apparently triggered by direct election.

Similarly, investigations within the third category—considering the Amendment's effects on the federal/state balance of power—may suggest outcomes not directly supported by evidence. Bybee (1997) contends that, in undermining the influence of state legislatures, the Amendment rendered the Senate less resistant to enhanced federal power, an observation echoed by Derthick and Dinan (1999). Rossum (1999), illustrating the Amendment's effect, points out successful reform legislation that weakened state discretion and independence on matters such as workers' rights, child labor, suffrage, and liquor regulation. But, while the general concept of transformation of the federalism dynamic during the Progressive era is sound, the particular

conclusion suggested by much of this work—that the Amendment itself fundamentally altered the state/federal balance—relies on the untested supposition that reforms (at least those of the federal-power-enhancing variety) drew more robust Senate support after 1913.

Certainly, a scenario in which the Amendment fostered a more conducive environment for change in general is, to an extent, theoretically plausible and rational. At least some individuals and groups of the time supported certain reforms, and the Amendment solidified direct ties between constituents and their senators. More pointedly, to at least a degree the Amendment reduced the influence of state legislatures, corporate interests, and political machines, all of which had reason to oppose certain innovations. Thus, it is not surprising that William Jennings Bryan's contention that "until we can get the United States Senate elected by the people, it is impossible to do anything in the way of national reforms" (Gould, 1978:128) seems to have hardened into a conventional truth in subsequent years. Even modern historians (Grimes, 1978; Kelly and Harbison, 1970) routinely and understandably support the idea that the post-Amendment Senate was more reformist, for the logic is straightforward and persuasive.

Yet, despite the theoretical soundness of this expectation, the reality and context of the times may well have presented an unsuitable setting for its fulfillment. As Diner (1998) observes, voters may have been opposed to, undecided on, or just unaware of all or part of the Progressive agenda. Even assuming direct election rendered senators more solicitous of their constituents, demand may simply have been nonexistent or minimal. More importantly, even supposing public support for or insistence on change, it is not clear that the pre-Amendment Senate was *anti*-reform and in need of a shakeup. For example, in his study of Senate endorsement of the Progressive agenda from 1911–1916, Allen (1961) does not consider the Amendment's influence on votes, asserting instead that, depending on the preference of their home state, some senators consistently backed the platform while others never did, regardless of method of election. Hoebeke (1995) further suggests that the allegation of an out-of-touch elitism and corruption in the early years of the 20th century is overblown, arguing that the Senate's own vote to accept direct election refutes the notion that the chamber was generally resistant to innovation. Overall, then, despite the strong argument for why a change of this sort *could* have made a difference, whether it *did*, or even had the opportunity to, is another matter, one that can effectively be determined only through a narrowly tailored empirical analysis of the roll-call record.

Research Design

Addressing this need, my investigation assesses the degree to which direct election rendered the Senate, as evidenced through aggregate roll-call votes, more supportive of Progressive reforms. The period I examine is 1905

through 1921, a 16-year span bisected by ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, embodying the heart of the Progressive era. The study begins the year Theodore Roosevelt helped kindle the agenda and ends when the arguably last Progressive president, Woodrow Wilson, left office and the nation moved on to confront the challenges of postwar recovery.

The basic data set is comprised of Senate roll-call votes from the 58th through 66th Congresses. Eligible substantive topics were: trust regulation; banking/currency; rural/farmers' aid; worker/union empowerment; child labor restrictions; implementation of income tax; conservation; suffrage expansion; food and drug purity; and prohibition/temperance.³ I selected votes through a careful reading of the code book for the United States Congressional Roll Call Voting Records data set provided by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).

Where there were multiple votes on a single bill (e.g., amendments; motion to recommit; final passage; and approval of conference committee report), I generally included only the final vote in the data set, since findings could be skewed by including a string of roll-calls marked by similar or identical outcome patterns. But when an amendment to a bill represented an essentially separate vote on a different topic, it was included. The final, basic data set is comprised of 61 votes, with overall percentage of recorded votes in favor of reform the primary dependent variable.⁴

The time period allows me to assess both conceptions of direct election, as outlined in the previous section, as independent variables. A simple pre/post 1913 dichotomy provides the appropriately sharp division to test whether the Amendment alone prompted a change, with votes in the 58th through 62nd Congresses representing the pre-test and those in the 63rd through 66th the post-test.⁵ In addition, the first eight years in this data set (1905–1913) were marked by a proliferation of state direct-election mechanisms, with senators subject to some sort of direct voter control gradually increasing from 21 to 73 percent. Utilizing the putatively best available data on the appearance of these state measures, I will test the impact of this alternate conception of direct election by coding for the value of this variable at the time of each vote.⁶

³Excluded issues that arguably fit with the Progressive agenda are tariffs and immigration restriction, but the "reform" position on each is too complicated and contrary to warrant their consideration here.

⁴When a "nay" vote was actually the pro-reform position, this was duly accounted for. I counted only actual votes, omitting announced "pairs." Although paired votes are occasionally included in roll-call studies (Clubb and Allen, 1967), it is not standard practice (Haynes, 1938).

⁵There appears to be a window of incongruence (the 63rd Congress began in March 1913, and the Amendment was not officially ratified until late May); however, none of the 63rd Congress votes in my data set occurred prior to ratification.

⁶This draws on Lapinski (2004). Since his data were compiled in recognition of the inadequacy of previous attempts, it appears to be the currently best available source. Post-1913 bills will be coded 100 percent.

Granted, this version is more commonly considered (at least in the abstract, given the absence of published research on this version of the question) at the individual level—effect on a senator of his state's adoption of such a measure. However, the logic of its potential impact holds at the aggregate level. If some sort of constituency link coaxed individual support for reform, the effect should be echoed chamberwide as more states jumped on the direct-election bandwagon. Moreover, this development, and the growing number of senators selected through these methods, may have more broadly shaped general roll-call outcomes, conceivably influencing even those members not yet subject to direct voter control.

Since the primary question at hand is the extent to which direct election (either of the evolutionary or revolutionary variety) fostered a Senate more amenable to reform bills, the investigation must consider and control for two rival explanations of potential shifts in roll-call support across these years. The first is that the Senate itself changed, and the second is that the agenda changed. Let me address each in turn.

Background literature suggests that the institutional characteristic most likely to have influenced reform support is the partisan makeup of the chamber, indicating in particular the significance of Democrats and insurgent Republicans (Hamby, 1999; Harrison, 2004; Sanders, 1999). Again, this might be more commonly considered at the individual level—Democratic or insurgent Republicans more likely to vote for reform. But, in the aggregate, the point is that, independent of direct election, chamber support for reform may have grown stronger as this contingent grew larger. Over the years of this study, Democrats/insurgents as a percentage of the body rose from 40 percent in the 58th Congress to 69 percent in the 64th Congress, dropping back to 57 percent by the 56th Congress. In addition to the correspondent power of the coalition's size, Harrison (2004:156–57) suggests a more broadly influential aspect of this trend, noting that the insurgents “though relatively small in number, had a disproportionate impact on the tenor of congressional debate, on the formulation of policy, and on the decision-making process in both houses of Congress. They were able to do this primarily because their objectives partially coincided with those of the Democratic minority, which was consistently more sympathetic to progressive reform than all but a handful of congressional Republicans.” I control for this aggregate dynamic by coding for percentage of Democrats and insurgent Republicans (identified in Holt, 1967) in the chamber in the year of the vote.

A more slippery factor to consider and control for is the notion of the comparability of roll-calls in the data set. In short, if the Senate did grow significantly more (or less) amenable to reform in the post-Amendment years (or as the number of states utilizing direct election grew larger), this could be the result of the changing substance of bills, independent of election method. This is an important concept, but one that in large part cannot be considered within the limits of this study, since broader issues of

agenda change are not easily captured in an investigation focused solely on roll-calls. For example, it is possible that some issues were so contentious that they did not even reach the Senate floor in the early years of the study. Thus, even a failed vote in the later years could suggest a movement *toward* acceptance of the reform.

It is possible that the measures that did reach the roll-call stage changed in some significant way over the span of this study, but the vast literature on the Progressive era provides little evidence of such a shift, with breakthrough policies passed throughout, from the significant business regulations of Roosevelt's second term to the meaningful constitutional amendments of the later years. Analyzing the era's regulations, Keller (1999) provides the more nuanced argument that ground-breaking policies were rooted in historical and political traditions, and pushed to fruition by strong public and group outcries. In other words, even the most "difficult" reforms likely reached the voting stage only when support and demand materialized, and only if they were seen as reflecting core U.S. values. This perspective suggests that if more radical policies did appear on the Senate's roll-call docket in the later years of the timeframe, they may well have undergone a crucial softening-up period in the intervening years, again implying that bills remain roughly comparable, and equivalently passable, across the years.

Still, in order to accommodate, at least to a degree, the potential dissimilarity of these bills, I introduce the House of Representatives into the mix as a comparison and control. This will provide a somewhat alternate take on the effect of direct election on the Senate as well as an indication of whether items on the agenda appreciably evolved in some way in the post-Amendment years. To justify the utility of this strategy, let me return to the most rudimentary argument for direct election—that by strengthening the constituency link, senators would become more amenable to reforms putatively supported by large portions of the public. In other words, it would render Senate votes more like House votes. If the data show not just that Senate reform votes strengthened after 1913, but that they became more closely aligned with House patterns, it will suggest that the Amendment indeed exerted the expected effect. At the same time, if the data indicate no increase, or even a decrease, in Senate support in the wake of the shift, the House record will provide a crucial check. For if the House grew less accommodating of reform after 1913, this will imply that both chambers were encountering more difficult, less publicly popular, bills, and undermine the implication that direct election simply failed to work as anticipated. The comparison will also clarify the extent to which the Senate was anti-reform, or at least relatively so, in the pre-Amendment years.

This aspect of the investigation will be limited in scope. The Senate voted on a number of bills that never reached the House floor, and vice versa, thus making a blunt comparison of all House to all Senate reform roll-calls incongruent and unreliable. Therefore, I sought out House matches for the set of Senate votes—where the House considered substantially the same bill

in the same session of Congress. There were 38 of these pairs, thus comprising 76 roll-calls.

To review, the investigation will consist of the following analyses, all of which utilize aggregate roll-calls as the unit of analysis. Utilizing the basic, 61-case set of Senate votes, I will first present a difference in means test of aggregate, roll-call support for reform in the pre- and post- Seventeenth Amendment periods. I will then conduct two multivariate regression analyses to capture the potential impact of the two conceptualizations of direct election. The first equation will include the pre/post Amendment variable, while the second will substitute percentage of states with a direct-election mechanism. Both equations will include percentage of Democrats/insurgent Republicans in the chamber as a control. Finally, using the data set of 38 matched House/Senate pairs, I will present a difference in means test of each chambers' pro-reform roll-call record in the pre- and post-Amendment periods.

Findings

Let me begin with a simple but illustrative comparison of the mean level of Senate roll-call votes. As Table 1 reflects, the Senate was conducive to reform *throughout* this era. Although support subsequent to passage of the Amendment actually declined, it did so at a statistically insignificant rate and remained well above majority levels. It is important to keep this initial finding in mind, as it echoes throughout the subsequent analyses of the data.

Table 2 reports the results of the first multiple regression analysis, in which the effect of the Amendment itself, as well as the control for party composition, is estimated on overall reform support. This reiterates the absence of evidence for the Amendment fostering the supposed transformation, with aggregate roll-call support for reform significantly *less* likely after 1913. Again, this trend must be considered in light of the context, with the decline largely a function of the comparison to the very high pre-1913 score. The size of the Democratic/insurgent Republican block was in the expected direction, with a higher percentage linked to greater reform support, but the variable falls short of statistical significance.

TABLE 1
Mean Percentage of Senators in Support of Reform Bills

Pre-Amendment (58th–62nd)	68.7 (N = 29)
Post-Amendment (63rd–66th)	61.1 (N = 32)

t = - 1.50; sig. = 0.14, two tailed.

TABLE 2
Seventeenth Amendment and Roll-Call Support for Reform ($N = 61$)

	Unstandardized OLS Coefficient	Standard Error	Two-Tailed Significance
Amendment	- 16.564	7.805	0.038
Party	0.600	0.399	0.138
Constant	40.455	19.171	0.039
Model Sig.	0.112		
R^2	0.072		

REFORM = $\beta_0 + \beta_1$ (AMENDMENT) + β_2 (PARTY).

REFORM = percent of voting members supporting the reform position.

AMENDMENT = 0 if vote occurred before passage of the Seventeenth Amendment; 1 if after.

PARTY = percent Democrat/insurgent Republican in chamber.

Moving to the alternate conception of direct election, Table 3 indicates that this variable similarly fails to demonstrate a positive impact on outcomes. As the percentage of senators from states with a pre-Amendment mechanism grew larger, reform votes grew only less likely. In this equation, percentage of Democrats/insurgent Republicans achieves statistical significance as a determinant of aggregate roll-call support.

Finally, Table 4 reports the comparison between the Senate/House matched pairs. Recall that this is a means of recasting the question somewhat, from whether pre- and post-1913 Senate roll-calls differed, to whether post-1913 Senate votes grew more analogous to those of the House. It will also shed light on the question of whether the post-1913 Senate roll-calls may have been inherently more difficult to support than those of the earlier

TABLE 3
Direct Election by State and Roll-Call Support for Reform ($N = 61$)

	Unstandardized OLS Coefficient	Standard Error	Two-Tailed Significance
Direct	- 0.562	0.180	0.002
Party	1.277	0.493	0.012
Constant	38.385	16.640	0.024
Model Sig.	0.011		
R^2	0.14		

REFORM = $\beta_0 + \beta_1$ (DIRECT) + β_2 (PARTY).

REFORM = percent of voting members supporting the reform position.

DIRECT = percent of states with direct election mechanism.

PARTY = percent Democrat/insurgent Republican in chamber.

TABLE 4
Mean Percentage of House and Senate Support Coalitions for Reform Bills

	House	Senate
Pre-Amendment <i>t</i> = - 0.5; sig. = 0.62, two tailed	75.4 (N = 16)	71.9 (N = 16)
Post-Amendment <i>t</i> = - 1.77; sig. = 0.08, two tailed	74.4 (N = 22)	65.0 (N = 22)

years. This has become of particular importance now that the data suggest that direct election (however operationalized) did not increase reform votes. Although this lack of influence is most likely attributable to the high levels of support early on, it is possible that the Senate’s potential to become even *more* reformist was muted by the appearance of especially radical bills.

As for the first matter, Table 4 shows that Senate votes did not become more similar to the House after 1913. Crucially, however, it is not that such a convergence never occurred, but that it was in effect prior to 1913. Support scores in each chamber/time are strikingly (and statistically) similar, and quite high, indicating that the Senate did not require the Seventeenth Amendment to bring it in line with the House and, by implication, public sentiment, at least in regard to reform bills of the Progressive era. Furthermore, as House support remained steady throughout the period, there is little indication of any substantive change in bills that may have mitigated the impact of the electoral shift in the Senate.

Conclusions

Finally clarifying a historical ambiguity, this analysis indicates that the Seventeenth Amendment was not the crucial step toward passage of Progressive era reforms it is often assumed to be. Furthermore, its predecessor, the incremental state-by-state incorporation of direct-election mechanisms, also did not spur aggregate reform support. Yet, the evidence points not toward a sclerotic, conservative Senate that even a constitutional revision failed to jump start into responsiveness, but rather to a chamber already strongly supporting reform, at least in regard to the roll-calls on its docket. Underscoring this characterization is the degree to which Senate votes consistently mirrored those in the House. Whether the House comparison suggests a capitulation to public demand remains unsettled, but the fact that House and Senate outcomes were similar both before and after 1913 implies that senators did not require the intercession of direct election to begin voting in line with their reputedly more constituent-oriented colleagues in the House.

These results do not assail the general idea that structure and structural change are meaningful. My purpose here was not to question the theoretical influence of election method, but to conduct a long overdue investigation of a matter of historical importance. Rather than implying that direct election failed to matter, my findings simply suggest that in this instance the shift was not a necessary precursor to reform.

To be sure, these conclusions cannot be construed beyond the narrow historical circumstances or limited perspective of this investigation. Clearly, the analysis established that the early 20th-century Senate was a more reformist body than traditionally supposed, well before this electoral innovation built up steam. Still, the incorporation of direct voter involvement in Senate elections was an integral piece of the Progressive agenda, and expectations that it would prevail could have influenced roll-call outcomes in advance of state or federal policy change.

Furthermore, the negative impact of direct election on reform votes in this study must be taken in context as well. The data simply suggest a rising support level for overall reform that outpaced the appearance of state direct-election laws or the Amendment, relegating the electoral shift to simply one more facet of the Progressive agenda, as opposed to either its breakthrough vanguard *or* an agent of its demise. Finally, I emphasize that my interest in settling a historical matter of policy outcomes focused this investigation on the aggregate level. It does not speak to the behavior of individual senators following adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment, or a direct election law in their state, particularly as reelection loomed.

In conclusion, these findings allow for a refinement of Crook and Hibbing's (1997:853) assertion that "it is abundantly clear that changes did occur as a result of direct election . . . [i]nstitutions like the Senate may not be total creatures of their 'mode of election,' but they are at least partially shaped by it." Although that characterization accurately depicts compositional change and other consequences, no support was found here for a direct, causal relationship between the Seventeenth Amendment, or the state movement toward direct election, and roll-call vote support for Progressive reforms.

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